Cosgrove v. City of Hartford, No. Cv96 0561077 (Feb. 27, 1998)

1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 2048
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedFebruary 27, 1998
DocketNo. CV96 0561077
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 2048 (Cosgrove v. City of Hartford, No. Cv96 0561077 (Feb. 27, 1998)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cosgrove v. City of Hartford, No. Cv96 0561077 (Feb. 27, 1998), 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 2048 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION CT Page 2049 This action is a municipal property tax appeal filed by the plaintiff, Francis M. Cosgrove, on behalf of the owner of the property, 330 Main Street Associates Limited Partnership (partnership). Pursuant to a foreclosure action by a first lienholder, Cosgrove was appointed a receiver of rents on March 15, 1994 by order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut to collect the rents and operate the subject premises. On October 7, 1996, Cosgrove was discharged as a receiver, and on May 7, 1997, the partnership was substituted as plaintiff in this action by order of this court.

The subject property, 330 Main Street, is a three story multi tenant office building located at the northeast corner of Main Street and Charter Oak Avenue containing 43,956 square feet of gross building area.

In 1990, the partnership, in a previous tax appeal, challenged the valuation of the subject property on the grand list of October 1, 1989, the revaluation year. The partnership amended its appeal to include the grand lists of October 1, 1990 and 1991. The partnership and the city of Hartford entered into a stipulation for judgment on July 2, 1992 in which both parties agreed that the fair market value of the property on the list of October 1, 1989 and 1990 would be $6,153,500. The stipulation further provided that the fair market value of the property on the list of October 1, 1991 would be $6,100,000.1 The stipulation also provided that "[t]he parties hereto stipulate and agree that the plaintiff, 330 Main Street Associates Limited Partnership may reserve its right to contest any valuation and/or assessment for assessment years subsequent to October 1, 1991." (Plaintiff's exhibit B.) Judgment was entered based on this stipulation on July 10, 1992.2

The plaintiff now brings this second appeal challenging the valuation of the subject property on the grand lists of October 1, 1995 and October 1, 1996. The parties agree that the valuation for the lists of October 1, 1995 and October 1, 1996 must be based upon the revaluation date of October 1, 1989. The appraiser for the plaintiff, Arnold J. Grant, and the appraiser for the city, Patrick A. Lemp, both trended back their valuation of the subject property to October 1, 1989. Both appraisers concluded that the highest and best use of the property was its continued use as an office building. We agree. CT Page 2050

Grant found the value of the property, as of October 1, 1989, to be $4,100,000. Grant used three approaches to value. He found the value using the cost approach to be $4,100,000, using the sales comparison approach, $4,730,000, and using the income approach, $3,750,000. Grant placed primary reliance on the income approach. In his appraisal report he stated that he placed no reliance on the cost approach.

Lemp found the value of the property to be $6,175,000 as of October 1, 1989. Lemp also used all three approaches to value, finding the value to be $6,300,000 using the cost approach, $6,000,000 using the sales comparison approach, and $6,050,000 using the income approach. Lemp gave equal weight to the income approach and cost approach, and gave least weight to the comparable sales approach because of the extensive adjustments required to the four comparables chosen by Lemp.

Although Grant placed no reliance on the cost approach, it was the cost approach valuation figure that ended up as his final estimate of value. Under the cost approach, Grant found the value of the land on October 1, 1989, to be $1,340,000. The reason Grant rejected the cost approach, however, was because the owner of the property, in 1986, acquired the land from the Hartford Redevelopment agency for only $161,285. Grant theorized that "[o]nce the value of land was increased due to speculative pressure, it became financially impossible to recreate the subject property as a for profit venture." (Plaintiff's exhibit A, p. 32.) Grant fails to recognize, however, that when the owner acquired the land, the cost was subsidized by the redevelopment agency. It is the highest and best use of the land that affects value, not the cost of acquiring and redeveloping the land for future speculation. See The Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal ofReal Estate (10th ed. 1992) p. 294. It is obvious that Grant did not follow his own theory here because he found the value of the land to be $1,340,000, not $161,285. "The most reliable way to estimate land value is by sales comparison." Id., 78. Based on sales of land west of Main Street, Grant selected the midpoint range of sales with weighted average prices between $30 and $45 per square foot to arrive at a land value of $37.50 per square foot. $37.50 times the land area of 35,841 square feet equates to $1,344,038. Grant rounded this to $1,340,000. Of the nineteen land sales used by Grant, only two were located in the same B-2 zone as the subject. CT Page 2051

Using the cost approach, Lemp found the value of the land to be $1,970,000. Of the three land sales used by Lemp, two were purchased for the highest and best use as a parking garage, not an office building. The remaining sale used by Lemp was located on Sheldon Street, much further east of the subject. Lemp concluded, based on his three land sales ranging from $23.85 to $70.81 per square foot, that the value of the land was $55 per square foot, or $1,970,000.

We note that the parties to this action previously stipulated that the October 1, 1989 land value was $2,007,100. At the time of the stipulation, July 2, 1992, both parties had available to them all of the comparable land sales listed by both Grant and Lemp.

Grant concluded that, using the cost approach on October 1, 1989, the building had a value of $4,238,585; adjusted by $1,478,585 for physical, functional, and economic and environmental depreciation, leaving a balance of $2,974,691. Since the subject building was constructed in 1986, according to Grant's analysis, it sustained approximately a 30% depreciation in value during the first three years of the building's life.

Using the cost approach, both Grant and Lemp used the Marshall Valuation Service for cost estimates. Grant arrived at a total cost of improvements of $4,238,585. Lemp arrived at the same cost of improvements as of October 1, 1989, of $4,620,000. The basic difference between Grant's and Lemp's computations is in the value each attributed to site improvements and entrepreneurial profit. Grant used 5% of construction costs for entrepreneurial profit whereas Lemp used 10%. Another substantial difference between Grant and Lemp as to their final value of the improvements using the cost approach lies in their view of depreciation. Grant concluded that the subject building had a three year accrued depreciation of $1,478,585. Lemp's conclusion regarding depreciation was $275,000. Our view of the credibility of the process of valuations used by both Grant and Lemp leads us to accept and reject parts of each of Grant's and Lemp's analyses. Pursuant to the cost approach, we conclude that the land value on October 1, 1989, was $52.27 per square foot times 35,841 or $1,873,409, and the value of improvements was $3,833,945. We arrived at the value of improvements by taking the building costs at $3,525,000 and adding $311,450 for additional site, soft, and entrepreneurial costs. Our conclusion of the value of the subject property using the cost approach, as of CT Page 2052 October 1, 1989, is $5,707,354.

In using the comparable sales approach, both Grant and Lemp used as comparables 61-87 Huyshope Avenue and 90-104 Allyn Street.

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Related

O'BRIEN v. Board of Tax Review
362 A.2d 914 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1975)
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626 A.2d 1292 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1993)
Xerox Corp. v. Board of Tax Review
690 A.2d 389 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 2048, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cosgrove-v-city-of-hartford-no-cv96-0561077-feb-27-1998-connsuperct-1998.