Corteal v. Department of Transportation

821 A.2d 173, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 228
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 9, 2003
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 821 A.2d 173 (Corteal v. Department of Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Corteal v. Department of Transportation, 821 A.2d 173, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 228 (Pa. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

OPINION BY

Judge PELLEGRINI.

Doug Corteal, t/d/b/a Divito Park (Divito Park), petitions for review an order of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (Department) adopting a proposed report of a Department of Transportation hearing officer revoking his advertising device permit because it violated the Outdoor Advertising Control Act of 1971(Act), Act of December 15, 1971, P.L. 596, as amended, 36 P.S. § 2718.101-2718.115, 1 and its applicable regulations, *175 specifically, 67 Pa.Code § 445.4(b)(3)(iv), 2 prohibiting commercial advertising, and 67 Pa.Code § 445.6(e)(1), 3 prohibiting a deviation from information provided in the application.

Divito Park, a roller and ice skating rink as well as a dining room, is located at 101 Frankie Lane, Leisenring, in Fay-ette County. On June 18, 1999, Divito Park filed an Application for Advertising Device Permit (Permit) with the Department for the erection of a new sign on the property at the intersection of two state highways containing an electronically controlled message board displaying public service type announcements. 4 The appropriate zoning and ownership information was included in the application, as were the sign dimensions with language indicating that the contemplated sign was to be a “Digital Electronic Sign” that would be installed after the Permit was issued. In its approval letter, the Department advised Divito Park that the sign would be subsequently inspected by it to determine conformity to law. The sign was installed in August or September of 2000.

Shortly after the sign was erected, the Department began receiving inquiries regarding the sign, and it sent an employee to investigate. Based upon that investigation and because the sign advertised businesses other than Divito Park and also violated 67 Pa.Code § 445.4(b)(3)(iv) and 67 Pa.Code § 445.6(e)(1), the Department revoked the Permit by letter dated May 9, 2001, unless the violations were cured within 15 days. Divito Park filed a pro se appeal from the Department’s determination and a hearing was held.

Before the hearing examiner, Terri L. Boyce (Boyce), the Department’s outdoor advertising device manager at the time Divito Park submitted its Permit application, testified that Divito Park applied for an off-premise, 8 foot by 14 foot, single-faced sign that was to be illuminated by LED lamps and included an electronically controlled message board that would produce flashing, intermittent or moving lights. On the application, Divito Park had written that the sign would be used for, inter alia, “tributes to sponsors,” which Boyce understood to mean that if an *176 event was sponsored by an outside group at the facility, the message would so indicate. She further testified that “tributes to sponsors” would not include advertising by other commercial establishments, their business locations or the products offered for sale. The Department approved the Permit on the basis of the application.

David K. Bucan (Bucan), a roadway administrator with the Department, testified that he had received inquiries about the sign, and that he visited the site to investigate and make a video recording of the sign in operation. 5 Bucan testified that the sign was being operated as a commercial advertising device because it listed company names and their locations, as well as the prices of products and services. He also testified that the advertisements did not qualify as sponsorship because the advertisers were not sponsoring events held at Divito Park, but rather were advertising for their commercial businesses in the area.

Doug Corteal (Corteal), the owner of Divito Park, testified that after the Department’s approval and prior to the installation of the sign, Divito Park solicited local business to sponsor the sign by selling advertising space. 6 Corteal testified that the 12 advertisers sponsored the sign and not necessarily activities at Divito Park. In addition, messages on the two “extra” screens had, at times, included political advertising. Corteal believed that once the Permit had been issued, the 12 advertisers had the right to put whatever they wanted on the sign, including company names, locations and prices of products and services. He admitted that only one message, besides the time/temperature message, contained public service information on the video recording. However, he stated that he had put other public service announcements on the sign in the past.

The hearing examiner issued a proposed report sustaining the revocation of the Permit. Divito Park filed exceptions to the proposed report, but they were dismissed by the Department, without opinion. Divito Park petitions for review of that decision with this Court. 7

Divito Park first contends that the Department’s interpretation of 67 Pa. *177 Code § 445.4(b)(3)(iv) unreasonably and arbitrarily differentiates between incidental advertising through sponsorship of public service announcements and direct advertising because it did not define those terms. What Divito Park is contending, without saying so, is that the Commonwealth and the Department have no rational basis for treating those two classes differently. Classification along non-suspect lines is permissible if there is a rational basis for doing so. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). Moreover, the state need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather, the burden is upon the challenging party to negate any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. FCC v. Beach Communications, Incorporated, 508 U.S. 307, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). In this case, not surprisingly, because it presumes that the Department has the burden to establish a rational basis for the distinction, Divito Park failed to establish that there are no reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for distinguishing between public service announcements and commercial advertising. In any event, there is a valid distinction between incidental and direct advertising signs. As stated, supra, the intent of the legislature in passing the Act was, in part, to limit advertising along roadways. Patrick, 533 Pa. at 193, 620 A.2d at 1128; 36 P.S. § 2718.102. 8 Sponsors of public service announcements are not paid ads, but instead, serve the purpose of informing the public, while advertisers do so solely for their own profit. Because Divito Park’s sign contains advertising, the Department did not err in adopting the proposed report revoking its Permit.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

S. Crawford v. The Com. of PA - 562 M.D. 202
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2022
Barge v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole
39 A.3d 530 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2012)
Barge v. PENN. BD. OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
39 A.3d 530 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2012)
Adams Outdoor Adv., Lp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Smithfield Township
909 A.2d 469 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
821 A.2d 173, 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 228, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/corteal-v-department-of-transportation-pacommwct-2003.