Corrina Markley v. Kilolo Kijakazi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 23, 2023
• Docket: 20-35956
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 23 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CORRINA MARKLEY, No. 20-35956

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05058-MAT

v. MEMORANDUM* KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 23, 2023**

Before: WALLACE, D.W. NELSON, and O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.

Corrina Markley appeals pro se from the district court’s affirmance of the

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo, Attmore v.

Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.

First, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to credit Dr.

Patamia’s June 2015 opinion and to interpret his assertion that Markley was

incapable of full-time work as limited to Markley’s abilities to perform her past

work. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 2008)

(establishing that the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts and ambiguities in

the medical evidence); Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198

(9th Cir. 2008) (“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” (quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

Second, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons to discount Dr.

Patamia’s January 2016 opinion as speculative, limited in usefulness, and

inconsistent with his own later treatment notes. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that an ALJ may reject a

treating physician’s opinion that is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported

by clinical findings (citations omitted)); Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th

Cir. 2020) (reasoning that opinions noting an applicant’s “limited or fair” ability to

perform in the workplace are “not useful” because they do not specify the

functional limits required for determining residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

2 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Any error in the ALJ’s additional reason for

discounting Dr. Patamia’s January 2016 opinion was harmless. See Carmickle v.

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling that

error is harmless where it is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability

determination” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Finally, any error in the ALJ’s failure to expressly address Dr. Patamia’s

February 2016 opinion was harmless. See id. Critically, the ALJ’s analysis and

RFC accounted for Markley’s improvement with treatment and the specific

limitations Dr. Patamia noted in his February 2016 opinion. Moreover, explicit

consideration of Dr. Patamia’s statements regarding “likely needed

accommodations” would have been inconsequential to the ALJ’s decision because

the ALJ rejected similar suggestions as too speculative.

Because Markley raises multiple issues for the first time on appeal, none of

which entails an “exceptional case in which review is needed to prevent a

miscarriage of justice,” we decline to consider these claims. Greger v. Barnhart,

464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006).

AFFIRMED.