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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
GASTON CORNU-LABAT,
Respondent, No. 86842-5
v. En Bane
HOSPITAL DISTRICT NO.2 Filed !APR 11 2013 GRANT COUNTY d/b/a QUINCY VALLEY HOSPITAL,
Appellant.
J.M. JOHNSON, J.-While employed as a physician at Quincy Valley
Medical Center (QVMC), Gaston Cornu-Labat was the subject of several
complaints that raised doubts as to his competency to practice medicine.
QVMC conducted two investigations that ended after the charges against
Dr. Cornu-Labat were not substantiated. Nevertheless, QVMC requested
that Dr. Comu-Labat be psychologically evaluated and ended the doctor's
employment when he failed to consult the recommended provider. Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
Dr. Cornu-Labat filed a Public Records Act (PRA) (chapter 42.56 RCW)
request asking for records related to the hospital's investigations. QVMC
claimed the documents were exempt from disclosure under RCW 4.24.250
(documents prepared for and maintained by a regularly constituted peer
review committee), RCW 70.41.200 (documents prepared for and
maintained by a regularly constituted quality improvement committee), or
RCW 70.44.062 (meetings ·or proceedings of a public hospital district board
or its agents concerning the status of a health care provider's clinical
privileges).
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Cornu-
Labat, holding none of the PRA exemptions invoked by QVMC applied.
The court concluded that the records of a peer review committee that
contained nonphysicians could not qualify for the exemption in RCW
4.24.250. This was error. We remand because questions of material fact
remain as to whether the records at issue were prepared for a regularly
constituted peer review body under RCW 4.24.250. Questions also remain
as to whether any records were generated during a confidential meeting of
agents of the QVMC board concerning Dr. Cornu-Labat's clinical or staff
privileges. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that the exemption for
2 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
quality improvement committees, RCW 70.41.200, does not apply under
these facts.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
QVMC is a public hospital district. A public hospital district is a
municipal corporation. RCW 70.44.010. As such, QVMC is a "local
agency" for purposes of the PRA. RCW 42.56.010(1). The hospital is very
small. At the time of the events pertinent to this case, the medical staff
consisted of four physicians with voting rights and two nonvoting nurse
practitioners. The medical staff is governed by QVMC's bylaws. Article
VIII of the bylaws delineates a procedure for corrective or disciplinary
action. Corrective action taken under article VIII must be authorized by the
medical staff. QVMC also has a disruptive behavior policy under which the
hospital administrator or chief of staff can act unilaterally.
Respondent, Gaston Cornu-Labat, was a surgeon employed by QVMC
from February 2007 until January 2010. While serving as president of the
QVMC medical staff, Dr. Cornu-Labat enlisted a consultant to conduct a
hospital improvement project. Dr. Cornu-Labat openly challenged the
administration on a number of issues. His relationship with the
administration and staff became strained, which he believes led to a series of
strange incidents at the hospital and ultimately his dismissal.
3 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
The first relevant incident occurred on the night of July 23, 2009.
Dr. Cornu-Labat was conversing with a nurse who told him she felt
uncomfortable with the interaction. Dr. Cornu-Labat left the conversation
and self-reported the incident to hospital administrators. The nurse stated
she smelled alcohol on Dr. Cornu-Labat and that he seemed aggressive and
impatient during their conversation. Dr. Mark Vance, the vice-president of
the medical staff, and Mr. Mehdi Merred, the hospital administrator,
interviewed four witnesses regarding the matter. Dr. Cornu-Labat was also
interviewed. He was informed the interview was being conducted in
accordance with article VIII of the hospital's bylaws. The investigators
concluded there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation of
intoxication.
In August 2009, several other complaints were made to hospital
administration regarding Dr. Cornu-Labat's competency to practice
medicine and his behavior at work. It was alleged the doctor was
uncharacteristically arriving late, rescheduling patients without explanation,
having patients wait while he made lengthy phone calls, failing to take
patients' vital signs, neglecting his hygiene, and intimidating staff members.
The complaints were accompanied by requests that the doctor be suspended
immediately.
4 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
In response, Dr. Vance and Mr. Merred met with the entire medical
staff to determine if an investigation should be conducted. The medical staff
authorized an investigation. It was led by Mr. Merred, Dr. Vance, and
Mr. Anthony Gonzalez, the board commissioner in charge of personnel.
Dr. Cornu-Labat was interviewed on August 4, 2009. Like before, he was
informed the interview was conducted in accordance with article VIII of the
hospital's bylaws. The complaints were not routed to the hospital's Quality
Improvement Committee, a specialized committee that manages the
hospital's "Organizational Quality Plan."
QVMC did not uncover enough evidence to substantiate the
complaints during its investigation. On August 6, 2009, Dr. Cornu-Labat
was presented a letter stating he had been cleared of all charges of
unprofessional behavior. Nevertheless hospital administrators "remained
concerned" for him. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 88. QVMC placed Dr. Cornu-
Labat on paid leave and referred him to the Washington Physician's Health
Program (WPHP). QVMC informed Dr. Cornu-Labat it would await a
recommendation from WPHP as to his fitness to practice. Dr. Cornu-Labat
refused to visit WPHP and instead sought examinations from other
psychologists. He was later dismissed from QVMC for his failure to follow
QVMC's requests.
5 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
Dr. Cornu-Labat filed a PRA request on July 29, 2009, seeking
disclosure of records relating to the first investigation. QVMC denied the
request, initially claiming that the hospital was not a public agency subject to
the PRA or, in the alternative, that the records were "investigative" and
exempt under RCW 42.56.240. Dr. Cornu-Labat made a second PRA
request for documents relating to both investigations on August 11, 2009.
QVMC did not respond. A third request was made on August 26, 2009, and
a fourth on January 5, 2010. QVMC responded that the requested records
were exempt from disclosure as quality assurance and peer review materials.
On March 8, 2010, Dr. Cornu-Labat filed suit in Grant County
Superior Court seeking an order requiring QVMC to disclose the requested
records and requesting penalties and attorney fees under RCW 42.56.550( 4).
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted
Dr. Cornu-Labat's motion and denied QVMC's motion. It ruled the PRA
exemptions cited by QVMC did not apply because the investigations into
Dr. Cornu-Labat's conduct were conducted by "ad hoc investigative teams
which included non-physicians." CP at 375. The court held under RCW
4.24.250, "the peer review committee must be regularly constituted and must
consist only of the professional peers of the member being reviewed." ld.
After QVMC's motion for reconsideration was denied, QVMC appealed.
6 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
The Court of Appeals, Division Three, certified the case to this court
pursuant to RCW 2.06.030 and RAP 4.4. This court accepted review.
ANALYSIS
Public agency actions challenged under the PRA are reviewed de
novo. RCW 42.56.550(3). An appellate court stands in the same position as
the trial court when the record consists entirely of documentary evidence and
affidavits. Spokane Police Guild v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 112
Wn.2d 30, 35-36, 769 P.2d 283 (1989). The reviewing court is not bound by
the trial court's factual findings. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc y v. Univ.
of Wash., 125 Wn.2d 243, 253, 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (PAWS). But, where a
case was decided as a matter of summary judgment below, it may be
appropriate to remand for resolution of a factual question. I d.
The PRA is a "strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of
public records." Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 127, 580 P.2d 246
(1978). It "requires all state and local agencies to disclose any public record
upon request, unless the record falls within certain very specific
exemptions." PAWS, 125 Wn.2d at 250. QVMC contends the privileges it
invokes should be liberally construed because there is no underlying
litigation demanding broad discovery. Appellant's Opening Br. at 18-19.
But the PRA explicitly declares its disclosure provisions "shall be liberally
7 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
construed and its exemptions narrowly construed." RCW 42.56.030. Thus,
QVMC's assertion is untenable. The requested documents are exempt from
disclosure only if they fall under one of the specific, narrowly construed
exemptions.
Hospital internal review mechanisms are critical to maintaining
quality health care. See RCW 7. 71.01 0; see also Coburn v. Seda, 101
Wn.2d 270, 275, 677 P.2d 173 (1984) ('"Candid and conscientious
evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua non of adequate hospital care."'
(quoting Bredice v. Doctors Hasp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970)
aff'd, 156 U.S. App. D.C. 199, 479 F.2d 920 (1973))). "[E]xtemal access to
committee investigations stifles candor and inhibits constructive criticism
thought necessary to effective quality review." Anderson v. Breda, 103
Wn.2d 901, 905, 700 P.2d 737 (1985). Acknowledging this, the legislature
created a PRA exemption for "[i]nformation and documents created
specifically for, and collected and maintained . . . by a peer review
committee under RCW 4.24.250 .... " RCW 42.56.360(1)(c). Incorporated
into the PRA by reference, RCW 4.24.250 provides:
(1) Any health care provider as defined in RCW 7.70.020(1) and (2) who, in good faith, files charges or presents evidence against another member of their profession based on the
8 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
claimed incompetency or gross misconduct of such person before a regularly constituted review committee or board of a professional society or hospital whose duty it is to evaluate the competency and qualifications of members of the profession, including limiting the extent of practice of such person in a hospital or similar institution, or before a regularly constituted committee or board of a hospital whose duty it is to review and evaluate the quality of patient care and any person or entity who, in good faith, shares any information or documents with one or more other committees, boards, or programs under subsection (2) of this section, shall be immune from civil action for damages arising out of such activities. . . . The proceedings, reports, and written records of such committees or boards, or of a member, employee, staff person, or investigator of such a committee or board, are not subject to review or disclosure, or subpoena or discovery proceedings in any civil action, except actions arising out of the recommendations of such committees or boards involving the restriction or revocation of the clinical or staff privileges of a health care provider as defined in RCW 7.70.020(1) and (2).
(Emphasis added.)
In this case, the trial court concluded the records requested by
Dr. Cornu-Labat did not fall within the RCW 4.24.250 exemption because
nonphysicians were involved in the investigation. The court supported this
conclusion by pointing to the part of RCW 4.24.250(1) providing immunity
to those who bring charges against "another member of their profession."
This language does not support the trial court's conclusion, however. The
statute is plain in extending the exemption for written records to "a member,
employee, staff person, or investigator" of the committee. !d. (emphasis
9 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
added). The trial court's reading makes this portion of the statute
superfluous. We interpret statutes to give effect to all the language used so
that no portion is rendered meaningless or unnecessary. State v. J.P., 149
Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). The trial court's interpretation is
erroneous.
In interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Watson, 146 Wn.2d 947, 954,
51 P.3d 66 (2002). "In order to determine legislative intent, we begin with
the statute's plain language and ordinary meaning." Nat 'l Elec. Contractors
Ass 'n v. Riveland, 138 Wn.2d 9, 19, 978 P.2d 481 (1999). RCW 4.24.250
itself does not contain the language ''peer review committee." While RCW
42.56.360(1 )(c) references RCW 4.24.250 as involving a "peer review
committee," what constitutes a peer review committee is not defined in
RCW 42.56.360. Where the legislature has not defined a term, "this court
will give the term its plain and ordinary meaning ascertained from a standard
dictionary." Watson, 146 Wn.2d at 954. In "peer review committee," the
word "peer" is used as an adjective that describes a particular kind of review
committee. In the dictionary, the adjective "peer" is defined as "belonging
to the same group in society." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1665 (2002). This definition is not particularly instructive. A
10 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
"group in society" could be comprised of physicians alone or different types
of health care providers.
If, after looking to the dictionary, the meamng of a term is still
unclear, its meaning may be gleaned from "related statutes which disclose
legislative intent about the provision in question." Dep 't of Ecology v.
Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). The only
statute to define "peer review" is contained in chapter 7. 71 RCW (Health
Care Peer Review). RCW 7.71.030(1) defines a "peer review body of health
care providers" by reference to RCW 7.70.020. The referenced provision
defines "'health care provider'" to include "a hospital, clinic, health
maintenance organization, or nursing home; or an officer, director,
employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his or her
employment." RCW 7.70.020(3) (emphasis added). Thus, Mr. Merred, as
an officer of the hospital, and Mr. Gonzalez, as one of its directors, could
contribute to a "peer review body of health care providers."
This interpretation is in alignment with a majority of jurisdictions that
do not require a peer review committee to be limited to physicians. See, e.g.,
Driscoll v. Stucker, 893 So. 2d 32, 45 (La. 2005) ('"Peer review' is the
process by which physicians, hospitals and other health care providers
review the performance of other physicians and, when warranted, discipline
11 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
the reviewed physician." (emphasis added)); State ex rel. Charles Town Gen.
Hosp. v. Sanders, 210 W.Va. 118, 125 n.6, 556 S.E.2d 85 (2001) (defining
peer review as '"the procedure for evaluation by health care professionals of
the quality and efficiency of services ordered or performed by other health
care professionals . . . "' (quoting W. Va. Code § 30-3C-1 (1975)));
Brownwood Reg'! Hasp. v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 927 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.
1996) (holding the minutes of a board of trustees' meeting were protected by
peer review privilege even though the board contained nonphysician
members). In addition, many hospitals in this state have a peer review
process that includes nonphysicians. CP at 404-98. The trial court's
interpretation ofRCW 4.24.250 would not cover the peer review activities of
many Washington hospitals, frustrating the legislature's intent.
Dr. Cornu-Labat also argues the documents do not fall under RCW
4.24.250 because the group involved in the investigation was not "a
regularly constituted review committee." We have held a "showing of an
informal investigation is not sufficient under RCW 4.24.250." Adcox v.
Children's Orthopedic Hasp. & Med. Ctr., 123 Wn.2d 15, 31, 864 P.2d 921
(1993). Instead, RCW 4.24.250 is applicable "only if the committee in
question is 'a regularly constituted committee or board of [the] hospital
whose duty it is to review and evaluate the quality of patient care.'"
12 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
Coburn, 101 Wn.2d at 277 (alteration in original) (quoting former RCW
4.24.250 (1981)).
Regarding QVMC's first investigation, Dr. Cornu-Labat argues
"Merred formed the 'committee' the morning after Dr. Cornu-Labat self-
reported the incident with a QVMC nurse .... The 'investigation' lasted for
one day only." Br. ofResp't at 17. According to Dr. Cornu-Labat, Anthony
Gonzalez joined the second investigation because he was a state patrol
officer with an investigatory background, not because he was a QVMC
board member. ld. at 18. Dr. Cornu-Labat also posits the investigation was
conducted under the "disruptive behavior policy" rather than article VIII of
the bylaws. He says this policy "does not call for review by a regularly
constituted committee" but "authorizes a hospital administrator and the chief
of staff to investigate" an allegation. I d. at 27. It is evident article VIII was
not followed, Dr. Cornu-Labat argues, because he was not given an
opportunity to respond to the charges before the entire medical staff, as
provided in article VIII's corrective action procedure.
In contrast, QVMC maintains the investigation was conducted under
article VIII of its bylaws. Because QVMC is a small district hospital, it does
not have a specific executive or credentialing committee. Instead, the
entirety of the medical staff performs the functions that a committee of this
13 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
sort would perform at a larger hospital. The medical staff meets on a regular
basis. One of the duties of the medical staff under the QVMC bylaws is to
evaluate the competency and qualifications of medical staff members.
According to QVMC, the Cornu-Labat investigations were authorized by the
medical staff, and Dr. Vance, Mr. Merred, and Mr. Gonzalez were acting as
agents of this regularly constituted body. In Breda, we emphasized that the
privilege in RCW 4.24.250 extends to "the records of committee members
and agents." 103 Wn.2d at 904-05 (emphasis added).
Issues of material fact remain regarding whether the QVMC officials
that investigated Dr. Cornu-Labat were acting as agents of a regularly
constituted committee (the medical staff) under RCW 4.24.250 or as an ad
hoc investigative team. Questions also exist as to what review mechanism
the hospital utilized in investigating Dr. Cornu-Labat-the disruptive
behavior policy, which does not require participation of a regularly
constituted committee, or article VIII, which does. While exact compliance
with either policy is not pertinent to this case, the policy purportedly
followed will be illustrative of whether a regularly constituted committee
was involved. Furthermore, it is possible the first investigation did not meet
the requirements ofRCW 4.24.250, but the second did.
14 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
As material facts are in dispute, this issue was inappropriately decided
by summary judgment. The trial court made insufficient findings of fact
regarding the applicability of RCW 4.24.250 to the review procedure
utilized by QVMC because the court's ruling hinged on the fact that the
committee included nonphysicians. We remand for determination of
whether a regularly constituted peer review committee was involved in the
Cornu-Labat investigation but note that this committee may include
nonphysicians. The trial court should consider the hospital's bylaws and
internal regulations in making this determination. See Coburn, 101 Wn.2d
at 278. If there is sufficient evidence Dr. Vance, Mr. Merred, and
Mr. Gonzalez were acting as agents of "a regularly constituted review
committee or board of a . . . hospital whose duty it is to evaluate the
competency and qualifications of members of the profession," then the
records created specifically for, and collected and maintained by that
committee, are exempt. RCW 4.24.250(1).
The PRA also exempts "[i]nformation and documents created
specifically for, and collected and maintained by a quality improvement
committee under ... RCW 70.41.200." RCW 42.56.360(1) (c). RCW
70.41.200(1) mandates that hospitals maintain a quality improvement
15 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
program dedicated to improving the quality of health care and preventing
malpractice. A "quality improvement committee with the responsibility to
review the services rendered in the hospital" is required as part of this
program. RCW 70.41.200(1 )(a). This committee is vested with the
responsibility to "oversee and coordinate the quality improvement and
medical malpractice prevention program" and to "ensure that information
gathered pursuant to the program is used to review and to revise hospital
policies and procedures." Id.
The trial court interpreted QVMC' s position as conceding that the
RCW 70.41.200 exemption does not apply. CP at 374. Dr. Comu-Labat
was apparently under the same perception. Br. of Resp't at 34. QVMC
contends its position was misinterpreted: QVMC acknowledges the quality
improvement committee, convened under the hospital's "Organizational
Quality Plan," was not involved in the investigation. CP at 272. Its view is
that a hospital may have multiple quality improvement committees that
qualify for the exemption. In this case, QVMC claims the medical staff
acted as a quality improvement committee under RCW 70.41.200.
Given that exemptions to the PRA are construed narrowly, it makes
little sense to extend the quality improvement privilege to every hospital
group that conducts activities vaguely related to improving the quality of
16 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
medical care. Such broad parameters could conceivably extend to every
hospital committee. As RCW 42.56.360(1 )(c) specifically references RCW
70.41.200, the PRA exemption applies only to the records of quality
improvement committees aimed at bringing a hospital into compliance with
the statutory requirements of RCW 70.41.200. In other words, the
exemption applies to the work product of committees that "oversee and
coordinate the quality improvement and medical malpractice prevention
program." RCW 70.41.200(1)(a). While QVMC is correct that there may
be more than one committee with these responsibilities, QVMC does not
show that its medical staff regularly dealt with the type of quality
improvement duties delineated in RCW 70.41.200(1)(a). Here, QVMC had
a specific quality improvement committee for purposes of RCW 70.41.200
(under QVMC's "Organizational Quality Plan"), but that committee was not
involved in the investigations at issue. CP at 31, 253-61. The exemption
does not apply.
As a public hospital district, QVMC is authorized and governed by
chapter 70.44 RCW. Under this chapter, RCW 70.44.062(1) provides:
All meetings, proceedings, and deliberations of the board of commissioners, its staff or agents, concerning the granting, denial, revocation, restriction, or other consideration of the
17 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
status of the clinical or staff privileges of a physician or other health care provider as that term is defined in RCW 7.70.020, if such other providers at the discretion of the district's commissioners are considered for such privileges, shall be confidential and may be conducted in executive session: PROVIDED, That the final action of the board as to the denial, revocation, or restriction of clinical or staff privileges of a physician or other health care provider as defined in RCW 7.70.020 shall be done in public session.
QVMC asserts the privilege recited in RCW 70.44.062 is incorporated into
the PRA through the PRA's "other statutes" exemption. The PRA mandates
disclosure of all public records "unless the record falls within the specific
exemptions of ... this chapter, or other statute which exempts or prohibits
disclosure of specific information or records." RCW 42.56.070(1)
(emphasis added).
Dr. Cornu-Labat adopts the position that RCW 70.44.062 cannot
possibly provide an exemption to the PRA because RCW 70.44.062 only
protects the confidentiality of "meetings, proceedings, and deliberations,"
not writings. In Brouillet v. Cowles Publishing Co., we held records
identifying the reasons that teachers' certificates had been revoked were not
exempt from disclosure under a statute that provided teachers with the right
to request a closed hearing. 114 Wn.2d 788, 800, 791 P.2d 526 (1990)
(citing RCW 28A.58.455(2) (recodified by LAWS OF 1990, ch. 33, § 4,
current version at RCW 28A.405.310)). We stated, "The closed hearing
18 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
provision does not specifically exempt anything from disclosure. The
language of the [PRA] does not authorize us to imply exemptions but only
allows specific exemptions to stand." !d.
Whether RCW 70.44.062 provides a PRA exemption for public
hospital districts is an issue of first impression. Again, in interpreting a
statute, our starting point is the statute's plain language and ordinary
meaning. J.P., 149 Wn.2d at 450. Unlike the statute at issue in Brouillet,
the language of RCW 70.44.062 does more than provide the right to request
a closed meeting. It declares the "meetings, proceedings, and deliberations"
of the hospital board regarding a physician's privileges "shall be
confidential." RCW 70.44.062(1) (emphasis added). The dictionary
definition of "proceedings"-a word that was not present in the statute
interpreted in Brouillet-is "an official record or account (as in a book of
minutes) of things said or done." WEBSTER'S, supra, at 1807. Accordingly,
RCW 70.44.062 refers not only to meetings, but the written records of such
meetings. Furthermore, the statute's declaration that "meetings,
proceedings, and deliberations ... shall be confidential" (emphasis added)
provides a specific-not implied-PRA exemption. It would make little
sense for the legislature to demand the unqualified confidentiality of these
meetings but not the written accounts of what occurred therein. In
19 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
conducting a plain meaning analysis, we take care to avoid such "unlikely,
absurd or strained consequences." State v. Sullivan, 143 Wn.2d 162, 175, 19
P.3d 1012 (2001).
A specific exemption for public hospital district board meetings is
logical in context. Public hospital districts operate a minority of the
hospitals in this state-mostly small, rural hospitals. In contrast, most of
Washington's hospitals are private entities and, as such, are not subject to
the PRA. Thus, the confidentiality provision in RCW 70.44.062(1) grants
public hospital districts a privilege already held by more than half the
hospitals in this state.
The next question is whether any of the records withheld by QVMC
constitute "proceedings . . . of the board of commissioners, its staff or
agents." RCW 70.44.062(1). While there is no evidence the board of
commissioners itself convened to address Dr. Cornu-Labat's situation,
QVMC claims the individuals involved in the investigation were all "staff or
agents" of the board: QVMC's bylaws state that the hospital administrator
(Mr. Merred) is "appointed by the Board to act in its behalf' and that the
medical staff is hired by the board and subject to its ultimate authority. See
CP at 134-35. A member of the board, Mr. Gonzalez, was active in the
20 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
second investigation. Dr. Cornu-Labat was informed that Mr. Gonzalez was
representing the board of commissioners in the investigation. CP at 192.
QVMC appears to seek a blanket exemption for all documents related
to the Cornu-Labat investigation because the investigation was conducted by
"staff or agents" of the board. But, RCW 70.44.062(1) speaks to formal
meetings and proceedings of the board or its agents, not casual discussions
among those subject to the board's direction. This is clear in the language
used. RCW 70.44.062(1) allows for the confidential meeting to be
"conducted in executive session." "Executive session" is a "meeting,
usu[ ally] held in secret, that only the members and invited nonmembers may
attend." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1495 (9th ed. 2009). This secret
meeting is in contrast to the usual "public session" required by Washington's
Open Public Meetings Act, chapter 42.30 RCW. Furthermore, as noted
above, the word "proceedings" refers to "an official record or account" of a
meeting. WEBSTER'S, supra, at 1807 (emphasis added). This language
indicates the statute does not contemplate the confidentiality of anything less
than a formal meeting of the board, its staff or agents, and the PRA
exemption protects only the official account of such a meeting.
Because the trial court did not address RCW 70.44.062(1) in its letter
opinion, factual issues remain. It is unclear if any of the withheld records
21 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
embody a formal meeting of the board's staff or agents concerning the status
of Dr. Cornu-Labat's clinical privileges. Rather, it appears a number of the
withheld records were generated during the general investigation into
Dr. Cornu-Labat's alleged misconduct. While the investigation may have
ultimately led to the redaction of Dr. Cornu-Labat's privileges, not every
record generated during the investigation will qualify for the exemption in
RCW 70.44.062(1 ). Upon remand, only the minutes of a formal meeting of
the board's staff or agents that concerned the status of Dr. Cornu-Labat's
clinical privileges may be withheld under RCW 70.44.062(1 ).
D. Employment Contract
QVMC next asserts that Dr. Cornu-Labat is bound by his employment
contract, under which he agreed that hospital records involving members of
the medical staff would remain confidential. The argument that Dr. Cornu-
Labat should be treated differently because he was under contract with the
hospital and not a mere member of the public cannot be sustained under the
PRA. The trial court correctly noted that "it is not Gaston Cornu-Labat the
QVMC employee who makes the request for public records. Rather, it is
Gaston Cornu-Labat the citizen who makes it." CP at 375. Dr. Cornu-
Labat's identity is irrelevant because the PRA states that agencies may not
inquire into the identity of the requestor or the reason for the request. RCW
22 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
42.56.080. Additionally, the prov1s10ns of the hospital's employment
contract cannot override the PRA. Brouillet, 114 Wn.2d at 794 (an agency
"is without the authority to determine the scope of exemptions under the act"
(citing Hearst Corp., 90 Wn.2d at 129)); Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wn.2d
at 40 ("'promises cannot override the requirements of the disclosure law"'
(quoting Hearst Corp, 90 Wn.2d at 137)).
E. Costs and Attorney Fees
The trial court found QVMC generally responded to Dr. Cornu-
Labat's PRA requests honestly and in good faith. It awarded a penalty of
$10 per day from August 1, 2009, through the entry of judgment. The trial
court also noted that Dr. Cornu-Labat is entitled to attorney fees and costs
related to any improperly withheld records. On appeal, Dr. Cornu-Labat
requests costs and fees pursuant to RCW 42.56.550(4), as well as the
maximum statutory penalty of$100 per day.
Upon remand, Dr. Cornu-Labat is entitled to costs and reasonable
attorney fees to the extent he prevails on his PRA claims. See Limstrom v.
Ladenburg, 136 Wn.2d 595, 616, 963 P.2d 869 (1998) ("If the trial court
determines that attorney fees are appropriate, the award should relate only to
that which is disclosed and not to any portion of the requested documents
found to be exempt."); see also Sanders v. State, 169 Wn.2d 827, 865, 240
23 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
P.3d 120 (2010). This amount will depend on the trial court's determination
of whether certain records are exempt under either RCW 4.24.250 or RCW
70.44.062. If Dr. Comu-Labat does prevail as to certain records, daily
sanctions on the low end of the scale are appropriate based on the trial
court's previous finding of good faith on the part of QVMC. See Yousoufian
v. Office ofRon Sims, 152 Wn.2d 421,433,98 P.3d 463 (2004).
CONCLUSION
We remand for determination of whether the group investigating
Dr. Cornu-Labat constituted a "regularly constituted committee" or the
agents of such a committee under RCW 4.24.250(1 ). In addition, the trial
court should decipher if any of the withheld records constitute proceedings
of the board of a public hospital district or its staff or agents concerning the
status of a physician's clinical privileges under RCW 70.44.062. The RCW
70.41.200 exemption for the records of a quality improvement committee
does not apply here. Attorney fees, costs, and penalties are available to the
extent the trial court finds any of the withheld records are not exempt from
disclosure. 1
1 If the trial court determines that attorney fees and costs are appropriate, the award should relate only to the records disclosed and not to any of the documents found to be exempt. See Sanders, 169 Wn.2d at 865.
24 Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County, No. 86842-5
WE CONCUR: