Cotara Christina Farrington v. Julson Nicolas

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed September 2, 2026.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D26-1295

Lower Tribunal No. 23-19973-FC-04

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Cotara Christina Farrington, Petitioner,

vs.

Julson Nicolas,

Respondent.

A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Scott M. Bernstein, Judge.

Cotara Christina Farrington, in proper person.

No appearance, for respondent.

Before FERNANDEZ, LOGUE and LINDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Cotara Christina Farrington seeks a writ of certiorari to quash two trial court orders: (1) a June 12, 2026 order, titled “Order Limiting Petitioner’s Litigation Conduct” (the “Limitation Order”); and (2) a June 15, 2026 order, which denied rehearing of the Limitation Order. She argues that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by entering the Limitation Order without first providing her notice and an opportunity to be heard, resulting in irreparable harm. We agree.

The underlying matter concerns a custody dispute in which Farrington was proceeding pro se. On June 12, 2026, the trial court entered, sua sponte, the Limitation Order, wherein the trial court limited Farrington’s future filings and emails to the court. Farrington moved for rehearing arguing that the Limitation Order was entered without notice and an evidentiary hearing, violating her rights to due process. The trial court denied her motion. This petition followed.

“A basic tenet of our jurisprudence is the right to due process.” Green v. Green, 394 So. 3d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). “Due process requires a notice of hearing and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. The limited record before this Court reflects the trial court entered the order sua sponte and failed to provide Farrington with notice or an opportunity to be heard. By

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limiting or restricting Farrington’s future filings and emails the trial court, in essence, sanctioned Farrington.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in entering the Limitation Order without notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Hefley v. Columbo, 420 So. 3d 589, 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (“A trial court violates a party’s due process rights when it imposes sanctions, sua sponte, without a pending motion directed to the right being restricted, proper notice, and an opportunity to be heard.”). This amounted to irreparable harm. See Presidio Networked Sols., Inc. v. Taylor, 115 So. 3d 434, 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (noting that the trial court’s failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to the litigant was a “complete denial of due process” that “constitutes the type of irreparable harm that is subject to certiorari review.”); K.G. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 66 So. 3d 366, 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (finding “the mother’s argument that she was denied the opportunity to be heard concerns harm which will be irreparable unless immediately addressed. . . . [T]he entire proceeding will have been based on a denial of her due process rights.”). Accordingly, we grant the petition and quash the subject orders. Petition granted; orders quashed.