Coronado v. Garland

Opinion

18-3718 Coronado v. Garland BIA

Thompson, IJ

A205 709 724

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 18th day of May, two thousand twenty-one. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JON O. NEWMAN, 8 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 9 DENNY CHIN, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 RENE SANDOVAL CORONADO, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 18-3718 17 NAC 18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 1 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY. 25

1Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Merrick B. Garland is automatically substituted for Attorney General William P.

Barr.

1 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant 2 Attorney General; Brianne Whelan 3 Cohen, Senior Litigation Counsel; 4 Lindsay Corliss, Trial Attorney, 5 Office of Immigration Litigation, 6 United States Department of 7 Justice, Washington, DC.

8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 9 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 10 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 11 is DENIED. 12 Petitioner Rene Sandoval Coronado, a native and citizen 13 of Guatemala, seeks review of a November 15, 2018, decision 14 of the BIA affirming an October 16, 2017, decision of an 15 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Coronado’s application for 16 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 17 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Rene Sandoval 18 Coronado, No. A 205 709 724 (B.I.A. Nov. 15, 2018), aff’g No. 19 A 205 709 724 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 16, 2017). We 20 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 21 procedural history. 22 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for 23 the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland 24 Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable 25 standards of review are well established. See Y.C. v.

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1 Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (reviewing factual 2 findings for substantial evidence and questions of law and 3 the application of law to undisputed facts de novo). 4 To establish asylum eligibility, an applicant must show 5 that he has suffered past persecution, or has a well-founded 6 fear of future persecution, “on account of race, religion, 7 nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 8 political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Absent a 9 finding of past persecution, an applicant may establish 10 asylum eligibility based on a fear of future persecution, but 11 the applicant must show that “he subjectively fears 12 persecution and establish that his fear is objectively 13 reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 14 (2d Cir. 2004). Although a fear may be objectively 15 reasonable “even if there is only a slight, though 16 discernible, chance of persecution,” Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 17 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2000), a fear is not objectively reasonable 18 if it lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely 19 “speculative at best,” Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 20 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005). To demonstrate a well-founded fear, 21 an applicant must show either a reasonable possibility that

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1 he would be singled out for persecution or that the country 2 of removal has a pattern or practice of persecuting 3 individuals similarly situated to him. 8 C.F.R. 4 § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). 5 Coronado became an evangelical Christian in the United 6 States and thus had the burden to show that he had a credible 7 fear of persecution as an evangelical Christian who could be 8 viewed as interfering with gang activity in Guatemala, and 9 that his fear was objectively reasonable. See Jian Xing 10 Huang, 421 F.3d at 129; Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 178. The 11 agency did not err in concluding that Coronado failed to meet 12 his burden. His daughters—also evangelical Christians—lived 13 unharmed in Guatemala, and missionaries from his church in 14 the United States had been robbed, but not persecuted, and it 15 was unknown if they were targeted because of their work. 16 While Coronado submitted one article discussing the targeting 17 of Christians—particularly those who were seen as challenging 18 the gang’s authority or promoting an anti-gang message—the 19 article did not document any specific instances of 20 persecution or their frequency as needed to establish a 21 pattern or practice of persecution. In re A-M-, 23 I. & N.

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1 Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A. 2005) (requiring a showing of “systemic 2 or pervasive” persecution); see also Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 3 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing as reasonable the 4 “systemic, pervasive, or organized” standard for finding a 5 pattern or practice of persecution). 6 Because Coronado failed to establish the objectively 7 reasonable fear of future persecution required for asylum, he 8 “necessarily” failed to meet the higher burden for 9 withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Lecaj v. Holder, 10 616 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010). 11 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 12 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 13 stays VACATED.

14 FOR THE COURT: 15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 16 Clerk of Court