Cosovic v. Term Leasing, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Cosovic v. Term Leasing, Inc.

234 A.D.2d 79, 650 N.Y.S.2d 697, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12388

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 10, 1996

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 234 A.D.2d 79 (Cosovic v. Term Leasing, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cosovic v. Term Leasing, Inc., 234 A.D.2d 79, 650 N.Y.S.2d 697, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12388 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Kapnick, J.), entered on or about July 11, 1996, which granted plaintiff’s motion to renew and reargue a prior order, same court and Justice, dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence of a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), [80]*80and thereupon reinstated the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The IAS Court correctly apprehended that on defendants’ prior motion for summary judgment, it improperly imposed on plaintiff a burden of adducing proof of a serious injury. As the parties moving for summary judgment, it was defendants’ burden to present evidence, in competent form, sufficient to establish that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury; having failed to meet that burden, plaintiff was not required to come forward with proof that he did sustain serious injury (Rodriguez v Goldstein, 182 AD2d 396). Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Ross, Williams, Mazzarelli and Andrias, JJ.

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—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Kapnick, J.), entered on or about July 11, 1996, which granted plaintiff’s motion to renew and reargue a prior order, same court and Justice, dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence of a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), [80]*80and thereupon reinstated the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The IAS Court correctly apprehended that on defendants’ prior motion for summary judgment, it improperly imposed on plaintiff a burden of adducing proof of a serious injury. As the parties moving for summary judgment, it was defendants’ burden to present evidence, in competent form, sufficient to establish that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury; having failed to meet that burden, plaintiff was not required to come forward with proof that he did sustain serious injury (Rodriguez v Goldstein, 182 AD2d 396). Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Ross, Williams, Mazzarelli and Andrias, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

234 A.D.2d 79, 650 N.Y.S.2d 697, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12388, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cosovic-v-term-leasing-inc-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

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