Home/Court of Appeals of Texas/Coulson v. Clark

Coulson v. Clark

319 S.W.2d 183, 1958 Tex. App. LEXIS 1643
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 26, 1958
Docket10605
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 319 S.W.2d 183 (Coulson v. Clark) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coulson v. Clark, 319 S.W.2d 183, 1958 Tex. App. LEXIS 1643 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958).

Opinion

ARCHER, Chief Justice.

This is a will contest, originating in the County Court of Tom Green County, Texas and duly carried to the 119th District Court of said County, where the trial was before a jury. Said District Court rendered judgment on the verdict, probating as the will of Charles Louis- Coulson, deceased, the instrument offered by Andrew Perry Clark, Proponent in both courts below, and Appellee herein.

*185 This appeal is based on thirty four points with a number of subpoints, but may be summarized to the effect that the trial court erred in overruling motion for a new trial because the verdict of the jury resulted from bias and prejudice; that jurors Buster, Shoemaker, Reynolds and Griffin were disqualified to serve as jurors for the reason that at the time each of said named jurors had a bias in favor of appellee and a prejudice against appellants; that the finding of the court that at the time of the voir dire examination of the panel said jurors did not recall having ever met C. L. Coulson, and the finding that juror Buster, before the rendition of the verdict, did not state that he had known Coulson and that Coulson was hardheaded and knew what he was doing; that the finding that juror Buster at the time he was selected as a juror had no bias in favor of proponent and no prejudice against the contestants is contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence; that the finding of the court that juror Shoemaker did not know Coulson was the same person he had known and had business dealings with, and that Shoemaker did not have an opinion as to whether Coulson was a person of strong will, of sound mind, or with reference to Coulson’s physical and mental condition at the time of making the will is contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence; that the court’s finding that when Shoemaker was selected on the jury he had no acquaintance with C. L. Coulson so as to influence him as a juror, and the finding that Shoemaker did not make a statement to the effect that Coulson was firm and knew what he was doing and appeared alert for a man of his age and not like the way he was described in the deposition and hospital record and that Shoemaker at the time he was selected as. a juror had no bias in favor of proponent or prejudice against contestants is contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence; that the court’s finding that at the time juror Reynolds was accepted on the jury she had no fixed idea and belief as to the effect of hardening of the arteries on the mind of an aged person; that Reynolds did not state in the course of the deliberations of the jury that she knew from experience that hardening of the arteries does not affect the mind like the doctors said and that she had no bias in favor of proponent and no prejudice against contestants is contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

That the finding that juror Griffin was accepted on the jury he had no fixed idea and belief as to the effect of hardening of the arteries on the mind of an aged person and that he had no fixed idea and belief as to the mental condition of C. L. Coulson on February 15, 1950, and that Griffin had no knowledge of having seen Coulson driving a car and no opinion as to whether Coulson operated his car in a normal way, and that Griffin had no bias in favor of proponent and no prejudice against contestants is contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

Under Assignment No. 22 appellants have four subpoints and complain of the overruling of the Motion for a New Trial showing material misconduct of the jury because of the statements made by jurors Buster, Shoemaker, Reynolds and Griffin as hereinabove referred to.

In Assignments Nos. 23 and 24 complaint is made of the court’s finding that:

“No juror in this cause made any statement to the jury during its deliberations and before it arrived at a verdict of any matter based upon the personal observations and knowledge of any juror outside the evidence herein * * * ”

and that:

“All jurors selected and impaneled herein were fair and impartial * *

In Assignment No. 25 complaint is made of the court’s Conclusion of Law No. 1 that:

*186 “The jury in this case was qualified and impartial * * * ”

because such is contrary to law and the fac'ts.

In Assignment No. 27 complaint is made as to the court’s Conclusion of Law No. 3, reading:

“No juror selected herein made an erroneous or incorrect answer on voir dire examination on any material matter inquired about, * * * ”

is contrary to law.

In Assignments Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 complaint is made concerning the exclusion from evidence of Direct Interrogatory No. 54 and its subdivisions, and the answers of the witness Dr. H. E. Hickman, in excluding the bank statements of appellee and the deposit slips of appellee, in excluding proof as to the value of all property and estate in the name of appellee Andrew Perry Clark on February 15, 1950 and subsequent thereto, and in excluding a letter dated December 10, 1957 from attorneys for appellee to a Mr. Royal Hart.

Under Assignment No. 34 complaint is made because of the refusal of the request of an attorney for appellants to have the court reporter read the evidence of witness McDonald, a dispute having arisen between the attorney and an attorney for appellee as to the testimony of such witness.

Appellee has seven counter points and are to the effect that the court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial on the grounds of the alleged bias and prejudice of jurors Buster, Shoemaker, Reynolds and Griffin and that the court’s findings were amply supported by the record; that the court did not err in refusing a new trial because of alleged jury misconduct, and the findings relative thereto were amply supported by the record; that the court correctly excluded interrogatory No. 54 and the answer thereto in the deposition of Dr. Hickman and did not err in excluding a number of exhibits of contestants; that if the court actually excluded the evidence as to the value of any property of Clark, such exclusion was not error; that the letter from appellee’s attorneys to Mr. Hart, the temporary administrator, was properly excluded and that the court did not refuse the request of an attorney for contestants during his argument to the jury to have the reporter read the evidence of McDonald but granted such request.

There were a number of witnesses called by the proponent who detailed knowledge and association and observance of the deceased and who testified that the instrument dated February 15, 1950 was written wholly in the handwriting of the deceased Charles Louis Coulson, and that on such date the deceased possessed testamentary capacity; that the making and execution of said instrument was not procured by undue influence on the part of Andrew Perry Clark, and that the will had not been revoked.

There were an even larger number of witnesses called by the contestants who testified that Mr. Coulson was not normal and was of unsound mind, was not crazy, just not himself — not a normal human. These witnesses detailed association and observation of the deceased.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
319 S.W.2d 183, 1958 Tex. App. LEXIS 1643, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coulson-v-clark-texapp-1958.