Coulson v. Whiting

14 Abb. N. Cas. 60
CourtNew York Court of Common Pleas
DecidedMarch 15, 1884
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 14 Abb. N. Cas. 60 (Coulson v. Whiting) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Common Pleas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coulson v. Whiting, 14 Abb. N. Cas. 60 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1884).

Opinions

Van Hoesen, J.

We were urged by the counsel for the appellant to treat this appeal with great indulgence because the learned justice before whom the action was tried, did not call attention to the insufficiency of the answer before he directed a verdict for the plaintiff. An offer to prove was entertained by the justice, and therefore, the counsel contends that if a good defense could have been established, we are at liberty to assume that it would have been established, and upon that assumption to reverse the judgment, though the answer sets up no bar to the plaintiff’s right to a recovery.

I do not so understand the duty of an appellate court in reviewing a judgment. There are few judges of experience that will receive an offer of proof; but when one is entertained, we are to pass upon it as we pass upon any other proceeding taken at a trial, and to construe it according to its language, and by the [62]*62light of the circumstances under which it was made. It is not to be treated with any special favor,, nor to be expanded so as to embrace matters that are not within the issues raised by the pleadings.

Let us see what the offer was. It was “to prove the substance of the answer in regard to the. question of sewage, and the substance and particulars and matters contained in the answer.” What was the answer that the defendant said he could prove ? He offered to prove his answer, and not a defense not pleaded; and, therefore, the first question that arises is, did the answer set up a good defense ?

It alleges that ‘ ‘ the sewerage or drainage is defective, and that offensive and noxious vapors and odors arise through the pipes, which have endangered the life of the defendant, and rendered the house unfit for habitation ; and that the said defects in the sewerage were wrongfully and fraudulently concealed by the defendant from the plaintiff, at the time of making the lease.”

I will not say that these allegations are made in bad faith, but'they are suspicious ; first, because the plaintiff-. resides in England, and the lease was executed in New York on her behalf by an attorney, and secondly, because the averment is not that the drainage was defective at the time of the making the lease, but only that it was- defective at the time the answer was verified. The, present tense is used when the defects of of the sewerage are mentioned, though the perfect tense is used in speaking of the effects of the alleged vapors and odors. It would not be unfair to infer- that there was some reason for omitting to allege what the condition of the house was at the time of the making of the lease (Bloomer v. Merrill, 1 Daly, 485). But it may be said that the pleader intended to say that the defects complained of existed prior to the execution of the lease, because it is said that the plaintiff fraudulently concealed them, I shall treat the answer, ^ [63]*63therefore, as if it alleged that the defects existed at the time the lease was made.

It will be observed that the defendant uses the words “fraudulently concealed,” - but fails to state the facts that made the fraud. What, in the defendant’s judgment amounts to a fraudulent concealment ? What did the plaintiff know respecting the condition of the plumbing ? What did she do to conceal the alleged defects \ What was her intent in doing what she did ? How was the defendant misled by her machinations \ These facts were essential to the establishment of a defense, and yet they were not pleaded, and, therefore, could not be proved (McMurray v. Gifford, 5 How. Pr. 14 ; Lefler v. Field, 52 N. Y. 621; Dubois Hermance, 56 Id. 673).

There is such a thing as a neglect to perform the duty of disclosure where such a duty exists ; and that is a case of passive concealment. But there are few instances in which it is the duty of the landlord or of a vendor to disclose to the intending tenant or the intending purchaser any defect in the subject of the negotiation. Where a tenement has recently been occupied by a person that had an infectious disease, it has been held that the landlord was answerable in damages if he re-let the premises to a stranger without communicating to him the facts within his knowledge respecting the sickness of the former occupant. This is an exception to the rule, and is not intended to relax the principle that a landlord is not bound to disclose any defects in the structure or condition of the premises that make them- unfit for habitation.' A defect in the plumbing is like a defect in the flues or in the heating apparatus. These imperfections cannot be discovered, perhaps, by any examination that the intending tenant can be expected to make, but yet it has never been held that the landlord is bound, under the penalty of fraud, to disclose such defects, even though he be( [64]*64aware of them. The tenant is as much bound to make ordinary repairs to the plumbing as he is to make any other ordinary repairs, in a house that he imprudently leases whilst it is out of order. ' '

There is another kind of concealment called “active concealment,” and this is where one party does something to prevent the other from learning a material fact ;• as, by using contrivances to hide defects ; of where he contributes to produce, by some overt act," an erroneous belief by the other party of an essential fact; or where he tells a part only of the truth, and withholds the remainder, which, if told, would entirely change the effect of what he has disclosed ; these are acts in the nature of “aggressive deceit,” but they fall under the head of active concealment. Of which kind of concealment did the answer mean to accuse the plaintiff? No man can say. It maybe that the pleader had no very clear idea in his mind, and that he shared the belief—only too common—that mephitic vapors are so injurious to the human constitution that rent" need not be paid where a tenant can show that he liasdetected the smell of sewer gas in the demised premises. This is an error. It is a fact known to all who dwell in New York that where a connection is made with a sewer it is certain that more or less of the exhalation from the sewer will ascend into the house. The great effort of the plumbers has been to devise some plan by which to prevent the ascent of these vapors, but it may well be doubted if any one of them ever succeeded or ever will succeéd. If they should" prove successful, only a part of the difficulty will be overcome,-for where liquid polluted with the filth of the human body is sent down the pipes to the sewer, apart will inevitably adhere to the interior surface of the conduits, and naturally produce offensive smells and gases. It is of this as "well as of vapors from the sewers Lthat people complain ;• and in all probability there is-[65]*65not a house in the city of New York that is not occasionally visited by unpleasant odors from the pipes leading to the sewers. Some houses are much worse than others ; but the fact is incontestable that a house that is entirely free from what is called sewer gas must be one that has no pipes in it for the discharge of the refuse of the household. People hire houses with a knowledge of all this, and then seek to avail themselves of the presence of sewer gas as a defense to the payment of rent. An unpleasant odor at times is a necessary evil in a house with sewer connections.

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Bluebook (online)
14 Abb. N. Cas. 60, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coulson-v-whiting-nyctcompl-1884.