Cosquillo-Maiza v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: March 17, 2026
• Docket: 24-63
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24-63 Cosquillo-Maiza v. Bondi BIA Reid, IJ A220 228 857/858/859/860

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17th day of March, two thousand twenty-six.

PRESENT: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, BETH ROBINSON, MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________________

JUAN DANIEL COSQUILLO-MAIZA, MARIA ANGELA MUNCHA-COSQUILLO, D. G. C.-M., Y. S. C.-M., Petitioners,

v. 24-63 NAC PAMELA BONDI, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.* _____________________________________________

FOR PETITIONERS: Thomas V. Massucci, New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Assistant Director; Deitz P. Lefort, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioners, Juan Daniel Cosquillo-Maiza, Maria Angela Muncha-Cosquillo,

and their minor children, natives and citizens of Ecuador, seek review of a

December 14, 2023, decision of the BIA affirming a June 2, 2023, decision of an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Juan Daniel Cosquillo-Maiza,

et al., Nos. A220 228 857/858/859/860 (B.I.A. Dec. 14, 2023), aff’g Nos. A220 228

857/858/859/860 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 2, 2023). We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the case caption accordingly. 2 We have considered the IJ’s decision as supplemented and modified by the

BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan

Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review factual findings for

substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. See Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive

unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

Petitioners primarily argue that the IJ denied them due process by failing to

develop the record. “To establish a violation of due process, an alien must show

‘that [he or] she was denied a full and fair opportunity to present . . . claims’ or

‘that the IJ or BIA otherwise deprived [him or] her of fundamental fairness.’”

Burger v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). An IJ “has

an obligation to establish and develop the record,” including by “prob[ing]

inconsistencies and develop[ing] the relevant facts,” but the IJ must remain “a

neutral, impartial arbiter.” Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2006).

“Parties claiming denial of due process in immigration cases must, in order to

prevail, ‘allege some cognizable prejudice fairly attributable to the challenged

process.’” Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation

3 omitted). To show prejudice, a claimant must demonstrate “that the outcome of

. . . removal proceedings would have been . . . different” but for the alleged

violation. Debeatham v. Holder, 602 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 2010).

Petitioners have not shown the prejudice required to state a due process

claim. They argue that the IJ failed to develop the record and should have probed

for more detail about the discrimination Cosquillo-Maiza suffered as a child, the

incident when police shut down Cosquillo-Maiza and Muncha-Cosquillo’s

produce stand, and their fears of returning to Ecuador. But they do not identify

what additional testimony Cosquillo-Maiza would have given or explain how

such testimony would have supported their claim for asylum. In other words,

Petitioners have not shown prejudice because they do not identify evidence that

would result in a different outcome. See Garcia-Villeda, 531 F.3d at 149; Debeatham,

602 F.3d at 486. Because the prejudice finding is dispositive of the due process

claim, we do not address any other arguments. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S.

24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make

findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

To the extent Petitioners challenge the underlying findings related to their

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims, their challenge fails. The IJ

4 and BIA did not err in finding that Petitioners failed to establish past persecution.

See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding a petitioner that

had suffered “minor bruising from an altercation with family planning officials”

was not persecuted); see also Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 328 (2d Cir. 2020)

(“[U]nfulfilled threats alone generally do not rise to the level of persecution”

unless an applicant presents “objective evidence that the threat was so imminent

or concrete, . . . or so menacing as itself to cause actual suffering or harm.”) (citation

omitted). Additionally, after reviewing the record, we conclude there was no

error in finding that Petitioners did not show an objectively reasonable fear of

future persecution based on Petitioners’ indigenous and evangelical identities.

Having concluded as much, we also determine that the IJ and BIA did not err in

denying the withholding of removal and CAT claims. See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d

111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Withholding of removal and CAT relief entail a greater

likelihood of future persecution than that required for the grant of asylum.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court