Cosenza v. United States

Ninth Circuit

Cosenza v. United States

195 F.2d 177, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2918

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 17, 1952

Docket13004

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 195 F.2d 177 (Cosenza v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cosenza v. United States, 195 F.2d 177, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2918 (9th Cir. 1952).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was indicted and convicted on two counts, the first of which charged that at Phoenix, Arizona, he unlawfully received from one Booth, while in interstate commerce, certain jewelry of a value in excess of $5,000, knowing it to have been stolen. This accusation was laid.under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2315. The second count charged a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 4, in that the accused feloniously concealed the commission of the federal offense by Booth and did not make the same known to the requisite authorities. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a single term of three years on the two counts.

At the close of the trial, appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the first count for lack of evidence that the jewelry received constituted, at the time, interstate commerce. We are satisfied that the proof substantially supports the charge in this respect. Appellant claims, in the same connection, that the instructions were inadequate to advise the jury as to the necessity of the government’s proving that the property was in interstate commerce *178 at the time 'he received it. In its instructions the court quoted the statute, and there was no request on appellant’s part for a more elaborate charge. Having failed to ask for additional instructions, appellant can not here be heard to complain. See Rule 30, Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 18 U.S.C.A.; Baugh v. United States, 9 Cir., 27 F.2d 257. The condition of the record does not warrant our noticing the point despite the absence of a timely request.

It is claimed, also, that the evidence is wholly insufficient to support the verdict of guilty on the second count for misprision of felony. Assuming this to be true, a reversal is not warranted, since the sentence is well within the maximum punishment prescribed for the first count. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 642, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant was indicted and convicted on two counts, the first of which charged that at Phoenix, Arizona, he unlawfully received from one Booth, while in interstate commerce, certain jewelry of a value in excess of $5,000, knowing it to have been stolen. This accusation was laid.under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2315. The second count charged a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 4, in that the accused feloniously concealed the commission of the federal offense by Booth and did not make the same known to the requisite authorities. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a single term of three years on the two counts.

At the close of the trial, appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the first count for lack of evidence that the jewelry received constituted, at the time, interstate commerce. We are satisfied that the proof substantially supports the charge in this respect. Appellant claims, in the same connection, that the instructions were inadequate to advise the jury as to the necessity of the government’s proving that the property was in interstate commerce *178 at the time 'he received it. In its instructions the court quoted the statute, and there was no request on appellant’s part for a more elaborate charge. Having failed to ask for additional instructions, appellant can not here be heard to complain. See Rule 30, Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 18 U.S.C.A.; Baugh v. United States, 9 Cir., 27 F.2d 257. The condition of the record does not warrant our noticing the point despite the absence of a timely request.

It is claimed, also, that the evidence is wholly insufficient to support the verdict of guilty on the second count for misprision of felony. Assuming this to be true, a reversal is not warranted, since the sentence is well within the maximum punishment prescribed for the first count. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 642, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

195 F.2d 177, 1952 U.S. App. LEXIS 2918, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cosenza-v-united-states-ca9-1952.

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