Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz

306 F. Supp. 3d 165
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedMarch 29, 2018
DocketCivil Action No. 09–02030 (CKK)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 306 F. Supp. 3d 165 (Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 306 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

Opinion

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge

Pending before this Court are CSP Defendants' [248] Motion-In-Limine ("CSP Mot."), which is broken down into four subparts addressing witnesses, exhibits, deposition transcripts and damages; Plaintiffs' [251] Responses to CSP Defendants' Motion In Limine ("Pls' Responses"); and CSP Defendants' [254] Reply in support of Motion-In-Limine ("CSP Reply"). Also pending before this Court are Plaintiffs' [249] Motions in Limine ("Pls.' Mot."), consisting of seven motions in limine ; CSP Defendants' [250] Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine ("CSP Opp'n"); and Gaubatz Defendants' [253] Response to Plaintiff's MILs ("Gaubatz Resp."). Plaintiffs did not file a Reply in support of their Motions in Limine. The Court will consider the CSP Defendants' Motion in Limine together with the Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine for the sake of judicial efficiency and because of the overlap of issues therein.1 The Court will address the Plaintiffs' Motions first, discussing each of the seven *171motions contained therein, in the order presented to the Court, before addressing the four subparts of the CSP Defendants' Motion in the same manner.

As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that the two motions addressed in the opinion and the oppositions thereto are presented in a summary manner, often without sufficient detail or responsive argument to enable this Court to make a determination regarding the requested exclusion (or admission) of evidence. Furthermore, in many instances the parties fail to specify how their requests asking for the exclusion (or admission) of certain evidence relate to the elements of the claims and defenses in this case, instead focusing on extraneous facts or engaging in convoluted argument. Accordingly, under these circumstances, the Court has summarized the arguments presented by each side and then indicated that such request or objection is denied without prejudice pending supplemental briefing by the parties. The scope of this additional briefing will be set forth in more detail in this opinion.

Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 1

Plaintiffs request that the Court preclude Defendants from referring to CAIR, CAIR-F and/or CAIR-AN as a criminal organization and/or a Muslim Brotherhood front group, which includes precluding: (1) evidence of CAIR as an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF [Holy Land Foundation] trial; (2) evidence of the "Morris Days fraud;" (3) evidence of financial contributions and/or donations CAIR has made to any person or organization; and (4) solicitation of testimony from CAIR employees, former or present about its status as a civil rights organization for the purpose of impeaching that testimony with evidence of terrorism. Plaintiffs contend that the issue of whether any of the CAIR organizations were engaged in "criminal conduct" at the time of the alleged violations does not relieve Defendants of liability for their own misconduct for violations of the D.C. Wiretap Act, the Federal Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act and trespass. Plaintiffs assert that any "[a]llegations of criminal conduct and/or ties to terrorism, therefore, are wholly and entirely irrelevant to this case and should be excluded at trial." Pls.' Mot. at 2.2 Plaintiff argue further that any alleged probative value of such evidence is far outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403.

The CSP Defendants submit that the CAIR Muslim Brotherhood connection evidence is relevant and directly probative of the Defendants' defense to the Federal Wiretap Act because the Act requires the CSP Defendants to know or have reason to know that Chris Gaubatz's actions violated the Act. See CSP's Opp'n at 5. The CSP Defendants allege that Defendant Brim, who received recordings from Chris Gaubatz, never even viewed or listened to the recordings, and thus she had "no knowledge or reason to believe that Chris Gaubatz was not following the legal advice provided by [David Yerushalmi] and obtaining the recordings legally." See id. Defendants explain that, in light of the fact that Plaintiffs questioned Defendant Brim's knowledge, this Court determined previously that the issue of knowledge (or imputed knowledge) is a factual dispute. Defendants assert that in order to resolve such factual dispute, the jury needs to understand the purpose of the Muslim Brotherhood/CAIR documentary to bolster its argument that the audio-video clips *172were only intended as background and were not that important. See CSP Opp'n at 6. Accordingly, the CSP Defendants argue that the jury has to be made aware of the Muslim Brotherhood/CAIR connection through testimony and exhibits in this case.3 The Court notes that this multi-faceted argument by the CSP Defendants fails to cogently explain how the allegations that CAIR is somehow linked to the Muslim Brotherhood are relevant to any of claims and defenses in this case, or the relevance of knowing the background of the documentary, and/or how the probative value of such allegations outweighs any obvious prejudice.

The Gaubatz Defendants premise their argument in support of referring to CAIR as a terrorist group upon the Court's statement that, because CAIR-F has argued that Chris Gaubatz had the intent of committing a breach of fiduciary duty, there are two unanswered questions: (1) whether Chris Gaubatz had a fiduciary duty to CAIR-F, and (2) whether the breach of this fiduciary duty was either a primary motivation or a determinative motivating factor for the interception. See CAIR Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz , 31 F.Supp.3d 237, 259 (D.D.C. 2014). The Gaubatz Defendants allege generally that "the relationship between a genuine civil rights organization and a person purporting to share its ideals is more likely to establish a fiduciary relationship than if CAIR is a criminal organization which used its intern program as part of its fake civil rights persona." See Gaubatz Resp. at 4-5. The Defendants' "argument" in support of this general statement consists of several disjointed propositions, first about general contract law, followed by statements about Hamas and cites from an opinion relating to the HLF criminal trial in Texas. The Gaubatz Defendants fail to coherently link their argument that the Defendants should be able to refer to CAIR as a terrorist organization to any of the claims or defenses in this case.

The Gaubatz Defendants allege further that "those engaged in criminal conduct in a quasi-public location have less of an expectation of privacy than they would have if their conduct were lawful" and they note, without further explanation, that Chris Gaubatz's assessment of CAIR was colored by CAIR's status as an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF trial. See Gaubatz Resp. at 9. The Gaubatz Defendants then proceed to cite extensively from the HLF Texas criminal case, and they launch into a historical review of the formation of CAIR, none of which has any bearing on the claims and defenses at issue in this case.

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Bluebook (online)
306 F. Supp. 3d 165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/council-on-am-islamic-relations-action-network-inc-v-gaubatz-cadc-2018.