Cottman Transmission Systems, LLC v. Wolfsgruber

621 F. Supp. 2d 266, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50685, 2008 WL 2620133
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 30, 2008
DocketCivil Action 08-0369
StatusPublished

This text of 621 F. Supp. 2d 266 (Cottman Transmission Systems, LLC v. Wolfsgruber) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Cottman Transmission Systems, LLC v. Wolfsgruber, 621 F. Supp. 2d 266, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50685, 2008 WL 2620133 (E.D. Pa. 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CARACAPPA, United States Magistrate Judge.

1. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Cottman Transmission Systems, LLC (hereinafter, “Cottman”) filed a complaint in this matter against Defendants, James R. Wolfsgruber, and JRC, Inc. (hereinafter, “Wolfsgruber”) alleging causes of action for trademark infringement, breach of contract, unfair competition, and seeking declaratory judgment that Cottman properly terminated Wolfsgruber’s License Agreement for cause.

At the time of filing the complaint, Cottman also filed a Motion for Injunctive Relief against Wolfsgruber. Cottman has a franchise relationship with Wolfsgruber whereby Cottman is the franchiser and Wolfsgruber is the franchisee. Cottman asserts that Wolfsgruber continues to operate a transmission repair business as a Cottman Transmission Center at 1190 S. Wickham Road, West Melbourne, Florida, despite the fact that Wolfsgruber’s License Agreement with Cottman has been terminated.

Cottman and Wolfsgruber entered into a license agreement on October 28, 2002 in which Wolfsgruber was authorized to use the name “Cottman” in connection with the operation of an automotive transmission repair center. 1

Subsequent to the License Agreement, Cottman asserts that Wolfsgruber failed to pay continuing fees due under the agreement and accumulated a substantial balance owed to Cottman. See Allen Sinclair Aff., para. 16. In a letter dated June 26, 2007, Cottman informed Wolfsgruber that he was in breach of the license agreement for failing to pay sums owed. (See Exhibit “B” attached to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction). The letter stated that Wolfsgruber was given a 10-day cure period. Cottman contends that Wolfsgruber refused to cure and refused to pay monies owed under the agreement. On November 26, 2007, Cottman again placed Wolfsgruber on notice that he was in breach of the agreement for failing to pay sums due under the License Agreement. Cottman asserts further that Wolfsgruber again refused to comply, and in a letter dated January 3, 2008, Cottman informed Wolfsgruber that the License Agreement had been terminated and demanded him to comply with the post termination provisions of the agreement. 2 (See Exhibit “D” attached to Motion for Preliminary Injunction). 3

*269 In this Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Cottman not only asks this court to enjoin Wolfsgruber from continuing to hold himself out as a Cottman franchise by use of the Cottman name, marks, and signs, but also to relinquish its business telephone number and to shut its transmission repair business down immediately pursuant to the provisions stated below of the License Agreement.

Section 14 of the License Agreement entitled “Telephone Service” states in part:

“OPERATOR acknowledges that all telephone numbers and directory listings for the CENTER are the property of COTTMAN and that COTTMAN has the sole and exclusive right and authority to transfer, terminate and amend such telephone numbers and directory listings as COTTMAN, in its sole discretion, deems appropriate.”

Section 21 of the License Agreement provides in part that:

“OPERATOR acknowledges that as a participant in the SYSTEM, OPERATOR will receive confidential information and materials, trade secrets, and the unique methods, procedures and techniques developed by COTTMAN. Therefore, to protect the SYSTEM and COTTMAN and to induce COTTMAN to grant to OPERATOR the license as set forth herein, OPERATOR represents and warrants ... For a period of two (2) years after the termination of this Agreement for any reason, OPERATOR shall not ... within a radius often (10) miles of OPERATOR’S former CENTER and three (3) miles of any other CENTER in operation at the time of termination of any CENTER ... begin or engage in any business the same as, similar to or in competition with such CENTER.”
(See Exhibit “A,” attached to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction).

Cottman contends that notwithstanding the termination of the License Agreement, Wolfsgruber continues to hold himself out as an authorized Cottman franchise and use Cottman’s name, marks, signs, forms of advertising, and telephone listings, and continues to operate his business as a transmission repair facility. In addition, Cottman asserts that Wolfsgruber continues to refuse to turn over to Cottman the telephone number, (321) 768-7665, which number links to former and current local Yellow page ads for Cottman Transmission. Cottman states that customers who consult their local Yellow Pages ads for the Cottman Transmission Center nearest them are unknowingly being directed to Wolfsgruber’s competing transmission business.

We held a hearing and heard argument in this matter on April 22, 2008.

2. APPLICABLE LAW

Pappan Enterprises, Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Systems, Inc., 143 F.3d 800 (3d Cir.1998) reiterated the well-established standard for the grant of a preliminary injunction in this circuit. The Court held that:

‘When ruling on a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, a district court must consider four factors: (1) the likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits at final hearing: (2) the extent to which plaintiff is being irreparably harmed by the conduct complained of; (3) the extent to which defendant will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) the public interest.” Id. at 803.

All four factors should favor preliminary relief before an injunction should issue. Opticians Ass’n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir.1990).

*270 It must first be noted that Wolfsgruber in his answer to Cottman’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction sets forth no defense and/or argument that he should still be able to hold his business out to the public as a Cottman franchise, and that such an injunction should not be granted. In his answer, Wolfsgruber only asserts that Cottman has an “identical” action pending in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, and that it is improper to file two actions in two courts on the same issue. Spinelli v. Maxwell, 430 Pa. 478, 243 A.2d 425 (1968); Turner v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 542 (3d Cir.2006).

We reject this argument for several reasons. First, Wolfsgruber fails to set forth in his brief why the two actions are “identical,” and merely cites the two cases above.

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621 F. Supp. 2d 266, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50685, 2008 WL 2620133, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cottman-transmission-systems-llc-v-wolfsgruber-paed-2008.