COTE v. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedApril 4, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00029
StatusUnknown

This text of COTE v. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (COTE v. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
COTE v. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, (D. Me. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE GARRETT COTE, ) ) Plaintiff ) ) v. ) 2:25-cv-00029-NT ) MAINE DEPARTMENT OF ) CORRECTIONS et al., ) ) Defendants ) RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT Plaintiff, who is in custody at the Maine Correctional Center, filed a complaint against the Maine Department of Corrections and Mountain View Correctional Facility regarding the conditions of his confinement. (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) In addition to his complaint, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees (ECF No. 3), which application the Court granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) In accordance with the statute that governs actions where a plaintiff proceeds without prepayment of fees, a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s complaint is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Additionally, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to screening “before docketing, if feasible or . . . as soon as practicable after docketing,” because he is “a prisoner seek[ing] redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). After a review of Plaintiff’s complaint, I recommend the Court dismiss the complaint, unless Plaintiff amends the complaint to allege an actionable claim against a

proper defendant or defendants. LEGAL STANDARD 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is designed to ensure meaningful access to the federal courts for those persons unable to pay the costs of bringing an action. When a party is proceeding pursuant to the statute, however, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines,” inter alia, that the action is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under § 1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).

In addition to the review contemplated by § 1915, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act because Plaintiff currently is incarcerated and seeks redress from governmental entities and officers. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). The § 1915A screening requires courts to “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or

fails to state a claim …; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is subject to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), this is “not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a claim”, Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980). To allege a civil action in

federal court, it is not enough for a plaintiff merely to allege that a defendant acted unlawfully; a plaintiff must affirmatively allege facts that identify the manner by which the defendant subjected the plaintiff to a harm for which the law affords a remedy. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at the Mountain View Correctional Facility in August 2024, he was denied suitable (in amount and quality) water, was not allowed to shower for over seventy-two hours, and was placed in an unsanitary cell. (Complaint at 5; Attachment to Complaint, ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff claims his mental health has suffered as the result of the conditions. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks to recover monetary damages. (Complaint

at 5.) Plaintiff’s claim may be construed as a conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment. To pursue such a claim, a plaintiff must show (1) that “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994), and (2) that “the responsible prison official had ‘a sufficiently culpable state of mind’ amounting to ‘deliberate indifference’ to an inmate’s

health or safety of a degree indicative of an intent to wantonly inflict pain.” Connolly v. County of Suffolk, 533 F. Supp. 2d 236, 241 (D. Mass. 2008) (quoting DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991)). To the extent Plaintiff has alleged facts that could support a conditions of confinement claim, Plaintiff cannot pursue the action against Maine Department of Corrections or Mountain View Corrections Center. Subject to limited exceptions not

applicable in this case, the State of Maine and its agencies have immunity under the doctrine of sovereign immunity exemplified by Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution against suits brought by citizens in federal court, regardless of the form of relief requested. Poirier v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 558 F.3d 92, 97 n.6 (1st Cir. 2009) (“A plaintiff may seek prospective injunctive relief against a state official, but may not obtain

such relief against a state or its agency because of the sovereign immunity bar of the Eleventh Amendment.”). Additionally, while a federal district court would have jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act over claims against persons exercising state authority, § 1983 does not authorize claims against the state or its agencies. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); see also Nieves–Marquez v. Puerto Rico,

353 F.3d 108, 124 (1st Cir.2003) (“No cause of action for damages is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state, its agency, or its officials acting in an official capacity.”).

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Poirier v. Massachusetts Department of Correction
558 F.3d 92 (First Circuit, 2009)
Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset
640 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2011)
David R. Ferranti v. John J. Moran
618 F.2d 888 (First Circuit, 1980)
Steven M. Desrosiers v. John J. Moran
949 F.2d 15 (First Circuit, 1991)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Connolly v. County of Suffolk
533 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D. Massachusetts, 2008)

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Bluebook (online)
COTE v. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cote-v-maine-department-of-corrections-med-2025.