Corners v. Saccocia

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided January 17, 1995·No. 94-1519·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion



January 17, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 94-1519

KAVIN CORNERS,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

PAUL SACCOCIA, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Stahl, Circuit Judge. _____________

____________________

Kavin Corners on brief pro se. _____________
David J. Gentile on brief for appellees. ________________

____________________

____________________

Per Curiam. We affirm the judgment substantially for __________

the reasons recited in the magistrate-judge's comprehensive

report (as modified in part by the district court), adding

only the following observations.

Plaintiff insists that the lower court erred in invoking

the doctrine of qualified immunity. In order to overcome

such a defense, plaintiff bore the burden of demonstrating

that the law regarding a prison disciplinary board's reliance

on information from a confidential informant was "clearly

established" by May 1991. See, e.g., Horta v. Sullivan, 4 ___ ____ _____ ________

F.3d 2, 13 (1st Cir. 1993). Yet the sole law to which

plaintiff has referred in this regard is that contained in

the so-called "Morris Rules"--a set of procedures governing

prison administration first adopted in 1972 as part of a

consent decree and later promulgated as state law. See, ___

e.g., Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22, 23, 26-27 (1st Cir. ____ ____ __________

1991).1

While the Morris Rules were designed to implement

various constitutional protections, not every violation of

those rules results in a claim of constitutional dimension.

See, e.g., Morris v. Travisono, 509 F.2d 1358, 1362 (1st Cir. ___ ____ ______ _________

1975) (noting that Morris Rules embody both "what is ...

constitutionally necessary and what is not"); Nicholson v. _________

____________________

1. The current version of the rules is reproduced in Morris ______
v. Travisono, 499 F. Supp. 149, 161-74 (D.R.I. 1980). _________

Moran, 835 F. Supp. 692, 697 n.18 (D.R.I. 1993); see also _____ _________

DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Not __________ _____

every breach of [the Morris Rules] will give rise to an

Eighth Amendment claim."); cf. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. ___ _____ _______

183, 194 (1984) ("Officials sued for constitutional

violations do not lose their qualified immunity merely

because their conduct violates some statutory or

administrative provision.") (footnote omitted).2

Plaintiff's reliance on the Morris Rules provides no guidance

as to what is independently required in this context as a

matter of federal due process. See generally, e.g., Russell _____________ ____ _______

v. Scully, 15 F.3d 219, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1993) (on petition ______

for rehearing); Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 701-02 (10th ______ _______

Cir. 1991) (reviewing cases); Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, _____ _____

931-33 (4th Cir. 1990); Langton v. Berman, 667 F.2d 231, 235 _______ ______

(1st Cir. 1981). Inasmuch as neither side has addressed the

contours of the constitutional right at stake, we shall

likewise decline to do so. See, e.g., Wilson v. Brown, 889 ___ ____ ______ _____

F.2d 1195, 1196 n.3 (1st Cir. 1989) (plaintiff's pro se

____________________

2. In turn, to the extent plaintiff's argument rests on our
holding in Rodi that the Morris Rules "imbue prison inmates ____
with a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison
population," 941 F.2d at 23, it suffices to note that such
opinion was issued after the events in question here. See, ___
e.g., id. at 30-31 (finding such result not to have been ____ ___
clearly established prior thereto); Morgan v. Ellerthorpe, ______ ___________
785 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D.R.I. 1992).

-3-

status "does not make us more inclined to interpret damage

pleas further than their plain language permits").

Plaintiff also challenges the district court's refusal

to order that he be reclassified to minimum security/work

release status.3 His sole argument in this regard is that

the applicable regu

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Related

Joseph Morris v. Anthony Travisono
509 F.2d 1358 (First Circuit, 1975)
William Langton v. Louis Berman
667 F.2d 231 (First Circuit, 1981)
Stephen Gerard Rodi v. Donald R. Ventetuolo
941 F.2d 22 (First Circuit, 1991)
Steven M. Desrosiers v. John J. Moran
949 F.2d 15 (First Circuit, 1991)
Cugini v. Ventetuolo
781 F. Supp. 107 (D. Rhode Island, 1992)
Morris v. Travisono
499 F. Supp. 149 (D. Rhode Island, 1980)
Morgan v. Ellerthorpe
785 F. Supp. 295 (D. Rhode Island, 1992)
State v. Pari
553 A.2d 135 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1989)
Russell v. Scully
15 F.3d 219 (Second Circuit, 1993)
Nicholson v. Moran
835 F. Supp. 692 (D. Rhode Island, 1993)