Countryman v. Sherman

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedAugust 2, 2021
Docket2:19-cv-01767
StatusUnknown

This text of Countryman v. Sherman (Countryman v. Sherman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Countryman v. Sherman, (W.D. Wash. 2021).

Opinion

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 JUSTIN COUNTRYMAN, 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C19-01767-JCC-SKV 10 v. ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO FILE OVERLENGTH BRIEFS, 11 DAVID SHERMAN, et al., MOTIONS TO COMPEL, MOTION TO AMEND, DIRECTING STATUS 12 Defendant. REPORT, AND STRIKING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 13

14 This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner civil rights action. Currently pending before the 15 Court are Plaintiff’s motions for leave to file overlength briefs, Dkts. 32, 40, Plaintiff’s motions 16 to compel, Dkts. 33, 41, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 35, and Plaintiff’s 17 motion for leave to amend his complaint, Dkt. 50. Having considered the parties’ submissions, 18 the balance of the record, and the governing law, the Court finds and ORDERS: 19 A. Plaintiff’s Motions to File Overlength Brief 20 Plaintiff moves for leave to file overlength briefs in support of his motions to compel. 21 Dkts. 32, 40. Defendants have not opposed Plaintiff’s motions. Plaintiff’s motions are 22 GRANTED and the Court will consider the entirety of Plaintiff’s briefing. 23 // ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO FILE OVERLENGTH BRIEFS, MOTIONS TO COMPEL, 1 B. Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel 2 Plaintiff has filed two motions to compel which appear to be identical except that the 3 second motion appears to contain additional attachments. Dkts. 33, 41. Plaintiff moves to 4 compel with respect to several discovery requests. Defendants oppose the motions arguing that

5 they have properly responded or objected to some of the discovery requests and that, with respect 6 to the remaining requests, the parties have not yet met and conferred. Dkts. 43, 46. 7 A party may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged information that is relevant to 8 any claim or defense in their case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). When determining whether 9 evidence is discoverable, the Court must also consider “whether the burden or expense of the 10 proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefits.” Id. Once the party seeking discovery has 11 established the request meets this relevancy requirement, “the party opposing discovery has the 12 burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, 13 explaining or supporting its objections.” Bryant v. Ochoa, 2009 WL 1390794, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 14 May 14, 2009). When a party believes the responses to their discovery requests are incomplete,

15 or contain unfounded objections, they may move the court for an order compelling disclosure. 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. The movant must show they conferred, or made a good faith effort to confer, 17 with the party opposing disclosure before seeking court intervention. Id. Moreover, a motion to 18 compel may be premature where the record reflects that the parties have not reached an impasse 19 regarding discovery disputes. See Advanced Hair Restoration, LLC v. Hair Restoration Centers, 20 LLC, 2018 WL 828213, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2018) (denying motion to compel where 21 “[t]here is no evidence that the parties reached an impasse in their discussions” and defendant 22 was “attempting in good faith to resolve the discovery dispute outside of Court by producing the 23 requested records”); Beasley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 1268709, at *3 (W.D.

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO FILE OVERLENGTH BRIEFS, MOTIONS TO COMPEL, 1 Wash. Mar. 25, 2014) (denying motion to compel when there is no suggestion that the parties 2 reached impasse before the plaintiff filed his motion); Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. Pebble 3 Creek Plaza, LLC, 2013 WL 12176465, at *1 (D. Nev. July 26, 2013) (judicial intervention is 4 appropriate only when “informal negotiations have reached an impasse on the substantive issue

5 in dispute”). 6 Plaintiff challenges Defendant DOC’s response to Production Request No. 3 which 7 requested that Defendant, 8 Produce all documents, electronically stores [sic] information and tangible things showing all (court actions) legal or not against the Department of Corrections and or its 9 named facilities, directly in regards to the 2017-18 and 2018-19 Passover memo’s/policies/procedures preventing Incarcerated Individuals participation, in their 10 entirety, showing each individual case and its resolutions.

Dkt. 33-1, at 19-20. Defendant identified several objections to the request and also provided the 11 following response: 12 Without waiving the above objections, there are no cases that fit the time period 13 identified (2017-18 Passover sign up memo or 2018-19 Passover signup memo) and the issue identified (cases which challenged the memos preventing incarcerated individuals 14 participation, in their entirety). Therefore there are no responsive records to identify.

15 Id. Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ response solely on the grounds that he “believes this is 16 incorrect” but provides nothing to support this assertion. Dkt. 33, at 9. Plaintiff’s unsupported 17 assertion that he believes Defendants are incorrect fails to demonstrate Defendants’ response is 18 incomplete or otherwise deficient. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel is denied with 19 respect to Production Request No. 3 directed to Defendant DOC. 20 Plaintiff also challenges Defendant DOC’s response to Interrogatory No. 9 which 21 requested that Defendant DOC, 22 [E]xplain in full and complete detail, when the development of the Passover memo/policy in question took place in order to manage the limited resources issues, what if any, were 23 ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO FILE OVERLENGTH BRIEFS, MOTIONS TO COMPEL, 1 other solutions or resolutions, proposed, that were less restrictive measures that was discussed and turned down, prior to going with the 2018-19 Passover memo/policy used. 2 Dkt. 33-1, at 21. Defendant objected to the request on the following grounds: 3 This interrogatory is vague and ambiguous, as “development,” “solutions,” “resolutions,” 4 “less restrictive measures,” and “discussed” could have many meanings. This interrogatory in general is also confusing as worded and without a clear timeframe. The interrogatory is further argumentative in its style and appears to be an attempt to trap 5 Defendant into admitting liability or other similar legal conclusions, which is improper. Furthermore, this interrogatory is substantively duplicative of other interrogatories 6 already propounded to individual Defendants with more direct, personal knowledge, and so propounding this interrogatory to Defendant as an agency is unduly burdensome and 7 redundant.

8 Dkt. 33-1, at 21. Defendant also provided the following response: 9 Without waiving the above objections, see Answer to Interrogatory No. 8 to Defendant Belinda Stewart. As that answer describes in more detail, the three criteria in the 2018 10 Passover Memo were chosen because the Department wanted to add a third option in addition to the 2017 Passover criteria, but also because the earlier option of having no criteria for Passover sign up was not workable for the Department at the time. 11

Id. 12 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant’s response is incomplete with respect to 13 the portion of the Interrogatory asking “what if any, were other solutions or resolutions, 14 proposed, that were less restrictive measures that was discussed and turned down, prior to going 15 with the 2018-19 Passover memo/policy used.” The Court further does not find the Interrogatory 16 to be vague or ambiguous, unclear as to time frame, or otherwise improper as Defendant asserts 17 in their objections.

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Bluebook (online)
Countryman v. Sherman, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/countryman-v-sherman-wawd-2021.