Couch v. City of Villa Rica

203 F. Supp. 897, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4920
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedMarch 29, 1962
DocketCiv. A. Nos. 466, 486
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 203 F. Supp. 897 (Couch v. City of Villa Rica) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Couch v. City of Villa Rica, 203 F. Supp. 897, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4920 (N.D. Ga. 1962).

Opinion

MORGAN, District Judge.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Mrs. Marie Couch and Mrs. Eva Broom, each as petitioners, filed a proceeding in nature of mandamus under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 69(a), 81(b), 28 U.S.C.A., against the City of Villa Rica, Georgia, a municipal corporation, and named persons as the mayor and council of the city. Thereafter, petitioners amended, adding certain named tax assessors for the municipality as defendants. It was alleged that on June 3,1959, the petitioner Mrs. Marie Couch obtained a judgment in this Court in the principal sum of $27,500.00 plus costs of court, and that petitioner Mrs. Eva Broom recovered judgment in the amount of $37,-440.00 plus costs of court against the City of Villa Rica, which judgments were affirmed by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 22, 1960. City of Villa Rica et al. v. Couch et al., 281 F.2d 284. Executions on these judgments issued from the United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia. Although efforts have been made to collect these judgments, nothing has been paid thereon; and even though plaintiffs have demanded payment, these demands for payment have been refused. Each of the petitioners alleges that the defendants, as mayor and councilmen of the City of Villa Rica, have the legal responsibility, under the charter of the city, [899]*899for the operation and management of the affairs of the city, including the duties of the payment of lawful debts of the city; that the defendants refuse to perform their official duties, and have refused to levy the necessary taxes to raise the funds to pay off these lawful debts of the defendant city. The petitioners further allege that the city has money available in its bank account and treasury to pay these judgments; and, that the defendants, in their official capacity, have lawful authority to borrow the money to pay these judgments.

Petitioners further contend that the defendant city owns a gas distribution system and water and sewer system, and collects large sums of money from those to whom it provides gas, water, and sewerage service; that the defendant officers have a legal duty to set such rates for these utilities as to produce sufficient funds to pay these judgments, but that the defendants refuse to set the rates for these utilities so as to produce funds to pay off the judgments.

Petitioners allege that, unless the defendants are required by judgment and decree of this Court to pay the claims from the city treasury, to levy and collect taxes, or to assess and charge rates for its utilities sufficient to provide said funds for the payment of the judgments, the plaintiffs will be without remedy and a denial of legal justice will thereupon ensue.

In answer to the petitioners, defendants contend that, by the terms of the charter of the City of Villa Rica, as granted by the General Assembly of the State of Georgia in 1941, that as Mayor and Councilmen, the defendants are limited in their levy of ad valorem taxes in the amount of $1.25 on the $100.00 valuation; that insofar as they have been able to do so, officers of the defendant city have conducted the affairs of the city in a businesslike and efficient manner. The defendants deny that there are sufficient funds in the bank account and depositories to pay off these obligations, and further allege that they are limited in the amount that the city can charge for public utilities by reason of certain ordinances of the City of Villa Rica set at the time of the validation of revenue certificates by the Carroll County Superior Court, which ordinances the officers of said city claim limit the charges for the services of such public utilities to fair and reasonable rates. Defendants further allege that, after levying the maximum tax provided by law and charging reasonable rates for services rendered by the facilities, the said defendant city has no money on hand with which to pay the said judgments.

A rule nisi was issued directed to the defendants to show cause why the defendants should not be ordered to satisfy the judgment out of depositories, or, in the alternative, to levy and collect taxes, to borrow funds, or to charge rates for utilities furnished so as to produce sufficient funds with which to pay these judgments. A hearing on the show cause order was held on September 29, 1961, and completed on October 31, 1961. Thereafter, counsel were granted until January 30, 1962, to submit final briefs in the matter. Petitioners are seeking to have this Court order that the defendant do any one of the following alternatives, or a combination thereof, in order to satisfy the judgments:

1. That the defendants satisfy the judgments out of any moneys on hand in any depositories of the City of Villa Rica;

2. That the defendants levy and collect taxes for the payment of the judgments ;

3. That the defendants borrow funds with which to pay the judgments;

4. That the defendants set rates and charges for gas, water and sewerage services so as to produce from these services sufficient funds to satisfy the judgments.

DISCUSSION

“The old writ of mandamus is abolished by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 81(b). Proceedings in the nature of mandamus for the collection of judgments are clearly ‘proceedings supplementary [900]*900to and in aid of a judgment’, within the meaning of the quoted provision of Rule 69(a), as to which the practice and procedure of the state is required to be followed.” DeFoe v. Town of Rutherfordton, 4 Cir., 122 F.2d 342.

Under Georgia law, the holder of a judgment against a municipality is entitled to a writ in the nature of mandamus as a matter of right, not of grace, to enforce payment of judgment. Bradford v. Bolton, 215 Ga. 188, 109 S.E.2d 751.

From the evidence introduced at the hearing, it does not appear that the defendants have on hand any moneys in the general funds of the defendant city with which to satisfy the judgments. From the latest audit introduced into evidence, the total receipts of the defendant city for the year 1960 total $76,-093.50, exclusive of the separate utility funds. The disbursements total $78,-132.64, reflecting an excess of disbursements over receipts of $2,039.14. These receipts and disbursements were from the general funds of the city, and exclusive of the public utility functions carried on by the defendant city which are kept separate. Cash on hand and in depositories was less than $7,000.00, and it does not appear from the evidence that this amount is even sufficient to carry on the necessary municipal functions.

As an alternative, petitioners pray that defendants borrow funds with which to pay the judgments of the petitioners. No evidence was introduced at the hearing by the petitioners that the defendant city was able to borrow any funds at the time of the hearing, but the evidence introduced by the defendants strongly indicates that, because of the pending judgments approximating $65,000.00, no lending institution would consider making a loan to defendant.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
203 F. Supp. 897, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4920, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/couch-v-city-of-villa-rica-gand-1962.