GREENE, Judge.
On June 2, 2004, after a non-jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Nathaniel Cottman, Jr. (“Petitioner”) was convicted of distribution of cocaine, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and possession of cocaine. He was sentenced as a repeat offender to ten years in prison, without the possibility of parole, for distribution of cocaine. The remaining convictions were merged for sentencing purposes. After filing a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, both [733] Petitioner and the State waived oral argument and submitted their respective cases on brief.
On August 18, 2005, in response to Petitioner’s request, the trial judge granted Petitioner a new trial, thereby vacating the underlying judgment of conviction and sentence. As we shall explain further in this opinion, the State was not entitled to file a notice of appeal from the order granting a new trial. On October 31, 2005, not having been informed by counsel of that intervening event, the Court of Special Appeals filed its written opinion affirming the Circuit Court’s initial judgment and sentence. On November 4, 2005, prior to the Court of Special Appeals’s issuance of the formal mandate,1 Petitioner requested that the appellate court withdraw its opinion and dismiss the appeal as moot, in light of the Circuit Court’s decision to grant him a new trial prior to the filing of the Court of Special Appeals’s written opinion. On December 15, 2005, the Court of Special Appeals denied both of Petitioner’s requests.
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari2 in this Court and the State filed a cross-petition.3 We granted both peti[734] tions. Cottman v. State, 391 Md. 577, 894 A.2d 545 (2006). The main issue now before this Court is whether the Court of Special Appeals erred when it failed to dismiss the appeal and withdraw the reported opinion, after being informed that the Circuit Court had granted Petitioner a new trial. The Circuit Court issued its order granting Petitioner a new trial while the appeal from the judgment and sentence was pending in the intermediate appellate court. The effect of granting a new trial was to vacate the original judgment and conviction in the trial court that constituted the basis of the appeal. Any issue with regard to the propriety or effect of the grant of a new trial, as to the subject matter on appeal, could not have been decided on appeal for two reasons: (1) the appeal was noted long before the grant of a new trial; and (2) as a practical matter, the issue with regard to the propriety of granting a new trial could not have been raised by the prior notice of appeal. Thus, in this context, the trial court’s grant of a new trial constituted an event that the appellate court should have taken into consideration in issuing a mandate. The trial court had fundamental jurisdiction to grant a new trial and, under the circumstances, the granting of a new trial rendered the appeal pending in the Court of Special Appeals moot. Although the Court of Special Appeals had discretion to allow its reported opinion on the moot issues to stand, it had no choice but to reflect in its mandate that the appeal was dismissed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 14, 2002, at approximately 5:45 a.m., undercover Detective, Earnest Moore, drove into the parking lot of the Kingsley Park Apartment Complex in Baltimore County. A woman, later identified as Ms. Benson, yelled “hey, come here,” and then walked with a man over to Detective Moore’s vehicle. Detective Moore later identified the man as Petition[735] er. According to Detective Moore, Ms. Benson asked him whether he was a police officer. After Detective Moore stated that he was not a police officer, Petitioner asked “are you sure you’re not police”? When Detective Moore answered in the negative, Petitioner walked two feet forward to the left fender of the vehicle and looked up and down the road, while Ms. Benson stayed next to Detective Moore. After some additional discussion, Ms. Benson pulled a small bag of cocaine from underneath her tongue in exchange for a marked twenty-dollar bill from Detective Moore. After the transaction, Detective Moore provided a surveillance team with a description of both subjects. The surveillance team stopped Petitioner and Ms. Benson. A short time later, Detective Moore returned to the area of the previous sale and identified both Petitioner and Ms. Benson, who were then formally arrested. The police did not find any drugs or money on Petitioner’s person during the search incident to his arrest.
On June 2, 2004, the morning that Petitioner’s trial was to begin in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Petitioner’s counsel appeared before the administrative judge’s designee to request a continuance. Petitioner’s counsel argued that he had just located a critical witness for the defense and therefore needed more time. The administrative judge’s designee denied the motion, noting that the trial had already been postponed four times. The case then proceeded to a trial on the merits.
Detective Moore testified at trial that Petitioner’s actions were consistent with those of a lookout in a typical drug deal and that Petitioner and Ms. Benson walked off together after Detective Moore drove away. Detective Moore noted, however, that he never saw Petitioner and Ms. Benson exchange drugs or money with each other.
The trial judge determined that Detective Moore’s testimony was “very credible,” and that Petitioner had aided and abetted the distribution of drugs. He therefore found Petitioner guilty of distribution of cocaine, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and possession of cocaine. Prior to sentencing, Peti[736] tioner argued that this incident was one of mistaken identity and that he was innocent. The judge offered Petitioner the opportunity to take a polygraph examination, at his own expense, with the understanding that the court would grant him a new trial if the polygraph showed that he was not involved with this incident.4 On June 3, 2004, the judge sentenced Petitioner to ten years in prison for distribution. [737] Shortly thereafter, Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.5
On July 25, 2005, while Petitioner’s appeal was still pending in the Court of Special Appeals and before that court filed its opinion, he filed in the Circuit Court a request for appropriate relief based on the results of the polygraph examination. The Circuit Court held a hearing on this request, and on August 18, 2005, issued an order granting Petitioner a new trial. Petitioner, however, did not notify promptly the intermediate appellate court of this event. On October 31, 2005, more than two months after the Circuit Court granted Petitioner a new trial, the Court of Special Appeals filed its reported opinion, Cottman v. State, 165 Md.App. 679, 886 A.2d 932 (2005), in which it expressed its view on the question of first impression: whether a defendant may be convicted of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) on an aiding and abetting theory of culpability. It affirmed the previous judgment of conviction and sentence of the Circuit Court. On November 4, 2005, Petitioner requested, in writing, that the appellate court vacate its opinion and dismiss the appeal, on the basis that the issues were moot, because the Circuit Court had granted Petitioner a new trial before the Court of Special Appeals filed its opinion. Petitioner subsequently filed a memorandum of law, arguing that the Circuit Court retained jurisdiction to award him a new trial while the appeal was pending and that the State had waived any claim to the contrary.
The Court of Special Appeals directed the State to respond to Petitioner’s memorandum. On November 17, 2005, the State did so and acknowledged that the Circuit Court retained jurisdiction to make post-judgment rulings in Petitioner’s criminal case. It argued, however, that the intermediate appellate court should vacate the order of the Circuit Court granting Petitioner’s new trial because the Circuit Court’s [738] order frustrated the actions of the appellate court. On December 15, 2005, the Court of Special Appeals denied Petitioner’s requests and issued its formal mandate. The intermediate appellate court by its mandate purported to affirm the Circuit Court’s judgment of June 3, 2004, which had subsequently been set aside by the grant of a new trial. The Court of Special Appeals did not direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order granting Petitioner a new trial.
DISCUSSION
A.
The Circuit Court’s Order Granting Petitioner a New Trial
First, we point to the issues that are not before this Court and were not properly before the Court of Special Appeals. Neither this Court nor the intermediate appellate court obtained jurisdiction to rule on the propriety of the Circuit Court’s post-trial order granting Petitioner a new trial, because that order was not the subject matter of the initial appeal. In addition, whether the grant of the new trial interfered with the subject matter on appeal is not an issue before the appellate courts because that issue, likewise, was not the subject matter of the initial appeal. Because these two matters are not issues on appeal, neither the Court of Special Appeals nor this Court has jurisdiction to vacate, reverse, or affirm the order granting Petitioner a new trial.6 [739] Notwithstanding these facts, we will discuss the issues to address the contentions of both parties and to help elucidate, and provide background information for, the main issue before this Court: whether the Court of Special Appeals erred when it failed to dismiss the appeal and withdraw its reported opinion, after Petitioner notified the intermediate appellate court that he had been granted a new trial.
Petitioner contends that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction7 to grant th6e new trial motion, despite his pending appeal. He relies on the proposition that, as we first stated in Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406, 412 A.2d 1244 (1980), “a circuit court is not divested of fundamental jurisdiction8 to take post-judgment action in a case merely because an appeal is pending from the judgment.” Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 620, 751 A.2d 473, 477 (2000).
The State concedes that the Circuit Court retained jurisdiction to entertain post-trial matters under the general rule in Pulley, even after an appeal is filed. The State also cites Jackson, however, to convey that, because of a limitation [740] to the general rule, the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to grant Petitioner a new trial. The State relies on this Court’s statement in Jackson that “[w]hat the court may not do is to exercise that jurisdiction in a manner that affects either the subject matter of the appeal or the appellate proceeding itself — that, in effect, precludes or hampers the appellate court from acting on the matter before it.” Jackson, 358 Md. at 620, 751 A.2d at 477.9 The State contends that the Circuit Court’s order granting Petitioner a new trial while the appeal was pending frustrated the actions of the appellate court, and that the Circuit Court’s order should therefore be vacated or rendered null and void.10
We disagree with the State’s contention, as it applies to this case. As Petitioner points out, we have held since Pulley v. State, that trial courts are not stripped of their jurisdiction to take post-judgment action simply because an appeal is pending from that judgment. We have said that “ ‘[i]f the trial court does ... decide to proceed during the pendency of the appeal, it, absent a stay required by law, or one obtained from an appellate court, has the authority to exercise the ‘funda[741] mental jurisdiction’ which it possesses.’ ” Peterson, 315 Md. at 81, 553 A.2d at 676 (quoting Pulley, 287 Md. at 419, 412 A.2d at 1251).
The issue of whether the grant of a new trial interfered with the subject matter on appeal is not properly before us, nor was it before the Court of Special Appeals. Even if that issue were a proper subject of this appeal, we are not persuaded that the Circuit Court’s grant of a new trial interfered with the subject matter of the appeal. We reach this conclusion because the trial court did not re-decide the merits of the case or rule upon the issues pending before the appellate court; it simply eliminated the need for an appeal, ipso facto. We have “consistently taken the view that, when an appeal is taken, the trial court may continue to act with reference to matters not relating to the subject matter of, or matters not affecting, the appellate proceeding....” Peterson, 315 Md. at 80, 553 A.2d at 676. Had the trial court revisited the substantive issues of the case, or had the subject matter on appeal been whether the trial court should have granted Petitioner a new trial, our answer might be different.
This distinction is consistent with prior opinions of this Court and the Court of Special Appeals where a circuit court’s actions did not interfere with the subject matter on appeal. See, e.g., Pulley, 287 Md. at 414, 412 A.2d at 1248-49 (holding that Petitioner’s immediate appeal of the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss did not deprive the trial court of its “ ‘fundamental jurisdiction’ to adjudicate the controversy relating to the subject matter of th[e] criminal cause”); Jackson, 358 Md. at 621, 751 A.2d at 477-78 (concluding that the Circuit Court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion for a new trial while her appeal from her convictions was pending did not interfere with the subject matter on appeal); Folk v. State, 142 Md.App. 590, 791 A.2d 152 (2002) (holding that a circuit court retains the fundamental jurisdiction to rule on a defendant’s motion for a new trial even when an appeal is pending in the Court of Special Appeals). Cf. In re Emileigh F., 355 Md. 198, 733 A.2d 1103 (1999) (holding that the Circuit Court interfered with the subject matter on appeal in a CINA proceeding by [742] closing the case and terminating jurisdiction over the minor, because the question of custody and fairness of the procedure used to determine custody was still pending in the Court of Special Appeals and the issue was properly raised in the appellate court because there was a second order from which an appeal was taken).
Furthermore, if the issue were properly before the appellate courts and the State’s contention were correct, our observation in Jackson dictates that if a post-judgment trial court’s decision affected the subject matter of a pending appeal, it “may be subject to reversal on appeal, but it is not void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction to enter it.” Jackson, 358 Md. at 620, 751 A.2d at 477. See also County Comm’rs of Carroll County v. Carroll Craft Retail, Inc., 384 Md. 23, 45, 862 A.2d 404, 418 (2004) (stating that any ruling by a circuit court that interferes with the subject matter on appeal is “reversible on appeal, not void for lack of jurisdiction”). Under this reasoning, the Circuit Court’s grant of a new trial would not be rendered void, automatically, even if we determined that it was not proper to grant a new trial. Moreover, the State has not presented us any other reasons as to why the Circuit Court did not have the authority to grant Petitioner a new trial. Thus, we conclude that the Circuit Court had fundamental jurisdiction to grant a new trial and the propriety of that order and the effect on the subject matter of the pending appeal were neither then nor now subject to appellate review.
B.
The Court of Special Appeals’s Denial of Petitioner’s Request
We must next examine the issue properly before us in this case: whether the Court of Special Appeals should have decided the issues on appeal when the trial court granted a new trial, before the intermediate appellate court filed its opinion, and whether the intermediate appellate court acted [743] properly when it denied Petitioner’s request to withdraw its opinion and dismiss the appeal.
Petitioner argues that once the Circuit Court granted him a new trial, there no longer existed any judgment to be reviewed. He contends that by eliminating the final judgment, the Circuit Court rendered the appeal moot. According to Petitioner, because courts are not charged with the task of deciding moot or abstract questions, the Court of Special Appeals should have withdrawn its opinion and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal.
The State counters that the case was not moot at the time that the Court of Special Appeals filed its reported opinion, because there still remained an existing controversy between the parties. The State contends that Petitioner’s insufficiency of the evidence claim was still in controversy when the court filed its opinion, making Petitioner’s mootness claim untenable. We disagree.
In our view, Petitioner’s appeal became moot the instant that the Circuit Court granted him a new trial. We have said that “[i]t is generally recognized that the effect of granting a new trial is to leave the cause in the same condition as if no previous trial had been held.” Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 367, 46 A.2d 607, 610 (1946); see also Cook v. Toney, 245 Md. 42, 50, 224 A.2d 857, 861 (1966) (holding that when the new trial was granted, the verdict and judgment were eliminated entirely and the ease was put back in the same condition as if no trial had ever been held). When a court orders a new trial, “the beneficial procedural incidence of the order is to reestablish the equality in law of the parties, which was lost, by restoring them to the position of the litigants at the beginning of the trial before a jury.” State v. Balt. Transit Co., 177 Md. 451, 454, 9 A.2d 753, 754 (1939). Because the Circuit Court’s grant of a new trial eliminated the judgment of conviction, there no longer remained a judgment for the Court of Special Appeals to affirm, reverse, or vacate, thus rendering the appeal moot.
[744] It is well settled that “[a]ppellate courts do not sit to give opinions on abstract propositions or moot questions, and appeals which present nothing else for decision are dismissed as a matter of course.” State v. Ficker, 266 Md. 500, 506-07, 295 A.2d 231, 235 (1972) (citations omitted); See also In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 906 A.2d 915 (2006) (citations omitted). We consider a case moot “when there is no longer any existing controversy between the parties at the time that the case is before the court, or when the court can no longer fashion an effective remedy.” In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 452, 906 A.2d 915, 927; In re Karl, 394 Md. 402, 410, 906 A.2d 898, 902 (2006); GMC v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 365, 879 A.2d 1049, 1063 (2005); See also Hammen v. Balt. County Police Dep’t, 373 Md. 440, 449, 818 A.2d 1125, 1131 (2003); Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371, 375, 564 A.2d 395, 397 (1989) (citations omitted). Consistent with the holdings of those cases, we conclude that the Circuit Court’s grant of a new trial eliminated the controversy between the parties, which was the subject of the appeal, such that the mandate of the Court of Special Appeals, as a matter of law, should have read, “appeal dismissed.” Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 39, 111 A.2d 379, 380 (1954) (noting that appellate courts do “not sit to give opinions on abstract propositions or moot questions, and appeals which present nothing else for decision are dismissed as a matter of course”); Peterson, 315 Md. at 82, 553 A.2d at 677 (stating further that “ ‘[generally when a case becomes moot, we order that the appeal or the case be dismissed without expressing our views on the merits of the controversy.’ Nevertheless, there is no constitutional prohibition which bars th[e] [appellate] [e]ourt from expressing its views on the merits of a case which becomes moot during appellate proceedings.”) (citations omitted). See also GMC, 388 Md. at 365, 879 A.2d at 1063 (quoting Reyes v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12 (1977)); Bishop v. Governor of Maryland, 281 Md. 521, 524-25, 380 A.2d 220, 223 (1977) (citations omitted).
The State points to a public policy benefit served by reported judicial decisions. The State’s point is well taken. There [745] is a public benefit derived from published opinions, which is the reason appellate courts are sometimes “willing to decide moot questions where ‘it appears ... that there are important issues of public interest raised which merit an expression of our views for the guidance of courts and litigants in the future.’ ” Robinson, 317 Md. at 376, 564 A.2d at 397 (citing In re Special Investigation No. 281, 299 Md. 181, 190, 473 A.2d 1, 5 (1984)). See also Hammen, 373 Md. at 450, 818 A.2d at 1131 (explaining that this Court generally dismisses moot actions without a decision on the merits but that we retain the constitutional authority to express our views on the merits of a moot action in some circumstances). While we have, on prior occasions, discussed our view on the merits of moot questions when such discussions were important to the case at issue or future cases, we nonetheless dismissed those appeals pursuant to our mandate, as the mandate represents the judgment of the Court.11
The Court of Special Appeals should have dismissed the appeal and reflected that disposition in its mandate, once it learned that the Circuit Court had granted Petitioner a new trial.12 For example, in Peterson, we granted certiorari to decide whether the Court of Special Appeals had misapplied Maryland Rule 4-346(c), which provides that a revocation of probation hearing “ ‘shall be held before the sentencing judge, whenever practicable.’ ” Peterson, 315 Md. at 76, 553 A.2d at [746]*746674. Peterson violated his probation and had a probation revocation hearing conducted by a judge who was not the sentencing judge, despite the objections of Peterson’s counsel. The Court of Special Appeals held that the judge who presided over the violation of probation hearing violated Rule 4-346(c) because he made no findings as to the practicality of having the sentencing judge preside over the proceedings. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted. Despite the issuance of the writ of certiorari, another probation revocation hearing was held before another judge; however, neither party objected. Upon our review of the case, we determined that it was “clear that the present appellate proceedings ha[d] become moot” because both parties agreed to appear before the non-sentencing judge. Peterson, 315 Md. at 79-80, 553 A.2d at 675. We therefore stated that there was “ ‘no longer an existing controversy between the parties, so there [wa]s no longer any effective remedy which the court c[ould] provide,’ ” but asserted that “there is no constitutional prohibition which bars this Court from expressing its views on the merits of a case which becomes moot during the appellate proceedings.... We will do so, however, ‘only in the rare instances which demonstrate the most compelling circumstances.’ ” Peterson, 315 Md. at 79-80, 82, 553 A.2d at 675-76, 677 (citations omitted). We concluded that the circumstances represented “one of those ‘rare instances’ in which the Court should express its views on the merits of a moot case.” Peterson, 315 Md. at 82-83, 553 A.2d at 677. As a result, this Court examined Rule 4-346(c) to discern the legislative intent and concluded that “[w]e disapprove of the Court of Special Appeals’ construction and application ... of Rule 4-346(c). If this case were not moot, we would reverse the Court of Special Appeals’ judgment____” Peterson, 315 Md. at 85, 553 A.2d at 679. In our mandate, we reflected our holding of mootness by vacating the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals with directions to vacate the judgment of the Circuit Court. Peterson, 315 Md. at 90, 553 A.2d at 681.
Similarly, in Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 642 A.2d 232 (1994), we examined whether a sentencing court could alter a [747] sentence, without the consent of both parties, that it had imposed pursuant to a binding plea agreement. We expressly-determined that we would first have to address whether the State had a right to appeal the court’s modification of sentence and thereafter concluded that it did not have such a right. Chertkov, 335 Md. at 166-71, 642 A.2d at 235-37. Nonetheless, we stated that “[o]rdinarily our decision to dismiss the appeal would end our inquiry. When, however, the matter raised, and which we cannot reach because of our ruling on a threshold issue, is one of substantial importance, we will make an exception.” Chertkov, 335 Md. at 170, 642 A.2d at 237. We therefore expressed our views as to whether a binding plea agreement precludes a trial court from modifying an imposed sentence, and then issued our mandate dismissing the appeal. Chertkov, 335 Md. at 171-75, 642 A.2d at 237-39. See generally Robinson, 317 Md. 371, 564 A.2d 395 (discussing the issue before the Court to provide guidance for future litigants, even though we acknowledged that it was moot, and remanding the case to the court below with directions to dismiss on grounds of mootness); Hammen, 373 Md. 440, 818 A.2d 1125 (2003) (addressing an issue, although moot, on the basis that the issue could reoccur in the future, but then reflecting the issue’s moot status in the mandate).
The State argues that the reported opinion responded to a question of first impression in Maryland — whether aiding and abetting is sufficient to convict one of a CDS possessory offense — that is of importance. Based on that, the State maintains, the Court of Special Appeals should not be required to dismiss the appeal. Similar to Peterson and Chertkov, there is no reason the Court of Special Appeals could not issue an opinion to elucidate the issue and provide guidance for future cases, if it decided that the issue before it was important enough to discuss, even though the issues had become moot. The intermediate appellate court’s opinion, however, would, at most, constitute dicta because the court would still have to reflect that the issues were moot, by dismissing the appeal and reflecting that disposition in its mandate. See, e.g. Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 725, 490 A.2d 1228, 1245 [748] (1985) (asserting that “[w]hile what we say in this posture may be characterized as obiter dicta, we feel an urgency to speak in the hope of avoiding the burden of further appeals with respect to the issues discussed”). Therefore, even though the intermediate appellate court apparently decided to let stand its published opinion, the mandate would still have to reflect “appeal dismissed” because the issues before the court had become moot as to Cottman’s case. By parity of reasoning, the mandate also should have been accompanied by a consistent editorial change in the opinion, at its end, where the unofficial “mandate” appears because it otherwise would be inconsistent with the proper formal mandate.
The State argues further that Petitioner had ample time under the Maryland Rules to dismiss his appeal, but essentially waived his right to dismiss his appeal by waiting for the Court of Special Appeals to file its opinion. Maryland Rule 8-601 states specifically that “[a]n appellant may dismiss an appeal without permission of the Court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the filing of the opinion of the Court.” According to the State, because the Circuit Court granted Petitioner a new trial on August 18, 2005, he had more than enough time to dismiss his appeal before October 31, 2005, the date when the Court of Special Appeals filed its opinion. The State contends that, instead, Petitioner ignored the timeline provided by the Maryland Rules because he hoped to obtain a favorable result from the Court of Special Appeals, eliminating the need for a new trial. The State maintains that to order withdrawal of the filed opinion would reward Petitioner for seeking to obtain relief simultaneously in two separate courts.13
[749] We are in accord with the State that Petitioner should have followed the timeline set forth in the Maryland Rules and timely dismissed his appeal, in accordance with Rule 8-601 (by dismissing without the permission of the court before the appellate court filed its opinion on October 31, 2005). Had he done so, by dismissing his appeal at the latest, by October 31, 2005, instead of on November 4, 2005, further proceedings in the appellate courts would have been unnecessary.14 Notwithstanding, a party cannot “waive” life into a moot case, because mootness is something that an appellate court may notice on its own, even if no party raises the issue. Because the issues on appeal were moot, the intermediate appellate court could not have issued its mandate affirming or reversing a judgment that no longer existed at the time that it filed its opinion. Given the posture of the case before the Court of Special Appeals, that court could choose to maintain the expression of its views on the novel legal issue raised by leaving its reported opinion “on the books”; however, it did not have authority to affirm or reverse the prior judgment of the Circuit Court.
CONCLUSION
The Circuit Court retained its fundamental jurisdiction to grant Petitioner a new trial, even though the appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals. We hold that the Court of Special Appeals erred, as a matter of law, in denying Petitioner’s request to dismiss the appeal after he had been granted a new trial, as the new trial rendered moot the challenge to the judgment of the trial court before the appellate court. Although the Circuit Court granted Petitioner a new trial, the Court of Special Appeals retained the ability to express an opinion on the novel issue in the case; however, the judgment of the intermediate appellate court could not provide an effective remedy as there was no longer an existing [750] controversy between the parties at that time. Therefore, that court’s judgment, i.e., its mandate, should have reflected the moot status of the case and directed that the appeal be dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO DISMISS THE APPEAL ON THE GROUNDS OF MOOTNESS. BALTIMORE COUNTY TO PAY THE COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS.
RAKER, J., concurs specially and files an opinion in which BELL, C.J., joins.
WILNER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and files an opinion in which BELL, C.J., joins in part.