Corona v. Metropolitan 298-308 Associates, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Corona v. Metropolitan 298-308 Associates, Inc.

281 A.D.2d 447, 722 N.Y.S.2d 51, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2378

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 12, 2001

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 281 A.D.2d 447 (Corona v. Metropolitan 298-308 Associates, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Corona v. Metropolitan 298-308 Associates, Inc., 281 A.D.2d 447, 722 N.Y.S.2d 51, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2378 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Minnow Associates, Daniel Miller, Judy Miller, and Gerald Miller appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rappaport, J.), dated September 13, 1999, as granted those branches of the plaintiffs motion which were for summary judgment on the issue of liability based upon Labor Law § 240 (1) insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff was injured when he fell off the roof of a four-story building during the course of his employment with the third-party defendant S & H Construction. The defendant Metropolitan 298-308 Associates, Inc. (hereinafter Metro), is the owner of the building. The defendant Minnow Associates is the managing agent for Metro, and the defendants Daniel Miller, Judy Miller, and Gerald Miller (hereinafter the appellants), are all partners in Minnow. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment against Metro and the appellants on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240 (1). The appellants contend that they cannot be held liable as agents of the owner as there are questions of fact as to whether they exercised control over the plaintiffs activity. We disagree.

[448]*448The “key criterion in ascertaining Labor Law 240 (1) liability is not whether the party charged with the violation actually exercised control over the work, but rather whether he or she had the right to do so” (Kelly v LeMoyne Coll., 199 AD2d 942, 943). The record clearly indicates that the appellants had the right to control the plaintiffs work. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiffs motion which were for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim insofar as asserted against the appellants. Krausman, J. P., Goldstein, Luciano and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Minnow Associates, Daniel Miller, Judy Miller, and Gerald Miller appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rappaport, J.), dated September 13, 1999, as granted those branches of the plaintiffs motion which were for summary judgment on the issue of liability based upon Labor Law § 240 (1) insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff was injured when he fell off the roof of a four-story building during the course of his employment with the third-party defendant S & H Construction. The defendant Metropolitan 298-308 Associates, Inc. (hereinafter Metro), is the owner of the building. The defendant Minnow Associates is the managing agent for Metro, and the defendants Daniel Miller, Judy Miller, and Gerald Miller (hereinafter the appellants), are all partners in Minnow. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment against Metro and the appellants on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240 (1). The appellants contend that they cannot be held liable as agents of the owner as there are questions of fact as to whether they exercised control over the plaintiffs activity. We disagree.

[448]*448The “key criterion in ascertaining Labor Law 240 (1) liability is not whether the party charged with the violation actually exercised control over the work, but rather whether he or she had the right to do so” (Kelly v LeMoyne Coll., 199 AD2d 942, 943). The record clearly indicates that the appellants had the right to control the plaintiffs work. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiffs motion which were for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim insofar as asserted against the appellants. Krausman, J. P., Goldstein, Luciano and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.

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281 A.D.2d 447, 722 N.Y.S.2d 51, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2378, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/corona-v-metropolitan-298-308-associates-inc-nyappdiv-2001.

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