Cossette v. Downstate Correctional Facility

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided February 3, 2021·No. 7:20-cv-06427·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MARCUS COSSETTE, Plaintiff, 20-CV-6427 (CS) against- ORDER OF SERVICE DOWNSTATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, ef al., Defendants. CATHY SEIBEL, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Auburn Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his rights while he was incarcerated at Downstate Correctional Facility. By order dated November 25, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).' STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee ofa governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ, P, 12(h)(3).

' Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C, § 1915(b)(1).

DISCUSSION A. Eleventh Amendment Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) and Acting Commissioner Anthony Annucci are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and must dismissed. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity .. . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Jd. New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir, 1977). Here, Plaintiff names as defendants DOCCS and Acting DOCCS Commissioner Annucci, who Plaintiff does not allege was involved personally in any conduct. As these defendants are effectively arms of the State of New York, they are immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against these two defendants. B. Private parties A claim for relief under § 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. 3 1983. Private parties are therefore not generally liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir, 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 US. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir, 2002) (“{T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). As Defendants Hardy and Watkins, who are also prisoners, are private parties who do not work for

any state or other government body, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against these defendants under § 1983, The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 against these defendants. C. Service on Defendants Burnett, Malvarosa, Edwards, and Pavez Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process ... in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. A(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP)). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that the summons and complaint be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served the summonses and complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that summonses be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date summonses are issued. If the complaint is not served within that time, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v, Pataki, 378 FE. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (“As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals’ failure to effect service automatically constitutes ‘good cause’ for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule 4(m).”’). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants Deputy Superintendent Burnett, Dr. Malvarosa, Correction Officer Edwards, and Sergeant Pavez through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for each of these defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to

issue summonses for those defendants and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon these defendants. Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so. D. Unidentified “John Doe” defendants Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying an unidentified defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit the New York State Attorney General to identify “John Does #1 - #3.” It is therefore ordered that the Attorney General, who is the attorney for and agent of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, must ascertain the identity and badge number of each “John Doe” whom Plaintiff seeks to sue here and the address where each of those defendants may be served. The Attorney General must provide this information to Plaintiff and the Court within sixty days of the date of this order.

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Cossette v. Downstate Correctional Facility, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

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Related

Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Sykes v. Bank of America
723 F.3d 399 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Gollomp v. Spitzer
568 F.3d 355 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)