1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 CORONADO Case No. 1:22-cv-00677-JLT-BAM 10 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ v. MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO 11 AMEND CITY OF FRESNO, et al., 12 (Doc. 18) Defendants. 13 14 Anthony Coronado is a resident of Fresno, California. He brings this action against the 15 City of Fresno (“City”), Chief of the Fresno Police Department (“FPD”) Chief Andy Hall, FPD 16 Officers David Dechow, Mark Bishop, Gregory Nichols, and Caylee Graves (“Defendant 17 Officers”), as well as unnamed City employees, alleging violations of his personal rights 18 guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in 19 connection with a police shooting. (Doc. 16.) Defendants moved to dismiss second and third 20 causes of action, as well as the first cause of action with respect to Chief Hall. (Doc. 18.) The 21 matter is fully briefed and ripe for review. (Pl.’s Opp’n, Doc. 24; Defs.’ Reply, Doc. 25.) The 22 Court took the matter under submission without oral argument. (Doc. 26). For the reasons set 23 forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 24 I. INTRODUCTION 25 A. Background1 26 On the night of June 8, 2020,2 Plaintiff Anthony Coronado was on “a bike ride around the 27 1 For purposes of this background section, the Court assumes the truth of the factual allegations in the FAC. 28 1 neighborhood to find recyclables, as he collected and handed in these materials as a means of 2 making money.” (Doc. 16 at ¶ 12.) “While at or around the intersection of N. Blackstone Avenue 3 and E. Barstow Avenue in Fresno, California,” Plaintiff believed he was being followed by a 4 pickup truck that made him “feel uncomfortable and unsafe.” (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff then called his 5 sister Alma Coronado “to come pick him up at their usual rendezvous spot of Food Maxx near N. 6 Blackstone Avenue and E. Barstow Avenue.” (Id.) 7 Plaintiff was “riding his bike around midnight when[] . . . Officer Tuan Tran,” 8 “responding to a report about a man allegedly brandishing a gun at motorists,” pulled up to 9 Plaintiff, “got out of his vehicle, unholstered his weapon, and pointed his gun” at Plaintiff. (Doc. 10 16 at ¶ 14.) “Officer Tran commanded Plaintiff to ‘drop his weapon,’” even though Plaintiff “did 11 not have any type of weapon in his possession.” (Id.) “He simply had his bike, his mother’s cell 12 phone, a bottle opener, and a pair of pliers he carried in case his bike needed repairs while he was 13 riding it.” (Id.) 14 Plaintiff “gripped his bike with his left hand while holding his right hand up in the air 15 above his head” with his cell phone. (Doc. 16 at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff “attempted to communicate to 16 Officer Tran that he did not have a gun, that the object was indeed a cellphone, and that he posed 17 no threat.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) “Officer Tran returned to his vehicle and continued to follow Plaintiff 18 who walked very slowly.” (Id. at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff did not run, ride his bike, or otherwise evade or 19 “flee Officer Tran’s immediate vicinity.” (Id.) Plaintiff was then “intercepted by two police 20 vehicles, which were traveling toward him and blocked his path.” (Doc. 16 at ¶ 18.) Officers 21 Dechow and Bishop, who were driving those vehicles, “both used their PA systems to shout 22 commands at Plaintiff simultaneously.” (Id. at ¶ 19.) 23 Confused by the different commands shouted by the two officers, he tried to communicate 24 to the officers that he had no weapon in his possession “by putting his right hand up in the air— 25 again attempting to signal his compliance and surrender—and showing them that he was holding 26 a mere cellphone, not a weapon.” (Doc. 16 at ¶¶ 19–20.) Officers Dechow and Bishop then 27
28 allegations related to events at a hospital the following day, which is also indicated to be June 9, the Court infers that 1 “exited their respective vehicles and drew their weapons.” (Id. at ¶ 22.) “Without any verbal 2 warning,” the officers, together, fired 7 rounds at Plaintiff, hitting him multiple times. (Id. at 3 ¶¶ 23–24.) Even after noticing that Plaintiff had no firearm on him, the officers still proceeded to 4 handcuff Plaintiff, while he bled on the ground, and without reading him his Miranda rights. (Id. 5 at ¶ 25.) Officers-on-scene “did not administer first aid to Plaintiff while waiting for an 6 ambulance to arrive.” (Id. at ¶ 28.) 7 At the E.R. trauma room, Plaintiff “was handcuffed to the hospital bed rail by his left 8 wrist, despite not having been charged with any crime and being severely injured.” (Doc. 16 at 9 ¶ 29.) At least one officer questioned Plaintiff “while he was in a state of extreme pain and 10 disorientation, and chained to the hospital bed, without ever reading him his rights or explaining 11 to him why he was being detained.” (Id.) Around 1:00 p.m. on June 9, 2020, approximately 12 12 hours since he arrived at the hospital, Detective Raul Diaz “finally read Mr. Coronado his 13 Miranda rights, but made it clear that he was not charging Plaintiff with any crime, though 14 [Plaintiff] would have to remain handcuffed to the hospital bed and was not free to leave.” (Doc. 15 16 at ¶ 30.) 16 Plaintiff was detained at the hospital until around 5:30 p.m. the following day,” when he 17 was discharged from the hospital and “was immediately transported to the Fresno Police 18 Department Headquarters. There, he was cited with the misdemeanor offense of violating 19 California Penal Code § 148(a)(1)—Obstructing and Delaying a Police Officer, namely Officer 20 Tran. After issuing the citation, Det. Diaz finally told Plaintiff he was free to leave.” (Doc. 16 at 21 ¶ 31.) Plaintiff “has been consistently in and out of the hospital,” even after his release, for 22 multiple surgeries. (Doc. 16 at ¶ 36.) He has yet to fully recover from his injuries and continues to 23 “experience[] immense pain, illness, and weakness.” (Id.) 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move 26 to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 27 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, 28 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 1 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This 2 plausibility inquiry is a “context-specific task that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicial 3 experience and common sense,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and “‘draw all reasonable inferences in 4 favor of the nonmoving party[,]’” Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 5 Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 6 2014)). “Conclusory allegations and unreasonable inferences,” however, “do not provide [] a 7 basis” for determining a plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim for relief. Coronavirus Reporter v. 8 Apple, Inc., 85 F.4th 948, 954 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). 9 III. DISCUSSION 10 A. First Cause of Action: Excessive Force 11 The Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from using an objectively unreasonable 12 amount of force to effectuate an arrest or seizure. Plaintiff alleges under the first cause of action 13 that Officers Dechow, Bishop, Nichols, and Graves used unreasonable force against him, 14 including but not limited to shooting him seven times and keeping him handcuffed while he was 15 severely injured. (Doc. 16 at ¶¶ 40–41.) Defendants’ motion to dismiss does not address contest 16 this part of the first cause of action. What is being contested, however, is Plaintiff’s allegation that 17 Chief Hall “is liable in his individual capacity as a supervisor as he condoned, ratified, and 18 encouraged the use of force by approving the officers’ behavior and failing to discipline his 19 officers.” (Id. at ¶ 43.) Defendants argue that the first cause of action must be dismissed with 20 respect to Chief Hall. (Doc. 18 at 8–11.) 21 Although a municipal supervisor like Chief Hall may not be held liable for the 22 unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior under 42 23 U.S.C. § 1983, he “can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction 24 in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the 25 constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the 26 rights of others.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Watkins v. City of 27 Oakland, Cal., 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)). To impose liability in this context, the 28 plaintiff “must still allege sufficient facts to plausibly establish the defendant’s ‘knowledge of’ 1 and ‘acquiescence in’ the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates.” Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 2 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1206–07)). Defendants contend that 3 “Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts to support his conclusory allegations concerning Chief 4 Hall’s conduct.” (Doc. 18 at 10.) Plaintiff offers many arguments in his brief in opposition, none 5 of which this Court finds persuasive. 6 First, as Defendants point out, (Doc. 25 at 4), Plaintiff introduces many new statistics that 7 are not in the FAC, (Doc. 24 at 11), which cannot be considered by this Court on a motion to 8 dismiss. Nor do those statistics meaningfully advance Plaintiff’s case. For instance, Plaintiff talks 9 about how the FPD had more shootings between 2016 and 2021 than 68% of other law 10 enforcement agencies. The significance of that number, however, is not clear to this Court. 11 Similarly, Plaintiff points out that “[a]lmost half of guns ‘perceived’ guns were never found[,]”3 12 but without explaining the significance of this fact. 13 The FAC relies only on one statistic: that “only 18%” of complaints of police misconduct 14 “were ruled in favor of civilians.” (Doc. 24 at 11 (citing Doc. 16 at ¶ 33).) Plaintiff offers no 15 explanation as to how this bears on the liability of Hall, other than to argue that it “indicat[es] that 16 there is a lack of accountability and punishment for use of excessive force by officers.” (Doc. 16 17 at ¶ 33.) “Statistics of unsustained complaints of excessive force and other police misconduct, 18 without any evidence that those complaints had merit, does not suffice to establish [supervisory] 19 liability under § 1983.” Cf. Hocking v. City of Roseville, No. Civ. S-06-0316 RRB EFB, 2008 WL 20 1808250, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2008) (holding that unexplained statistics do not establish 21 Monell liability). Moreover, “the number of complaints filed, without more, indicates nothing. 22 People may file a complaint for many reasons,” perhaps for reasons wholly unrelated to 23 Plaintiff’s injury, “or for no reason at all.” See Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768–69 24 (7th Cir. 1985). Instead, Plaintiff “need[s] to identify what made the use of force in other matters 25 illegal and show that a similar illegality was involved in [his] case.” See Whiting v. City of San 26 Jose, No. 21-CV-05248-VKD, 2022 WL 2714968, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2022) (discussing the 27
28 3 The Court assumes Plaintiff is trying to say that officers’ belief that a person is holding a firearm is wrong half the 1 use of statistical evidence in the context of Monell liability) (emphasis added). 2 Second, as Defendants point out, Chief Hall became the head of the Fresno Police 3 Department in 2019—and Plaintiff has not explained his connection to two shootings that 4 occurred before 2019. (Doc. 25 at 4.) Though Chief Hall served for more than 40 years prior to 5 becoming the Chief of the Fresno Police Department, Plaintiff has not alleged in the FAC 6 whether Mr. Hall was in a position to reign in “rogue” officers prior to 2019. 7 Moreover, even though the incident involving Plaintiff occurred two years after Mr. Hall 8 became the head of the FPD, it does not suggest that Chief Hall was not trying to effectuate 9 change. Plaintiff has offered no “specific allegations” regarding Chief Hall’s purported 10 “‘acquiescence in’ the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates.” Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 942 11 (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1206–07)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court GRANTS 12 Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the first cause of action with leave to amend. 13 B. Third Cause of Action: Monell Liability 14 To establish municipal liability under § 1983, plaintiffs “must prove that ‘action pursuant 15 to official municipal policy’ caused their injury.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) 16 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). Official municipal policy includes “the decisions of a 17 government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and 18 widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Id. at 61 (citations omitted). “A municipality 19 may not, however, be sued under a respondeat superior theory. A plaintiff must therefore show 20 ‘deliberate action attributable to the municipality [that] directly caused a deprivation of federal 21 rights.’” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations 22 omitted) (alteration in original). 23 “Allegations of Monell liability will be sufficient for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) where 24 they: (1) identify the challenged policy/custom; (2) explain how the policy/custom is deficient; 25 (3) explain how the policy/custom caused the plaintiff harm; and (4) reflect how the 26 policy/custom amounted to deliberate indifference, i.e. show how the deficiency involved was 27 obvious and the constitutional injury was likely to occur.” Lucas v. City of Visalia, No. 1:09-CV- 28 1015AWIDLB, 2010 WL 1444667, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010) (citations omitted). 1 As an initial matter, the Court notes that “if individuals are being sued in their official 2 capacity as municipal officials and the municipal entity itself is also being sued, then the claims 3 against the individuals are duplicative and should be dismissed.” See Vance v. Cnty. of Santa 4 Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Carnell v. Grimm, 872 F. Supp. 746, 752 5 (D. Haw. 1994), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part for want of jurisdiction, 74 F.3d 977 (9th 6 Cir. 1996)) (emphasis in original). The FAC expressly states that third cause of action is grounded 7 in a theory of “Municipal Liability for Unconstitutional Custom or Policy.” (Doc. 16 at 17. 8 (emphasis added).) As such, Plaintiff’s “official capacity” claim against municipal officials (e.g., 9 Chief Hall) is redundant given that Plaintiff also has named the City. Therefore, this warrants 10 dismissal of the Monell claim against Chief Hall.4 Solis v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:14-cv-00483- 11 KJM-KJ, 2014 WL 2768847, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2014) (“As an initial matter, the court 12 dismisses plaintiff’s claim against Sheriff Ferrara as a municipal officer with prejudice because 13 plaintiff sues Sheriff Ferrara in his official capacity along with the County.” (citation omitted)). 14 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the third cause of action with respect to Chief Hall and other 15 individual defendants WITH PREJUDICE. 16 1. Monell Policy or Custom 17 To prove a claim for municipal liability based on a policy, custom, or practice, a plaintiff 18 must “demonstrate that an ‘official policy, custom, or pattern’ on the part of [the defendant] was 19 ‘the actionable cause of the claimed injury.’” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1143 20 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 21 2008)). “A policy or custom may be found either in an affirmative . . . policy or in the failure of 22 an official ‘to take any remedial steps after [the constitutional] violations.’” Gomez v. Vernon, 23 255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 647 24 (9th Cir. 1991). The former is sometimes called a policy of action, which occurs when “the 25 4 Plaintiff argues that the Ninth Circuit purportedly held in Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. 26 Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008), that an “official capacity claim against Sheriff of Los Angeles County, while equivalent to a suit against the Sheriff’s Department, is not equivalent to a suit against Los Angeles 27 County.” (Doc. 24 at 18.) That is plainly false, for the L.A. County was not even a party to that case, and the cited page made no such distinction. This Court finds no support in the case law for Plaintiff’s assertion that “an official 28 capacity claim against the Chief of the FPD is not equivalent to a suit against the City of Fresno.” (See id. (emphasis 1 government body itself violates someone’s constitutional rights, or instructs its employees to do 2 so[.]” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014). The latter is sometimes called a 3 policy of inaction, which “is based on a government body’s ‘failure to implement procedural 4 safeguards to prevent constitutional violations.’” Id. (quoting Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 5 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012)). 6 In addition to proving the existence of a written policy, “a plaintiff may be able to prove 7 the existence of a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express 8 municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the 9 force of law.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality) (quoting 10 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970)). “Liability for improper custom,” 11 however, “may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon 12 practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a 13 traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) 14 (citations omitted), holding modified by Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001). For 15 instance, “two vaguely described incidents are insufficient to support a claim for municipal 16 liability.” See Bagley v. City of Sunnyvale, No. 16-cv-02250-JSC, 2017 WL 5068567, at *5 (N.D. 17 Cal. Nov. 3, 2017); see also Wilkins v. City of Tempe, No. CV 09-00752-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 18 94116, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 6, 2010) (finding insufficient evidence to infer a municipal policy or 19 practice of racial discrimination based on the filing of two lawsuits and forced retirement of one 20 police officer). In contrast, court have denied the motion to dismiss the Monell claim when a 21 plaintiff alleges eight specific instances of misconduct by jail guards. See, e.g., Nelson v. City of 22 Los Angeles, No. CV 11-5407-PSG JPR, 2015 WL 1931714, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 23 2015). 24 Defendants argue that the 2015 and 2017 shootings mentioned in the FAC do not show a 25 “policy or custom” for purposes of Monell liability. (Doc. 18 at 8.) The Court agrees with 26 Defendants that “two vaguely described incidents are insufficient to support a claim for municipal 27 liability.” See Bagley, 2017 WL 5068567, at *5. Moreover, the Court finds that the 2015 and 28 2017 shootings are not analogous to the present incident. For instance, the FAC states at a high 1 level of generality that, in 2015, a Fresno Police Officer shot and killed a person “prior to 2 providing any warning or any attempt to utilize less lethal force.” (Doc. 16 at ¶ 34.) These sparse 3 factual allegations do not demonstrate a sufficiently analogous situation as to the shooting of Mr. 4 Coronado. Rather, the FAC expressly states that Officers Dechow and Bishop shouted commands 5 at Plaintiff, including “something again about dropping his weapon[.]” (Id. at ¶ 20.) The same is 6 true as to the 2017 incident. Mr. Coronado was neither running away nor did any officer say 7 anything like “good shot.” (See Doc. 16 at ¶ 37.) Therefore, because FAC does not set forth 8 enough factual detail to demonstrate that the 2015 and 2017 incidents appear to be analogous or 9 “closely related” to the present incident, cf. Canton, 489 U.S. at 391, whatever FPD policy or 10 custom implicated by them did not cause—i.e., was not the “moving force” behind—the shooting 11 of Plaintiff Coronado, City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985); Wright v. Cnty. 12 of San Bernardino, No. 5:24-cv-01123-JLS-JC, 2025 WL 546362, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2025) 13 (“None of these examples are sufficiently similar (and close enough to the incident at issue) to 14 permit the inferences that the alleged policy/custom exists and was the “moving force” behind 15 Plaintiff’s injuries.”). 16 Plaintiff argues that paragraphs 79 to 81 of the FAC shows that he has sufficiently pled 17 the existence of a practice or custom. (Doc. 24 at 19–20.) Those cited paragraphs, however, lack 18 factual allegations and are, instead, conclusory. The FAC alleges, for instance, that the City has 19 “an unconstitutional policy, custom, and practice of detaining and arresting individuals without 20 probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and using excessive force, which also is demonstrated by 21 inadequate training regarding these subjects.” (Doc. 16 at ¶ 79(g); see also id. at ¶ 79(h) 22 (“Condoning and encouraging [FPD’s] officers in the belief that they can violate the rights of 23 persons such as Mr. Coronado with impunity, and that such conduct will not adversely affect their 24 opportunities for promotion and other employment benefits.”).) Like Warner, Plaintiff’s “Monell 25 claim consists of formulaic recitations of the existence of unlawful policies, customs, or habits. 26 Plaintiff[] do[es] not allege any specific facts giving rise to a plausible Monell claim.” See 27 Warner v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10cv1057 BTM (BLM), 2011 WL 662993, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 28 Feb. 14, 2011). 1 Plaintiff further argues that none of the cases cited by Defendants “deal with pleadings 2 requirements or motions to dismiss.” (Doc. 24 at 20.) That is incorrect. In Warner—a case cited 3 by Defendants—arose in the context of a motion to dismiss. Finally, Plaintiff argues that facts 4 showing “systemic” misbehavior of the City’s police force can be found in Section IV.A of its 5 brief. (Id.) However, at issue here are factual allegations made in the FAC. 6 2. Failure to Train 7 Under limited circumstances, “a local government’s decision not to train certain 8 employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an 9 official government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 10 (2011). To establish liability under this theory, the “municipality’s failure to train its employees 11 in a relevant respect must amount to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom 12 the [untrained employees] come into contact.’” Id. (citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 13 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). The deliberate indifference standard requires Plaintiff to prove “that ‘the 14 need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the 15 violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have 16 been deliberately indifferent to the need.’” Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 802 (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. 17 at 390). “Ordinarily, ‘[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations,’ rather than proof of a single 18 incident, is ‘necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference.’ Nonetheless, single-incident 19 liability may exist in the rare case where ‘the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train’ are 20 ‘patently obvious.’” Perez v. City of Fresno, 98 F.4th 919, 931 (9th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). 21 Defendants first argue that “Plaintiff merely alleges that defendant officers were 22 inadequately trained, but “fails to allege sufficient facts to support a finding that the failure to 23 train amounted to [] ‘deliberate indifference’” within the meaning of Monell liability. (Doc. 18 at 24 19.) In response, Plaintiff “asserts Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the 25 foreseeable consequences” of Defendants’ failure to train its officers, (see Doc. 24 at 21. 26 (emphasis added)), but the FAC offers to facts to support this assertion. For instance, Plaintiff 27 alleges, in a conclusory manner, that the City “knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should 28 have known” that Officers Dechow and Bishop had a “propensity for violence” and for using 1 excessive force. (Doc. 16 at ¶ 79(c).) Such threadbare conclusory allegations have not been 2 permitted since Twombly and Iqbal. 3 Second, regardless of whether Plaintiff is alleging a “pattern of similar constitutional 4 violations” or pursuing “single-incident liability” theory, Perez, 98 F.4th at 931, Plaintiff needs to 5 plead and prove that “policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission 6 in their training program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights.” 7 Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (emphasis added). Plaintiff then needs to show that “the identified 8 deficiency in [the] city’s training program [is] closely related to [his constitutional] injury.” 9 Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. 10 As Defendants point out, (Doc. 18 at 19), however, Plaintiff has not offered little other 11 than threadbare conclusory statements, stating that the City’s hiring and training practices are 12 inadequate. (See, e.g., Doc. 16 at ¶ 79(b) (“Employing and retaining as police officers . . . 13 [Defendants knew or] reasonably should have known had dangerous propensities for abusing 14 their authority. . . .”); Id. at ¶ 79(c) (“Inadequately supervising, training . . . personnel, . . . whom 15 Defendants . . . knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known had the . . . 16 propensity for violence. . . .”).) Plaintiff has not, for instance, explained what are the specific 17 topics that the City is not teaching its police officers. Is it psychological discipline under stressful 18 situations, de-escalation strategies, or firearm identification? Thus, like Young v. City of Visalia, 19 “the complaint does not identify what the training and hiring practices were, how the training and 20 hiring practices were deficient, or how the training and hiring practices caused Plaintiff[’s] harm.” 21 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149–50 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted). 22 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to specifically identify the “particular 23 omission” in the City’s training program, nor has he shown how said omission is “closely related” 24 to his injuries. 25 3. Ratification 26 As Defendants correctly recognize, (see Doc. 18 at 20), to prevail on a theory of 27 ratification, Plaintiff must plead and prove that Chief Hall came to the same conclusion and on 28 the same grounds as officers under his command, for the Supreme Court’s decision in 1 “Praprotnik requires that a policymaker approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it 2 before the policymaker will be deemed to have ratified the subordinate’s discretionary decision.” 3 Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (citation omitted) 4 (emphasis in original). 5 Plaintiff, however, merely argues that Chief Hall has failed to “explicitly reject[] the 6 officers’ wrongdoing” and/or “deflect[ed] from their violative behavior by assigning blame to the 7 Plaintiff or unrelated topics like homelessness and addiction.” (Doc. 24 at 22.) Plaintiff fails to 8 allege how Chief Hall approved of “the basis for” his subordinate’s decision. Put differently, 9 Plaintiff has not alleged how Chief Hall’s “deflecti[on]” onto the topic of homelessness and 10 addiction relates to the reason(s) why Officers Dechow, Bishop, Nichols, and Graves used 11 excessive force. 12 The City’s purported ratifications of the two prior shootings are also insufficient to 13 support a Monell claim. (See, e.g., Doc. 24 at 20 (arguing that the FAC “provid[es] multiple 14 examples of use of deadly force against unarmed civilians, as well as facts supporting the 15 systematic impunity endorsed by the FPD and ratified by its highest officials[]”); Id. at 21 16 (arguing that Plaintiff has “explicitly identifie[d] several documented instances of the FPD’s 17 deficient response” to the misconduct of its officers).) Notably, the FAC provides nothing but a 18 one-sentence description of the 2015 incident, followed by a ten-word-long sentence stating that 19 “[a]n investigation found the use of force to be justified.” (See Doc. 16 at ¶ 34.) Such barebone 20 description does not provide this Court with any colorable basis to determine whether the FPD 21 had ratified “the basis for” its officers’ decision to shoot Casillas, the victim of the 2015 shooting. 22 With respect to the 2017 shooting, the FAC states that the incident was investigated by the Fresno 23 Police Department’s Internal Affairs Bureau, the Fresno County District Attorney’s Office, and 24 the City of Fresno’s Office of Independent Review, and they all “concluded that the use of lethal 25 force was justified.” (Doc. 16 at ¶ 35 (quotation marks omitted).) Plaintiff has not explained why 26 Chief Hall’s reliance on the unanimous judgment of three distinct investigations amounted to 27 “ratification” or otherwise rose to the level of reckless, “deliberate indifference,” see Peterson v. 28 City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding no ratification of use of 1 excessive force where the Chief of Police determined after investigation that the officers 2 complied with department policies), especially since the District Attorney’s finding is entitled to 3 the “presumption of regularity,” cf. Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 400 (2019) (discussing the 4 presumption of prosecutorial regularity in the context of malicious prosecution). Rather, “[f]or 5 there to be ratification,” Plaintiff must plead and prove “‘something more’ than a single failure to 6 discipline or the fact that a policymaker concluded that the defendant officer’s actions were in 7 keeping with the applicable policies and procedures.” Kong Meng Xiong v. City of Merced, No. 8 1:13-cv-00083-SKO, 2015 WL 4598861, at *29 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2015) (citing Kanae v. 9 Hodson, 294 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1191 (D. Haw. 2003)); see also Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 10 1239 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is well-settled that a policymaker’s mere refusal to overrule a 11 subordinate’s completed act does not constitute approval.”); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 12 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009) (no ratification of use of excessive force where the Chief of 13 Police determined after investigation that the officers complied with department policies); 14 Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 382 (1st Cir. 1989) (“As we have indicated before, we cannot 15 hold the failure of a police department to discipline in a specific instance is an adequate basis for 16 municipal liability under Monell.” ). Again, isolated incidents are not enough to support a theory 17 of ratification. 18 Moreover, as Defendants point out, (Doc. 25 at 4), Plaintiff is relying on new facts 19 introduced in Part IV.A of its brief, which are not in the FAC, (Doc. 24 at 20, 22); the Court 20 cannot consider them on a motion to dismiss. Relatedly, the Court declines to consider any 21 allegation without citation to the FAC. Plaintiff was obligated to direct the Court to the factual 22 allegations of the FAC that support his position. It is not for the Court to comb through the FAC 23 to try to find support for Plaintiff’s assertions. In sum, Plaintiff has failed to show that the 24 incidents amounted to a municipal “policy;” “that this policy amount[ed] to deliberate 25 indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right;” and that the policy is sufficiently analogous to 26 the incident involving Mr. Coronado as to have had caused the constitutional violation. Plumeau 27 v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks 28 and citation omitted). 1 For the foregoing reasons, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the third 2 cause of action with leave to amend. See AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 3 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that leave to amend is appropriate because plausible facts supporting a 4 policy or custom can cure deficiencies in a Monell claim). 5 C. Second Cause of Action: Pre-Trial Detention 6 The FAC states, under the second cause of action, that Plaintiff “has a right to safe 7 conditions of pretrial confinement under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 8 Constitution.” (Doc. 16 at ¶ 65. (emphasis added).) 9 1. Unsafe Conditions 10 The Court first considers the claim that was explicitly raised in the FAC—the unsafe 11 conditions claim. The Court agrees with Defendants, (Doc. 25 at 6), that the correct legal standard 12 for assessing Plaintiff’s unsafe conditions claim is “objective deliberate indifference,” under 13 which “the plaintiff must ‘prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something 14 akin to reckless disregard[,]’” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) 15 (quoting Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016)) (footnote omitted). 16 In Mastromonaco, the Southern District of New York addressed a situation where the 17 plaintiff complained “that he was ‘chained’ to the bed while at the Hospital.” Mastromonaco v. 18 Cnty. of Westchester, No. 15 CV 10166 (VB), 2018 WL 4042111, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 19 2018), aff’d, 779 F. App’x 49 (2d Cir. 2019). The S.D.N.Y explained: 20 In evaluating the reasonableness of handcuffing, a court considers: (i) whether the handcuffs were unreasonably tight; (ii) whether 21 defendants ignored plaintiff’s pleas that the handcuffs were too tight; and (iii) the degree of injury to the wrists. Here, there is no evidence 22 to suggest plaintiff’s handcuffs were too tight, he asked to have the handcuffs removed, or he was injured as a result of being handcuffed 23 to the bed. Therefore, the use of handcuffs while plaintiff was at the Hospital does not amount to a constitutional violation. 24 25 Id. (internal citation omitted); see also El Bey v. Russel, No. 23-cv-00107-LB, 2023 WL 4332389, 26 at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2023) (“Overly tight handcuffs sometimes can establish a Fourth 27 Amendment violation, and sometimes they do not. Usually, viable claims involve extremely tight 28 cuffs and resulting injury. The plaintiff needs to describe more specifically what happened when 1 he was handcuffed.” (internal citations omitted)); Saddozai v. San Francisco Gen. Hosp. Med. 2 Ctr., No. 18-04492 BLF (PR), 2019 WL 3082944, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2019) (holding that 3 Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an excessive force claim in light of the fact that officers applied 4 “excessively tight shackles and handcuffs that were applied continuously for four days,” and that 5 officers “allegedly punched Plaintiff in the face ‘without reason[]’” (citation omitted)), aff’d sub 6 nom. Saddozai v. Nelson, No. 20-16803, 2022 WL 501580 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 2022). 7 Here, Plaintiff alleges that he “was handcuffed to the hospital bed rail by his left wrist, 8 despite not having been charged with any crime and being severely injured,” (Doc. 16 at ¶ 29); 9 that he was questioned while he was chained to the hospital bed, (id.); and that he was not 10 charged with any offense until the following evening. (Id. at ¶ 31.) He has not, however, alleged 11 that handcuffing him to a hospital bed had, in fact, caused additional injury to him, nor has he 12 alleged that he complained about the handcuff to unnamed officers at the hospital. Plaintiff 13 merely alleges that handcuffing him to his hospital “potentially interfer[ed] with his recovery,” 14 not that it actually did. (Doc. 24 at 16 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff has not plausibly 15 alleged/explained how police questioning was “inhumane” or “unsafe.”5 (See Doc. 24 at 15–16.) 16 The fact that Plaintiff was not charged for 40 hours, (Doc. 24 at 16), does not appear to 17 address whether he was confined in an unsafe or inhumane manner. Likewise, it does not appear 18 that the delay ran afoul of the Constitution. As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment requires 19 that judicial determinations of probable cause to be made within 48 hours of arrest or seizure. See 20 Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). While an arrestee or detainee may have 21 a due process right to be released within a reasonable time after the reason for his detention has 22 ended, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments may permit a “reasonable postponement” of—or 23 delay in—a person’s release. See Brass v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 24 2003) (quoting McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 48)). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege or 25 explain that his 40-hour-long confinement arose to an actionable constitutional violation. 26
27 5 “Claims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment. Because pretrial detainees’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to 28 prisoners’ rights under the Eighth Amendment, however, [courts] apply the same standards.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 1 2. Non-Punitive Purpose 2 To prevail on his Fourteenth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must establish that the 3 restrictions imposed by his confinement constituted punishment rather than a legitimate 4 governmental purpose. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). To constitute impermissible 5 punishment, Plaintiff must plead and prove that (a) the harm or disability caused by the 6 government’s action must significantly exceed, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of 7 confinement, Bell, 441 U.S. at 537, and (b) that the particular restriction/condition is not 8 reasonably related to a legitimate, non-punitive government objective, Demery v. Arpaio, 378 9 F.3d 1020, 1028–30 (9th Cir. 2004). 10 Plaintiff’s claim of unnecessary handcuffing does not rise to the level of a harm or 11 disability condemned by the Constitution. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.21 (“There is, of course, a 12 de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned.”). As Defendants 13 point out, (Doc. 24 at 25 at 7), Plaintiff has not explained how handcuffing him to his hospital bed 14 injured him.6 Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that handcuffing him to his hospital “potentially 15 interfer[ed] with his recovery,” not that it actually did. (Doc. 24 at 16 (emphasis added.) “[T]he 16 detainee’s understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as 17 possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into 18 ‘punishment.’” See Bell, 441 U.S. at 537. Rather, Plaintiff must plausibly allege sufficient facts 19 showing how handcuffing him to his hospital bed caused “objectively serious” harms, Sain v. 20 Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 2008), and caused injuries that significantly exceed the 21 “inherent discomforts of confinement,” Demery, 378 F.3d at 1030. As currently plead, his 22 conclusory allegation that handcuffing him to his hospital bed was both “inhumane” and 23 unjustifiably punitive, (Doc. 24 at 16–17), fail to state a claim. 24 Plaintiff also complains “that there was no reasonable penological need for . . . keeping 25 him under surveillance[] and subjecting him to questioning” without support from his family, 26
27 6 “Claims by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment. Because pretrial detainees’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to 28 prisoners’ rights under the Eighth Amendment, however, [courts] apply the same standards.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 1 especially considering that “Plaintiff was ultimately charged with a mere misdemeanor,” not a 2 “serious crime;” as such, the conditions of his confinement was punitive in nature. (Doc. 24 at 16 3 (citation to the record omitted).) The Court disagrees. First, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that 4 he was harmed or injured due to any surveillance or questioning. Second, Plaintiff’s allegations 5 fail to plausibly suggest that the government’s action—questioning an individual who was shot by 6 an officer—was not reasonably related to a legitimate, non-punitive government objective. Third, 7 Plaintiff has cited no authority for his position that familial visitation for a pre-arraignment 8 detainee within 48 hours of detention is a relevant factor that this Court needs to consider. Fourth, 9 the fact that “Plaintiff was ultimately charged with a mere misdemeanor” does not directly speak 10 to the question of whether police officers had legitimate reasons to handcuff Plaintiff to his 11 hospital bed for the first 40 hours immediately after a shooting, before all the facts are known. 12 The Court also notes that Plaintiff is challenging, under the second cause of action, the 13 conditions of his confinement at the hospital, yet the FAC clearly states that Plaintiff was not 14 charged with, or cited for, any crime or misdemeanor when he left the hospital. (Doc. 16 at ¶ 31.) 15 It is the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, that governs claims asserted 16 by an arrestee who is detained without a warrant up to the time the arrestee is arraigned or 17 released. Pierce v. Multnomah Cnty., Or., 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We hold, 18 therefore, that the Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations on the 19 treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up until the time such arrestee is released or 20 found to be legally in custody based upon probable cause for arrest.”). Put another way, it appears 21 that Plaintiff must pursue a theory of liability based on his Fourth Amendment right to be free 22 from unreasonable seizure,7 not a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on pretrial conditions of 23 confinement. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the second cause of action WITH LEAVE 24 TO AMEND consistent with the above instructions. 25 7 The Fourth Amendment requires police officers making an arrest or seizure to use only an amount of force that is 26 objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances facing them. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The answer to this question calls for a balance test that weighs “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s 27 Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing government interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted above, Plaintiff has not alleged that the handcuffs or restraints were applied too tightly. 28 Rather, Plaintiff is apparently objecting that he was required to wear handcuffs and restraints at all. Absent more 1 CONCLUSION 2 | Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS: 3 (1) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16) is GRANTED IN PART. 4 (2) Plaintiff's first cause of action is DISMISSED with respect to Chief Hall with 21 5 days leave to amend. 6 (3) Plaintiffs second cause of action is DISMISSED with PREJUDICE. 7 (4) Plaintiffs third cause of action is DISMISSED with respect to the City of Fresno 8 with 21 days leave to amend. 9 (5) Plaintiff's third cause of action is DISMISSED with respect to all other defendants 10 with PREJUDICE. 11 | Failure to amend the FAC will result in the action proceeding only on the causes of action and as 12 | to the defendants not dismissed in this order. 13 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: _ October 24, 2025 Charis [Tourn TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 18