Cortina Integrated Waste Mgt. Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior

District Court, E.D. California·Decided February 27, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-03014·Unknown

Opinion

----oo0oo---- CORTINA INTEGRATED WASTE No. 2:24-cv-3014 WBS AC MANAGEMENT, INC., Plaintiff, ORDER RE: MOTION TO INTERVENE v. BY KLETSEL DEHE WINTUN NATION OF THE CORTINA RANCHERIA UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; UNITED STATES BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS; BRYAN NEWLAND, in his official capacity as Assistant Secretary in the U.S. Department of the Interior-Indian Affairs; BRYAN MERCIER, in his official capacity as Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the U.S. Department of the Interior; AMY DUTSCHKE, in her official capacity as Regional Director for the Bureau of Indian Affairs Pacific Region; and INTERIOR Defendants. ----oo0oo---- Plaintiff Cortina Integrated Waste Management, Inc. filed the instant action for declaratory and equitable relief alleging that the federal government defendants unlawfully terminated its lease. (Docket No. 1.) The Kletsel Dehe Wintun Nation of the Cortina Rancheria (“Tribe”) moves to intervene. (Docket No. 12.) Plaintiff and defendants do not oppose the Tribe’s intervention.1 (See Docket Nos. 14-15.) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), the court must grant a timely motion to intervene as a matter of right where the movant “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” See also Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (same). The Tribe’s motion is timely since the court has not heard any dispositive motions in the case. See Hoopa Valley Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 648 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1200- 01 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (concluding a tribe’s motion to intervene was timely because it was filed “well before any substantive matters had been heard or decided”). Moreover, the Tribe provides evidence showing that it is plaintiff’s counterparty in the lease at issue (see Docket No. 12-1 at 101-05), which establishes the type of interest contemplated by Rule 24(a)(2). See Backcountry Against Dumps v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, No. 20-CV-2343 JLS (DEB), 1 Because the motion is unopposed and the court does not see that it would be assisted by oral argument, the hearing on March 17, 2025 is vacated and the court takes the motion under submission on the moving papers. See L.R. 230(g). eee eee OI ED EE

2021 WL 2433942, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. June 14, 2021). If the Tribe did not intervene, its interest in the lease may be impaired by the disposition of the instant matter. See id. Finally, the Tribe asserts without contradiction its concern that the current parties will not adequately protect its interest in the lease because the federal government does not share the Tribe’s reasons for defending the lease in question. See No Casino In Plymouth v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, No. 2:18-cv-1398 TLN CKD, 2022 WL 1489498, at *10-11 (E.D. Cal. May 11, 2022), aff’d on other grounds, No. 22-15756, 2023 WL 4646113, at *1-2 (9th Cir. July 20, 2023), cert. denied, 144 □□□ Ct. 1347 (2024). Accordingly, the requirements for intervention under Rule 24(a) (2) are met. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Tribe’s motion to intervene (Docket No. 12) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. The Tribe shall file its proposed answer (Docket No. 12-2) on the court’s docket within 14 days. Dated: February 27, 2025 bette 2d. □□ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Cortina Integrated Waste Mgt. Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Cortina Integrated Waste Mgt. Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior (Cortina Integrated Waste Mgt. Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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