Corning Gilbert Inc. v. United States

837 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 2012 CIT 62, 2012 WL 1681766, 34 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1503, 2012 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 63
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedMay 14, 2012
DocketSlip Op. 12-62; Court 11-00511
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 837 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (Corning Gilbert Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Corning Gilbert Inc. v. United States, 837 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 2012 CIT 62, 2012 WL 1681766, 34 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1503, 2012 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 63 (cit 2012).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

GORDON, Judge:

Before the court is a motion by John Mezzalingua Associates, Inc., d/b/a PPC (“PPC”), pursuant to USCIT Rule 76 for leave to (1) participate as amicus curiae and (2) file briefs regarding all “pending motions or the ultimate disposition of the case.” Mot. to Appear as Amicus Curiae at 4, Dec. 27, 2011, ECF No. 23. For the reasons set forth below, PPC’s motion is denied.

Background

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) excluded Plaintiffs coaxial cable connectors from entry into the United States because Customs determined that they violated a General Exclusion Order issued by the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) on unlicensed connectors covered by U.S. Patent No. 6,558,194, which PPC owns. Plaintiff, Corning Gilbert Inc., filed a number of protests contesting the exclusion, which Customs denied. This action ensued. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2006).

Discussion

In section 1581(a) actions challenging a denied protest, Congress limited the number of interested parties to two: the importer (or someone standing in the shoes of the importer under 19 U.S.C. § 1514) and the Government. The statute forecloses intervention by any other interested party. 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(l)(A) (2006) (“[N]o person may intervene in a civil action under [19 U.S.C. §§ 1515 or 1516].”). The scope of PPC’s motion implicates this statutory prohibition and raises an issue about the appropriateness of the role of amicus curiae in de novo, trial-based proceedings at the U.S. Court of International Trade. See Stewart-Warner Corp. v. United States, 4 CIT 141, 142, 1982 WL 2261 (1982) (“The Court is also somewhat concerned that in this action participation as amicus should not become a substitute for intervention. Participation in this action by intervention is expressly forbidden by ... 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(l)(A)”); see also United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165 (6th Cir.1991) (“Amicus curiae may not and, at least traditionally, has never been permitted to rise to the level of a named party/real party in interest nor has an amicus curiae been conferred with the authority of an intervening party....”).

USCIT Rule 76, which governs amicus curiae motions, is unique to the U.S. Court of International Trade as a trial-level federal court. It has no counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but instead finds a parallel in Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 76 is a consequence of the hybrid nature of the subject matter jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of International Trade. In some actions, e.g., those brought under section 1581(a), the court *1306 functions as a federal district court hearing cases de novo; in others, such as those commenced under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), the court functions as a federal circuit court of appeals, reviewing determinations based on the record made before an administrative agency. Rule 76, therefore, should typically find application in those actions in which the court functions as an appellate court.

The specific contours of Rule 76 make this clear. The rule provides that an applicant may, with the court’s permission, file “a brief,” and, for extraordinary reasons, participate in “the oral argument.” USCIT R. 76. These are predominantly (though not exclusively) appellate concepts. The rule certainly does not contemplate general participation at the trial level, with everything that entails (e.g., procedural motions, discovery motions, or settlement discussions). The broad scope of PPC’s requested involvement — the filing of briefs on all pending motions and the ultimate disposition of this case — is problematic. PPC, in effect, is seeking the same rights as those afforded an intervenor. In the court’s view, granting PPC’s motion would be akin to granting a motion to intervene, which is statutorily barred by section 2631(j)(l)(A).

With that said, amicus briefs are not altogether unheard of in section 1581(a) actions. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. United States, 7 CIT 13, 583 F.Supp. 581 (1984) (allowing amicus brief on legal issue of meaning of tariff provision). PPC points out that the court has previously granted an amicus motion in a similar case, Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States, Court No. 04-00494. In Jazz Photo, a domestic patent holder, like PPC, sought to participate as amicus curiae in a section 1581(a) action challenging the exclusion of merchandise covered by an ITC general exclusion order. Although the court granted the motion, it did so without explanation. See Order on Fuji’s Mot. to Appear as Amicus Curiae, Oct. 13, 2004, ECF No. 14. More important, in its quite lengthy disposition on the merits involving complex factual findings and conclusions of law related to the underlying patents, the court also resolved in one paragraph a bevy of outstanding motions relating to the amicus curiae (at least six, perhaps more), granting some and denying others. Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States, 28 CIT 1954, 1996, 353 F.Supp.2d 1327, 1363 (2004), aff'd 439 F.3d 1344 (Fed.Cir.2006). Reading between the lines, one wonders whether the amicus submissions (and attendant motions) aided the court, or proved more of a burden and distraction.

The court understands PPC’s desire to participate as the owner of the underlying patent. PPC has a direct and immediate interest in this litigation. The court though does not believe that PPC’s participation at this point in the litigation will assist with the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of this action. US-CIT R. 1. Instead, the court believes that PPC may prove more of a hindrance than help, as the court will have to repeatedly weigh whether PPC’s participation runs afoul of the prohibition on intervention. The court in Stewarh-Wamer said it best:

In the abstract, the Court sees no limitation to the issues on which a brief by amicus curiae may be found useful. Nor is it an objection that amicus

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837 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 2012 CIT 62, 2012 WL 1681766, 34 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1503, 2012 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 63, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/corning-gilbert-inc-v-united-states-cit-2012.