Cosma v. Fit Kitchen, LLC

2022 NCBC 36
CourtNorth Carolina Business Court
DecidedJuly 18, 2022
Docket22-CVS-7915
StatusPublished

This text of 2022 NCBC 36 (Cosma v. Fit Kitchen, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Business Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cosma v. Fit Kitchen, LLC, 2022 NCBC 36 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2022).

Opinion

Cosma v. Fit Kitchen, LLC, 2022 NCBC 36.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION MECKLENBURG COUNTY 22 CVS 7915

DANIEL COSMA,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER AND OPINION FIT KITCHEN, LLC, d/b/a Get Fit ON MOTION TO DISMISS Foods; FIT KITCHEN PARK ROAD, LLC, d/b/a Get Fit Foods Park Road; FIT KITCHEN PLAZA MIDWOOD, LLC, d/b/a Get Fit Foods Plaza Midwood; LLOYD ACE; and DAVID YERMANOS, individually,

Defendants.

The Montgomery Law Firm, PLLC, by Eric A. Montgomery, for Plaintiff Daniel Cosma.

Villmer Caudill, PLLC, by Bo Caudill, for Defendants Fit Kitchen, LLC, Fit Kitchen Park Road, LLC, Fit Kitchen Plaza Midwood, LLC, Lloyd Ace, and David Yermanos.

Conrad, Judge.

1. This case arises out of a failed restaurant concept known as Get Fit Foods.

As alleged, Lloyd Ace and David Yermanos opened several restaurants under that

name sometime around 2016. They later invited Daniel Cosma to invest in the

business. Together, the three men formed multiple LLCs and adopted an operating

agreement to govern their rights as comembers. Cosma now claims that Ace and

Yermanos closed the restaurants without notice while denying financial records,

other information, and payments promised by the operating agreement. (See Compl.

¶¶ 14–21, ECF No. 3.) On that basis, Cosma has sued Ace, Yermanos, and three of

their LLCs (together, “Defendants”) for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and unfair or deceptive trade practices under

N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1.

2. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. (ECF No.

5.) Cosma has not filed a response brief, and the time to do so has passed. By rule,

the motion is deemed “uncontested,” BCR 7.6, and the Court elects to decide it

without a hearing, see BCR 7.4.

3. In deciding the motion, the Court applies familiar standards, taking the

allegations of the complaint as true and viewing the facts and permissible inferences

in the light most favorable to Cosma. See, e.g., Sykes v. Health Network Sols., Inc.,

372 N.C. 326, 332 (2019). The Court need not accept as true any “conclusions of law

or unwarranted deductions of fact.” Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 46

(2017).

4. Breach of Contract. Defendants challenge the claim for breach of contract

on two grounds: that the complaint fails to allege, first, that each defendant is a party

to the operating agreement and, second, that there was a breach of that agreement.

Neither is persuasive. Construed liberally, the complaint alleges that “Plaintiff and

Defendants entered into” the operating agreement, that the agreement gave Cosma

inspection rights, promised certain “equity payments,” and barred cessation of

operations without all members’ consent; and that Defendants breached these

provisions. (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19–21, 23, 26, 27.) In short, Cosma has alleged the

“existence of a valid contract” and a “breach of the terms of that contract.” Poor v.

Hill, 138 N.C. App. 19, 26 (2000). When these elements are alleged, “it is error to dismiss a breach of contract claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Woolard v. Davenport, 166

N.C. App. 129, 134 (2004); see also, e.g., Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody, 2019

NCBC LEXIS 39, at *10 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 19, 2019) (collecting cases). The Court

therefore denies the motion to dismiss the claim for breach of contract.

5. Unjust Enrichment. When the parties have made an express contract, the

law will not imply one “with reference to the same matter.” Vetco Concrete Co. v. Troy

Lumber Co., 256 N.C. 709, 713 (1962). Defendants contend that this principle bars

Cosma’s claim for unjust enrichment. At this early stage, however, the Court is

persuaded that Cosma may plead unjust enrichment in the alternative to his claim

for breach of the operating agreement. See, e.g., N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2); Moose v.

Allegacy Fed. Credit Union, 2021 NCBC LEXIS 47, at *10 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 5,

2021) (denying motion to dismiss claim for unjust enrichment when pleaded in the

alternative to claim for breach of contract); Gao v. Sinova Specialities, Inc., 2018

NCBC LEXIS 71, at *34–36 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 16, 2018) (same). The Court sees

no other basis for dismissal of this claim.

6. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Constructive Fraud. Cosma has not

adequately alleged the existence of a fiduciary relationship between him and

Defendants. The complaint refers to the parties as “partners” in a conclusory fashion,

but the allegations make clear that Cosma, Ace, and Yermanos were instead

comembers of various LLCs. (See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 4, 16, 17, 49.) Generally, LLC

members do not owe a fiduciary duty to each other, and an LLC does not owe a

fiduciary duty to its members. See, e.g., Kaplan v. O.K. Techs., L.L.C., 196 N.C. App. 469, 473 (2009). Cosma has not pointed to any applicable exception to these default

rules. Because the existence of a fiduciary relationship is an essential element of

claims for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud, the Court grants the

motion to dismiss both claims.

7. Section 75-1.1. Cosma alleges that Defendants committed unfair or

deceptive trade practices under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 by retaining his capital

contribution, failing to provide financial records, and failing to make “equity

payments.” (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 32.) Even if true, these actions were purely internal to

the LLCs and, as a result, were not “in or affecting commerce” as required by section

75-1.1. The Court therefore grants the motion to dismiss the section 75-1.1 claim.

See, e.g., Nobel v. Foxmoor Group, LLC, 380 N.C. 116, 121–22 (2022) (affirming

dismissal of claim based on misuse of capital contribution); White v. Thompson, 364

N.C. 47, 51–52 (2010) (affirming dismissal of claim based on conduct “solely related

to the internal operations” of business); see also Brewster v. Powell Bail Bonding, Inc.,

2018 NCBC LEXIS 76, at *16–17 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 2018) (collecting cases).

* * *

8. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the claims for

breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and violations of section 75-1.1. These

claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. The Court DENIES the motion in all

other respects.

9. The Court further ORDERS the parties to complete their BCR 9.1 case

management meeting no later than 1 August 2022 and to file their BCR 9.2 case management report and proposed case management order no later than 8 August

2022.

SO ORDERED, this the 18th day of July, 2022.

/s/ Adam M. Conrad Adam M. Conrad Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Poor v. Hill
530 S.E.2d 838 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2000)
Woolard v. Davenport
601 S.E.2d 319 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2004)
White v. Thompson
691 S.E.2d 676 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 2010)
Vetco Concrete Company v. TROY LUMBER COMPANY
124 S.E.2d 905 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1962)
Wray v. City of Greensboro
802 S.E.2d 894 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 2017)
Sykes v. Health Network Solutions, Inc.
828 S.E.2d 467 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 2019)
Kaplan v. O.K. Technologies, L.L.C.
675 S.E.2d 133 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2009)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2022 NCBC 36, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cosma-v-fit-kitchen-llc-ncbizct-2022.