Coronway Appeal

78 Pa. D. & C. 266, 1951 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 116
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County
DecidedOctober 22, 1951
Docketno. 785
StatusPublished

This text of 78 Pa. D. & C. 266 (Coronway Appeal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coronway Appeal, 78 Pa. D. & C. 266, 1951 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 116 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951).

Opinion

Ervin, P. J.,

— This is an appeal from the decision of the Superintendent of Public Instruction dismissing an appeal of petitioner from the decision of the Board of School Directors of the School District of Lansdowne Borough, Delaware County, Pa.

[267]*267The present controversy is a companion ease to one filed as of September term, 1950, no. 706, entitled Coronway v. Lansdowne School District, in which present petitioner sought a preliminary injunction to restrain respondent from compelling him to take tickets at a football game without additional compensation. He alleged that he had been threatened with dismissal if he failed to do so. We dismissed the bill on the ground that he should follow the procedure set forth in the Public School Code, which was exclusive: Coronway v. Lansdowne School District, 75 D. & C. 392. Wisely or unwisely, we said in that case:

“Plaintiff argues that the remedy provided by the School Code is not adequate in that it requires him to refuse to perform some assignment before the question of the right of the board to make such assignment can be raised and that he thereby jeopardizes his position in order to be able to raise the question. If this be so, it is unfortunate but it still remains true that the Act of 1806, supra, requires that such procedure shall be exclusive. Without deciding the question, it may be that plaintiff may find relief from his dilemma in Wesenberg Case, 346 Pa. 438. If plaintiff is in a position to claim that the duties assigned him beyond his class instruction duties amount to a demotion, the language in that case might apply. There the court said: ‘The amendment dealing with tenure of office (24 PS §1161, now 24 PS §11-1151) provides that “there shall be no demotion of any professional employe, either in salary or in type of position, without the consent of the said employe, or if such consent is not received, then such demotion shall be subject to the right to a hearing before the Board of School Directors (or Board of Public Education), and an appeal in the same manner as hereinbefore provided in the case of the dismissal of a professional employe”. Appellee did not invoke that remedy and ask for a hearing on the [268]*268question of demotion. If he had done so and at the same time assumed the new assignment until final disposition of the question, he could have safeguarded his rights under the statute and avoided the risk of dismissal’.”

As a result, petitioner on November 22, 1950, gave notice to the school board that he considered the assignment to take tickets at a football game to be a demotion in salary and type of position and demanded a hearing. In accordance with his request, there were five hearings held before the board of school directors, which, on March 12, 1951, unanimously decided that petitioner had. not been demoted in either salary or type of position. Petitioner appealed to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, who dismissed his appeal and sustained the action of the board of school directors. The notice sent by petitioner to the school board also objected to certain other assignments, such as attending home and school meetings and other duties following the close of the daily session of school and on days when school is not in session but when he was put on the witness stand he testified that he had no objection to activities “connected directly with the formal phase of the school” and only objects to working after the close of the daily session and on Saturdays without pay at activities that are “held to raise money where the audience is made up of anybody that pays to come in.”

We feel that such testimony limits petitioner’s claim to the assignment to collect football tickets, for this was the only affair specified in the testimony where petitioner was compelled to work at a function where the general public “pays to come in”. As we said in our former opinion:

“The question involved in this case extends far beyond the narrow confines of this particular plaintiff and this particular school district. It is a matter of [269]*269construction which will affect the duties and compensation of all the school teachers of the Commonwealth because all of them hold similar contracts. It is unfortunate that the legislature itself did not define the duties of a teacher so that questions of this nature would not become the subject of controversy.”

It was said in Ganaposki’s Case, 332 Pa. 550:

“The statutory form of contract does not define teaching duties or those to which a teacher may be assigned. ‘Teach’ as thus used has a comprehensive as well as a restricted meaning. The School Code restricts its meaning to instruction within the qualifications expressed in the teacher’s certificate; but in a broad sense, it refers to general instruction within the fields certified, including all incidents and subdivisions thereof. Within these qualifications, the discretion of the school authorities is absolute, under the contract, to assign the teacher regardless of prior understandings before his contract was entered into. Neither the teacher nor the board, nor, both combined, can circumvent by contract, or otherwise, the statutory right of the board to assign teachers or to administer the school under their control. The Code thus reserves to the board the power to assign the teacher to any duties for which he is properly qualified under his teacher’s certificate. . . . When a professional employee is regularly employed to ‘teach’, thereafter he may be assigned such teaching duties for which he is qualified as the board may direct. . . .” (Italics supplied.)

It was, therefore, held that since Ganaposki’s teaching certificate included physical education he could be assigned to coach basketball. In the present case petitioner’s certificate covered the subjects of social science and physical science only. There are very few cases involving the duty of a teacher to perform services other [270]*270than those which pertain to instruction. In 47 Am. Jur. 375, it is said:

“Where a contract of employment fails to define teaching duties, an instructor may be assigned to teach any subject for which he is certified, including any subdivision thereof. Thus, one who has been employed as a teacher of physical education may be required to coach football and basketball. On the other hand, a teacher holding a certificate limited to the teaching of only one subject may not, where her services as a teacher of that subject are no longer needed, be assigned to other duties.
“Whether a teacher may be required to render services other than those pertaining to instruction is dependent upon the contract of employment or upon statutory requirements. Hence, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary in the contract of employment, a teacher may not be required to perform janitorial work, but, where the school laws provide to that effect, must keep statistics and make reports, in accordance with the terms of the statute.”

See also: 56 Corpus Juris 396, §325; 38 A. L. R. 1414.

It is well known and petitioner by his testimony admits that the duties of teachers are professional and cannot be measured with a time clock. Modern day schools are more and more offering to their students opportunities to participate in extracurricular activities, most, if not all, of which broaden the experience and knowledge of the pupils participating therein.

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Related

Ganaposki's Case
2 A.2d 742 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1938)
Wesenberg Case
31 A.2d 151 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1943)

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Bluebook (online)
78 Pa. D. & C. 266, 1951 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 116, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coronway-appeal-pactcompldelawa-1951.