Cornell v. State

74 Tenn. 624
Tennessee Supreme Court·Decided April 15, 1881·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Cooper, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Cornell was indicted for assault and battery, tried by the court without a jury, by consent of parties, and convicted. He appealed in error.

The trial was of two separate indictments upon an agreed state of facts. Each of the persons assaulted had been convicted of a misdemeanor, and sentenced to confinement for a definite time at hard labor in the county work-house, and leased by the county, during that. time, to Forrest & Richardson, under the act of 1875, ch. 83, to work on their farm. The defendant [625] was in the employment of Forrest & Richardson, as their superintendent and manager, his duties being to supervise and • direct the convicts in tlicir work, see that they were humanely treated, and did their work in a proper manner, and to maintain order and discipline among them, and to conform to the rules and regulations prescribed by his employers, with the approval of the county court. One of these rules was: .“Any neglect on the part of the convict to carry out the orders of the guard or failure to do the work according to .instructions (unless in case of sickness), shall subject the convict to punishment to be inflicted by the warden, and shall not exceed fifteen lashes at any one time.”

One of the convicts charged to have been assaulted, it was agreed, became, while under the charge of defendant, mutinous, and used insulting language towards defendant while engaged in superintending the convicts, and finally seized a gun and threatened to shoot defendant if he gave any further orders to the convicts, the defendant having said and done nothing to the convict except to reprimand him for not properly doing the work assigned. The other convict smuggled into the prison whisky, of which ho and other convicts participated so freely as to become drunk, unfit for work, and mutinous. Under these circumstances, the defendant punished said convicts for their misconduct, with the approbation of the agent of the county court,duly appointed, under their contract with the lessees, to reside upon the farm and see that the convicts were humanely treated, and properly fed, clothed and [626] worked, and who was also appointed a deputy sheriff. The punishment consisted in striking each of said convicts, one of them nine, and the other seven licks on the bare back, with a leather strap about . one and a half inches 'wide and eighteen inches long, having a short wooden handle thereto attached. The blows were inflicted with sufficient force to cause pain to the convicts, without drawing blood, and inflicted no injury beyond the pain attending the immediate infliction.. The defendant acted from a sense of duty to suppress disorder, and maintain discipline among the convicts, “and further with the full knowledge and approbation •of the said lessees, his said employers, and by their direction.”

The agreed statement concludes thus: There is no claim that the said Cornell,. in whipping said parties, acted ozi provocation, but simply because the said ■convicts had been guilty of a violation of prison rules. The question being, did Cornell have legal authority, under any circumstances, to punish convicts by whipping.”

The act of 1875, ch. 83, which makes provision for county work-houses, further provides that any per•son confined in the work-house may be compelled to work outside of the same, as the superintendent of the work-house may direct, and that such person shall be secured so as to prevent escape, and also may be corrected and punished in a reasonable manner, if such person refuse to work as ordered, or be guilty of gross violation of duty or good order.” The act authorizes any person to bail a convict by entering into [627] a recognizance or bond to' pay the fine and costs in a given time, it being made the duty of the superintendent to see that convicts in the employment of bailees be treated without cruelty, and in accordance with the dictates of humanity. Section 15 of the act is in these words: The chairman or county . judge, by authority of the quarterly county court, may hire out any or all of its misdemeanor convicts in the same manner, and subject to the same rules and conditions herein prescribed for bailing convicts, and the person or persons to whom said convicts shall be hired shall have all the rights, powers and privileges, and be •subject to all the restrictions, duties and liabilities herein given to and imposed on said bailee and superintendent.” Section 18 contains this clause: “ All persons sentenced under the provisions of this act shall be kept at continuous hard labor during the day, ex•cept while eating or preparing their food; and no communication shall be allowed between them and any other person, and all intercourse between themselves shall, as far as practicable, be prevented.”

There can be no doubt' that the main purpose of the act was to keep the convicts in question at continuous hard labor at a certain price, as a punishment and a means of securing the fine and costs, and, to ensure this purpose, the act provided that the convict might be punished in a reasonable manner for a refusal to Avork, and for gross violations of duty or good order. The acts of both of the convicts assaulted were clearly violative of duty and good order, and interfered with the proper performance of the labor required from each. [628] The punishment seems to have been inflicted without anger, and for the sole purpose of securing good order and proper subordination. And if corporal punishment can be inflicted at all by the manager of the lessee, upon his own motion, with the consent of the agent of the county court, the punishment cannot be said to have been unreasonable.

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Cornell v. State, 74 Tenn. 624 (Tenn. 1881).

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