Corr v. Continental Oil Co.

64 P.2d 30, 145 Kan. 78, 1937 Kan. LEXIS 266
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJanuary 23, 1937
DocketNo. 33,109
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 64 P.2d 30 (Corr v. Continental Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Corr v. Continental Oil Co., 64 P.2d 30, 145 Kan. 78, 1937 Kan. LEXIS 266 (kan 1937).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Smith, J.:

This was an action for damages for draining the oil from under a lease on which plaintiffs owned the royalty interest. The case was tried and the issues of fact were submitted to a jury. The jury failed to agree and was discharged. Defendants appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the evidence of plaintiffs.

The action arose in the Valley Center oil field. The lease of which plaintiffs owned the royalty interest is known as the “Lambe 80.” The defendants owned the lease upon this tract as well as the adjoining tracts to the north and east.

The lease was given May 5, 1927, for a term of five years from that date or as long thereafter as oil or gas should be produced therefrom. The lease provided that if operations for the drilling of a well were not commenced on the land within one year from the date of the lease, it should terminate unless the lessees should on or before one year from that date pay to lessors the sum of $1 per acre. The clause in the lease covering this point is as follows:

[79]*79“Shall operate as rental and cover the privilege of deferring the commencement of drilling operations for a period of one year. In like manner and upon like payments or tender, the commencement of drilling operations may be further deferred for like periods successively during the original term of this lease.”

It was admitted at the trial of the case that all rentals provided for- in the lease covering the privilege of postponing drilling operations for the years 1928, 1929, 1930 and 1931 had been paid and accepted by the lessors.

A well was drilled on the “Lambe 80” before the expiration of the five-year period. It came in with a daily production of 126 barrels of oil and later dropped to 64 barrels with a great deal of water.

It was also agreed at the time of the trial that at no time was any demand made upon defendants by plaintiffs for the drilling of any well to protect against drainage.

The petition alleged the discovery of the Wright pool by the drilling of a well about a half mile east of the “Lambe 80” and that this well came in with an initial production of seventeen hundred barrels of oil a day; that this pool was of a continuous and uniform shape, and covered a well-defined oil-bearing strata which was of an open, porous, continuous and uniform type, which permitted the free and unrestricted accumulation, migration and drainage of oil in any direction; and that the “Lambe 80” was located higher on the geological strata than any other land over the pool, and in the most favorable position for the accumulation of oil; and that the oil-bearing formation under the “Lambe 80” was of the same grade and had the same characteristics. The petition further alleged that the pool had produced 16,000 barrels of oil per acre and there was that- amount of oil under the “Lambe 80” when the field was discovered.

The petition then alleged the drilling of various wells in the neighborhood of the “Lambe 80” during 1929 and 1930, but that defendants waited until January 8, 1932, before commencing to drill the only well that was drilled on the “Lambe 80,” and this well was the last well to be drilled into the main Wright pool, and it was not sufficient and was drilled too late to prevent drainage of oil from the “Lambe 80.”

The petition then alleged that about October 1, 1929, the oil began to be drained from the “Lambe 80”; that defendants owned [80]*80the leases on all lands adjoining the “Lambe 80” and owned and controlled the wells that were drilled thereon, and as the oil was drained from the “Lambe 80” it was caught and recovered from defendants’ oil wells and marketed by them; and that plaintiffs never received any remuneration from defendants for their royalty share of the oil so recovered; and that the amount of oil drained from beneath the “Lambe 80” from about October 1, 1929, to the date of the filing of this petition amounted to about 640,000 barrels and amounted to $108,000 in value.

The petition then alleged that defendants knew the shape of the geological structure beneath the lease in question and knew that the “Lambe 80” was better located structurally than any other tract of -ground over the pool, and knew with reasonable certainty that this “Lambe 80” would have as many barrels of oil beneath each acre as would be beneath each acre of any other tract, but that defendants did not disclose any of this information to plaintiffs; that defendants knew at all times that oil was being drained from beneath the “Lambe 80” and that defendants deliberately planned that they would drain the oil from beneath the “Lambe 80” to save the cost of drilling seven additional wells thereon.

Judgment was asked in the amount of $108,000.

The answer of defendants was first a general denial. The answer then alleged the payment of the delay rentals and that during all the time in question no demand was made by plaintiffs upon defendants for the drilling of a well on the “Lambe 80” or for a development of the lease, and that for that reason plaintiffs were estopped from claiming any damage by reason of the failure of the defendants to commence drilling operations upon the “Lambe 80.”

The reply was a general denial, and especially that the acceptance of delayed rentals or failure to demand the drilling of a well operated as estoppel of plaintiffs.

It will be seen that two facts are undisputed. First, plaintiffs did accept delayed rentals — and second, plaintiffs did not demand that defendants drill wells on the “Lambe 80.” Defendants argue that since these two facts appeared from the evidence of plaintiffs, either one of them would require that the demurrer of defendants to the evidence of plaintiffs should be sustained.

The third question argued by defendants is that there was no competent evidence that there had been drainage or that these plaintiffs had been damaged, the evidence submitted being based [81]*81upon no facts, being entirely conjectural and too remote and specu-. lative to afford any proper measure.

On account of the conclusion we have reached as to the' third ground for the demurrer it will not be necessary for us to consider the first two questions.

We shall proceed to a consideration of the question of whether the evidence offered by plaintiffs to prove that oil was drained from their lease and the amount of drainage was so remote, speculative and conjectural as not to afford any proper measure of darn-ages. This necessitates an examination of the evidence offered by plaintiffs. They depended in the main upon two experts to establish the facts upon which they depend.

The first expert qualified by testifying that he had a master’s degree from the University of Pittsburg and had worked as a practical geologist in various fields. His work was with operators to' determine where wells should be located, and the structural operations in various parts. He testified that he had studied the logs of the wells in the Valley Center oil field. He further testified that the oil-bearing structure in the Valley Center field was dolomite, a type of limestone; that where this formation produces oil it is porous enough to be a reservoir for oil and that the porosity of limestone runs all the way from four to thirty percent.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
64 P.2d 30, 145 Kan. 78, 1937 Kan. LEXIS 266, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/corr-v-continental-oil-co-kan-1937.