Cornell Miles II v. City of Sacramento, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 18, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00077
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CORNELL MILES II, No. 2:26-cv-77 DC AC PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was accordingly referred to the 18 undersigned by E.D. Cal. 302(c)(21). Plaintiff filed a request for leave to proceed in forma 19 pauperis (“IFP”), and has submitted the affidavit required by that statute. See 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915(a)(1). The motion to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) will therefore be granted. 21 Upon screening the complaint, however, the undersigned finds that it fails to state a 22 cognizable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against any identified defendant. The 23 undersigned will therefore not authorize service at the time, but instead grants leave to amend the 24 complaint. The court is also in receipt of a status report and a notice regarding discovery 25 submitted by non-party Cedric Miles, which are addressed below. 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 I. SCREENING 2 A. Legal Standard 3 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally 4 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 5 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A 6 claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. 7 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court will 8 (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly 9 baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 10 (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton 11 Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 12 1037 (2011). 13 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint 14 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court 15 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must 16 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a 17 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 18 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 19 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 20 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice 21 to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 22 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 23 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 24 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has 25 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 26 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 27 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity 28 to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. 1 Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in 2 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2000)) (en banc). 3 B. The Complaint 4 The complaint names as defendants the City of Sacramento, the Sacramento Police 5 Department (“SPD”), Police Chief Katherine Lester, and Does 1-10 (identified as “individual 6 SWAT officers and sniper”). Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff alleges that Cleavon Miles, one of his brothers, 7 was experiencing a mental health crisis while alone at a parking garage on September 12, 2023. 8 ECF No. 1 at 4. Cleavon was contained and surrounded by police for four hours before dawn, 9 during which time he posed no immediate threat to anyone. Id. Despite this, a SWAT sniper shot 10 and killed Cleavon while the Crisis Negotiation Team was still trying to talk him down. Id. at 5. 11 Cleavon’s death caused plaintiff extreme emotional distress, mental anguish, and the permanent 12 loss of the companionship and support of his brother. Id. at 6. 13 Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment 14 (protection against unreasonable seizure and excessive force) and the right to familial association 15 guaranteed by substantive due process. Id. at 3. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, 16 as well as injunctive relief reforming SPD’s de-escalation training and mental health crisis 17 protocols. Id. at 6. 18 C. Analysis 19 1. Overview 20 The complaint cannot be served at this time because the only defendant against whom a 21 claim is stated is a Doe defendant. Without a viable claim against a defendant whose identity is 22 known and who can be served, the case cannot proceed. Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to 23 amend his complaint to cure the problems identified below. 24 2. Elements of a Section 1983 Claim 25 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may seek relief for violations of their own 26 constitutional rights that were committed or otherwise caused by a person or persons acting 27 “under color of law.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 28 //// 1 3. Alleged Constitutional Violations 2 a. Loss of Familial Association 3 Surviving family members of a person killed by police may assert a claim for violation of 4 their own right to familial association, which is protected under the Due Process Clause. See 5 Ochoa v. City of Mesa, 26 F.4 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2022). The use of deadly force violates the 6 substantive due process rights of family members only when the officers’ conduct “shocks the 7 conscience.” Id. (citation omitted). What it takes to satisfy this standard depends on whether the 8 officers had time to deliberate their conduct. Id. Where a situation evolved in a time frame that 9 permitted the officers to deliberate before acting, the deliberate indifference standard applies. Id. 10 Where a situation escalated to a point that required a “snap judgment,” a purpose to harm 11 standard applies. Id. 12 The complaint in this case lacks sufficient factual detail to determine which test is the 13 appropriate measure. In any case, however, the allegations—liberally construed—state a 14 cognizable claim against the Doe sniper. According to the complaint, the sniper was the direct 15 cause of Cleavon’s death (which is plaintiff’s loss) and allegedly shot to kill when there was no 16 immediate threat and while crisis negotiators were actively trying to “talk [Cleavon] down.” As 17 explained more fully below, however, this claim does not lie against any other defendant. There 18 are no facts demonstrating that any other defendant directly or indirectly caused Cleavon’s death. 19 b. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force 20 Fourth Amendment rights against excessive force are personal rights that may not be 21 vicariously asserted. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014). The proper plaintiff in an 22 excessive force case is therefore the person who was subjected to the force and whose own rights 23 were thereby violated. When that person has been killed, the claim remains one for violation of 24 the decedent’s rights and may be brought by the person’s estate. Longoria v. Pinal County, 873 25 F.3d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 2017). 26 The present complaint is brought by Cornell Miles II on his own behalf. The Estate of 27 Cleavon Miles is not named as a plaintiff. Cornell may not pursue an excessive force claim on 28 his dead brother’s behalf; only the estate can do that. Moreover, even if he is the representative 1 of the estate or is Cleavon’s successor-in-interest,1 Cornell may not represent the estate in pro se. 2 See C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (pro se party “has 3 no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself”); McShane v. United States, 366 4 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966) (same); Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664-65 (9th 5 Cir. 2008) (pro se plaintiff may not bring claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity). 6 Because the privilege to appear pro se is personal, Cornell Miles II may represent himself without 7 an attorney on his claim that his own rights to familial association were violated. He may not, 8 however, appear pro se on behalf of an entity such as an estate. See United States v. Stepard, 876 9 F. Supp. 214, 215 (D. Ariz. 1994); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 559 (2nd Cir. 1998); Jones 10 v. Corr. Med. Servs., 401 F.3d 950, 951-52 (8th Cir. 2005). 11 An estate’s representative may appear in court only through counsel. Accordingly, if 12 plaintiff wishes to pursue an excessive force claim on behalf of the estate he must hire a lawyer. 13 4. Defendants Other than Doe Sniper 14 a. Individual Officer Defendants 15 Liability under § 1983 requires that a defendant’s own acts or omissions caused the 16 alleged constitutional violation. Manlove v. County of San Diego, 759 F.Supp.3d 1057, 1064 17 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (quoting Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988)). “A person 18 ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he 19 does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 20 which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 21 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Here, only the sniper is alleged to have 22 personally used deadly force. The conduct of other SWAT team members cannot be construed as 23 causes of the shooting, as plaintiff specifically alleges that the sniper fired while other officers 24 1 The proper party to commence an action on behalf of a decedent’s estate in California is the 25 personal representative for the estate, unless there is no personal representative, in which case the 26 proper party is the decedent’s successor in interest. Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006). A “personal representative” is the executor of a will or 27 other person appointed by the probate court to administer the probate of the estate. Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1331 n.2 28 (2008). A “successor in interest” is the beneficiary of an estate. Cal. Code of Civ. P. § 377.11. 1 were attempting to resolve the crisis with non-lethal means. Accordingly, the complaint as 2 drafted does not state a claim against any Doe defendant other than the sniper. 3 b. Chief Lester 4 There is no vicarious liability under § 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Accordingly, Chief 5 Lester cannot be liable for the actions of her subordinates. A supervisor can be individually liable 6 only when supervisory actions caused the constitutional deprivation. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 7 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (a supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only 8 if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to 9 act to prevent them). Here there are no allegations that Chief Lester participated in or directed the 10 alleged violations. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim against her in her individual 11 capacity. 12 A state official in her official capacity is not a “person” who can be sued for damages 13 under § 1983 at all. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). An official in 14 her official capacity is a proper § 1983 defendant only where the office—here, the office of Chief 15 of Police—is the office that can effectuate any injunctive relief sought by plaintiff and eventually 16 ordered by the court. See id., n.10. Plaintiff does seek an injunction reforming certain policies 17 and procedures of the Police Department, and the Chief of Police appears to be a proper 18 defendant for purposes of such relief. However, as the court explains next, the complaint does 19 not adequately state a claim for municipal liability based on an unconstitutional policy or on 20 failure to train. Accordingly, the complaint as drafted does not state any claim against the Chief 21 of Police in her official capacity. 22 c. City of Sacramento and the Sacramento Police Department 23 Local governments can be sued under § 1983 when the unconstitutional action at issue 24 “implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted 25 and promulgated by that [government’s] officers.” Monell v. Department of Social Services of 26 City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Even when a practice is not captured by official 27 policy, it may be “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the 28 force of law.” Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–168 (1970)). 1 Here, the complaint’s conclusory allegations fail support a claim under Monell. See Gonzalez v. 2 County of Merced, 289 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (“Since Iqbal, courts have 3 rejected conclusory Monell allegations that lack factual content from which one could plausibly 4 infer Monell liability”). Plaintiff does not specifically identify any policy of the City or its Police 5 Department that could have caused the alleged constitutional violation, nor provide facts 6 demonstrating a customary practice of such violations. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a 7 claim under Monell. 8 Alternatively, the failure to train employees may support municipal liability if it led to 9 “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into 10 contact.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 11 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Deliberate indifference arises only when “the need for more or different 12 training is so obvious, and the inadequacy [is sufficiently] likely to result in the violation of 13 constitutional rights[.]” Goodin v. City of Glendora, 380 F. Supp.3d 970, 995 (C.D. Cal. 2019) 14 (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). Policymakers must therefore have been on “actual or 15 constructive notice” of the likelihood that the violation would occur. Goodin, 380 F. Supp. at 16 995. Evidence that a single violation resulted from a single instance of following the policy or 17 training is not enough to demonstrate deliberate indifference. Id. at 995-996. Plaintiff must 18 demonstrate that the deficiency in training was “closely related to the ultimate injury.” Lee v. 19 City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 391) 20 (emphasis original). This means that a plaintiff’s own constitutional injury would have been 21 avoided but for this failure to train. Lee, 250 F.3d at 681. 22 Here, the conclusory allegations of the complaint fail to state a failure-to-train claim under 23 Canton and progeny. See McFarland v. City of Clovis, 163 F. Supp. 3d 798, 806 (E.D. Cal. 24 2016) (“Alleging that training is ‘deficient’ or ‘inadequate’ without identifying a specific 25 inadequacy is conclusory and does not support a plausible claim.”); see also Bini v. City of 26 Vancouver, 218 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1202 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (plaintiff did not adequately allege a 27 § 1983 claim for failure to train absent facts of specific shortcomings in training); Young v. City 28 of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1150 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“[W]ithout identifying the training and 1 hiring practices, how those practices were deficient, and without an identification of the 2 obviousness of the risk involved, the Court cannot determine if a plausible claim is made for 3 deliberately indifferent conduct.”). The complaint before the court includes no specific facts 4 showing the existence of a deficient training program—or the absence of a training program— 5 which was (a) deliberately indifferent to the rights of community members likely to encounter 6 police, and which (b) caused the fatal shooting of Cleavon Miles. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to 7 state a municipal liability claim on a failure to train theory. 8 5. Conclusion 9 For the reasons explained above, the complaint as drafted states a single cognizable claim: 10 violation of plaintiff Cornell Miles’ right to familial association by the Doe sniper’s use of lethal 11 force against Cleavon Miles.2 A Doe defendant, however, cannot be served. In order for this 12 case to proceed, plaintiff must state a cognizable claim against at least one defendant whose 13 identity is presently known and who can therefore be served. 14 A pro se litigant should receive leave to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could 15 not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 16 Accordingly, plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend the complaint in an attempt to state a 17 claim against a known defendant. He is cautioned that no claim on behalf of the Estate of 18 Cleavon Miles can be entertained unless the amended complaint is drafted and filed by an 19 attorney. Should plaintiff wish to proceed pro se on his own behalf only, the court now provides 20 information related to the amendment process. 21 II. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT 22 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, the amended complaint must not force the 23 court and the defendants to guess at what is being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 24 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court 25 was “literally guessing as to what facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain 26 2 The naming of Doe defendants is disfavored in the Ninth Circuit. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 27 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Nonetheless, naming Doe defendants may be appropriate where the plaintiff has stated a valid claim, but requires discovery to identify the proper defendant. See 28 Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). 1 defendants”). The amended complaint must not require the court to spend its time “preparing the 2 ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit.” Id. at 1180. The 3 amended complaint must not require the court and defendants to prepare lengthy outlines “to 4 determine who is being sued for what.” Id. at 1179. 5 The amended complaint must not refer to a prior pleading or separate motion to make 6 plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Any amended complaint must be complete without 7 reference to any prior pleading. Local Rule 220. This is because, as a general rule, an amended 8 complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline 9 Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 456 n.4 (2009) (“[n]ormally, an amended complaint 10 supersedes the original complaint”) (citing 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & 11 Procedure § 1476, pp. 556-57 (2d ed. 1990)). Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 12 original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 13 alleged. 14 III. MATTERS PRESENTED BY CEDRIC MILES 15 Another surviving brother of Cleavon Miles, Cedric Miles, has submitted two documents 16 related to this case. ECF Nos. 3, 4. The first is a status report that states the intent to seek 17 substitution in this action as the decedent’s successor-in-interest. ECF No. 3. The second is a 18 notice regarding Cedric Miles’s efforts to obtain evidence from Sacramento City and County 19 regarding the fatal shooting of Cleavon Miles. ECF No. 4. The court will not take any action 20 based on submissions by non-parties. 21 Moreover, as the court has explained above in screening the complaint, the representative 22 of an estate or a successor-in-interest to a decedent may bring an action on behalf of the 23 decedent’s estate only through an attorney. This case is presently brought by Cornell Miles II on 24 his own behalf only. There is no claim asserting the rights of Cleavon Miles which Cedric Miles 25 could seek to join by substitution or intervention,3 and neither Cornell nor Cedric may bring such 26

27 3 Substitution is the proper mechanism for stepping into the shoes of a party who has died after commencing a lawsuit, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a), and a motion to intervene is how one joins a 28 lawsuit as an additional plaintiff, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. 1 a claim in pro se. 2 IV. PRO SE PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY 3 Your request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and the filing fee will be waived, but 4 your complaint cannot proceed at this time for several reasons. First, as a non-attorney you may 5 only represent yourself on claims that your own rights were violated. You may not bring claims 6 based on violation of your brother Cleavon’s rights, including his Fourth Amendment right 7 against excessive use of force. To bring a complaint on behalf of a decedent’s estate for 8 violations of the decedent’s rights, a representative or successor-in-interest must be represented 9 by counsel. Second, the only claim that is supported by enough facts is the claim that the Doe 10 sniper violated your right to familial association by killing Cleavon. The facts in the complaint 11 do not show that any other defendant, including any of the other SWAT officers, caused 12 Cleavon’s death. 13 The Chief of Police can only be liable as an individual if she participated in or otherwise 14 caused the shooting. The Chief could be a proper defendant in her official capacity for purposes 15 of injunctive relief on claims for municipal liability.4 However, you have not provided enough 16 facts to support a claim against the City or the Police Department. If you think your brother’s 17 death was caused by a City or Department custom or policy, you need to specify what that custom 18 or policy is and give facts showing that it exists and that it caused the shooting. If you think your 19 brother’s death was caused by a failure to properly train SWAT officers, you need to provide 20 facts about the defective training that was provided (or what specific training was not provided) 21 and facts that show SPD and/or the City were deliberately indifferent to the risk. 22 Because a Doe defendant cannot be served, you are being given 30 days to submit an 23 amended complaint that corrects the problems identified here. An amended complaint will be 24 screened, and service will be appropriate only if it states a claim against at least one identified 25 defendant. If you do not submit an amended complaint by the deadline, the undersigned will 26 recommend that the case be dismissed. 27 4 “Official capacity” means that the Chief of Police is the defendant regardless of who holds that 28 position. 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons explained above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED; 4 2. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint 5 which complies with the instructions given above. If plaintiff fails to timely comply 6 with this order, the undersigned may recommend that this action be dismissed; and 7 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a courtesy copy of this order to Cedric Miles, 8 4801 Orange Grove Ave. #5, Sacramento, CA 95841. No future submissions from 9 non-parties shall be docketed in this case. 10 || DATED: February 17, 2026 . ~ Chtlternr—Clhor—e_ D ALLISON CLAIRE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11