COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-02-497-CR
CORNELIUS
RUSSELL DAVIS APPELLANT
V.
THE
STATE OF TEXAS STATE
------------
FROM THE 297TH
DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
A
jury found Appellant Cornelius Russell Davis guilty of burglary of a habitation
with intent to commit sexual assault, and the trial judge, after finding the
sexual offender notice to be true, sentenced him to mandatory life
imprisonment. Counsel on appeal has filed an Anders brief asserting
that there are no grounds that could be argued successfully on appeal.2 This court provided Appellant the opportunity
to file a pro se brief but he did not. Because we hold that any appeal
from this case would be frivolous, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I.
Factual Background
On
September 5, 2001, Rowena Thayer (Thayer) and her fiancé, Brian Pichler
(Pichler), were living in room 225 of the Intown Suites in North Richland Hills,
Tarrant County, Texas. On that day, while Pichler was at work, Thayer
received several telephone calls from one or more unidentified males, which made
her feel uncomfortable. Thayer called Pichler, informed him of the
telephone calls, and asked him to come home. While she was on the
telephone with Pichler, someone knocked on the door. She looked out the window
and observed a black male that she did not know. When she opened the door,
the man was gone. Thayer then asked Pichler to “come home now.”
Pichler told her he was on his way.
Shortly
thereafter, the same black man knocked on the door again, and Thayer answered
the door. When she opened the door, the man, who appeared drunk, asked her
for some water. Thayer agreed to get the man some water, shut and locked
the door behind her, and then grabbed a Coke for the man instead. She
opened the door and offered the man the Coke. As Thayer tried to close the
door behind her, the man blocked the door, pushed the door open, and entered the
room without her permission. Timothy McCausky, (McCausky) another resident
at the Intown Suites, passed by and witnessed the man forcing his way into the
room.
After
entering the room and locking the door behind him, the man grabbed Thayer by the
waist and threw her on the bed. Thayer told the man not to do anything
because her husband was coming home. The man told her to “shut up or
I’ll kill you, I want your pussy.” The man pulled Thayer’s shorts
down and licked her genital area. He then pulled his pants down and
exposed his own genital area. He was about to rape her but was interrupted by
Pichler knocking on the door and window. The man got up, pulled his pants
up, opened the door, and quickly left the room, passing Pichler on his way out.
After
the man left the room, Pichler found Thayer on the bed, dressed only in a
t-shirt and appearing to be in shock. Pichler asked her if she was hurt
and what had happened, but she did not respond. She crawled off the bed
and curled up on the floor. Pichler then asked her if she had been raped,
and she said, “he tried to.” At that time, Pichler grabbed his rifle,
loaded it, and took off after the man, intending to kill him.
As
Pichler was searching the Intown Suites for the man, a North Richland Hills
police officer on his regular patrol pulled in the parking lot. Pichler, rifle
in hand, ran over to the officer and told him what happened. The officer
told Pichler to go put the rifle back in his room and called for backup.
Shortly after backup arrived, two black men were seen walking down the second
floor hallway and were arrested for public intoxication. One of the men
met the description given by Thayer and Pichler of the man who had assaulted
Thayer. Thayer, McCausky, and Pichler identified Appellant at the scene as
being the black man who forced his way into the room and assaulted Thayer.
Appellant
was charged with burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit sexual
assault and the enhancement paragraph of the indictment contained a sexual
offender notice. A jury found Appellant guilty and the trial court found
the sexual offender notice to be true. Appellant was then sentenced to
mandatory life imprisonment.
II.
The Anders Brief
Appellant’s
court-appointed counsel on appeal has filed a motion to withdraw. In
support of the motion to withdraw, counsel has filed a brief in which he states,
in his professional opinion, this appeal has no merit. Counsel has
fulfilled the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional
evaluation of the record in explaining why there are no arguable grounds for
appeal. Once counsel has complied with the Anders requirements, we
must conduct an independent examination of the record to determine whether
counsel is correct.3 Only then may we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw.4
III.
Independent Review
A. Pretrial
The
indictment tracks the statutory language of the offense for which appellant was
convicted. It alleges that the offense occurred before the presentment of
the indictment.5 The enhancement paragraph
alleged in part that Appellant “was finally convicted of the felony offense of
sexual assault of a child,” which when found to be true required a mandatory
life sentence.6 Appellant filed a motion to
quash the indictment on the ground that the enhancement paragraph was
“vague” and “not specific” because it alleges “sexual assault of a
child” rather than “sexual assault” or “aggravated sexual assault.”7 The court denied the motion to quash. Because it is
not necessary to allege prior convictions for enhancement purposes with the same
particularity as required for charging the offense,8
by stating the nature of the offense, the style, cause number, county, and the
court, the enhancement paragraph was sufficient to put Appellant on notice of
the prior conviction.
Additionally,
the date of the prior conviction alleged in the enhancement paragraph is October
10, 1997, and the actual date of the prior conviction was September 13,
1995. On September 13, 1995, Appellant was convicted of the offense of
“sexual assault of a child” and sentenced to ten years in prison. His
sentence was suspended, and Appellant was placed on probation for ten
years. On October 10, 1997, that probation was revoked by the court, and
Appellant was sentenced to five years in prison. Appellant did not
complain of this variance nor did he present evidence that the variance
surprised or prejudiced him.9 Thus, the
variance was not fatal, and the information regarding the prior conviction in
the enhancement paragraph was sufficient to put Appellant on notice. The
indictment conferred jurisdiction on the trial court and provided appellant with
sufficient notice to prepare a defense.10
The
State filed a motion for continuance because it was unable to locate a material
witness, McCausky, which the trial court granted. The record does not
reflect that Appellant opposed the motion because he did not file a response to
the motion and a hearing was never held on the motion. A timely objection,
request, or motion with an adverse ruling is required to preserve error for
appeal.11 The granting of a motion for
continuance is within the discretion of the trial court and is not reversible
error absent an abuse of discretion that prejudices the defendant.12 Because Appellant did not oppose the motion, he
did not preserve error on the continuance for appellate review.
Before
the jury panel was brought in, Appellant moved to quash the jury panel on the
basis that there was only one black venire person on a panel of forty-two
persons. At Appellant’s request, the trial judge took judicial notice
that Appellant “is a member of the black race,” and that the percentage of
blacks in the population is at least twelve percent. The court denied the
motion to quash.
It
is well settled that jurors may not be selected or excluded on the basis of
race.13 It is also well settled that no
person has the right to have the venire, or a portion of it, composed of members
of his own race.14 An allegation that persons
have been excluded from jury service solely because of race must be supported by
evidence, and the mere absence of members of a particular race from the grand
jury, jury venire, or petit jury does not prove purposeful discrimination.15 The burden was on Appellant to prove the existence
of purposeful discrimination.16 Purposeful
discrimination is not proven by merely showing that on a single jury, the number
of members of one race is less than that race’s proportion of eligible
individuals because defendants are not entitled to demand that members of their
race be present on the juries before whom they are tried.17
Only if Appellant provided sufficient evidence of purposeful discrimination,
would the burden then shift to the State to rebut Appellant’s evidence.18
In
this case, the only evidence presented by Appellant in support of his motion to
quash the jury panel was that Appellant is a member of the black race, that the
jury venire of forty-two contained only one member of the black race, and that
at least twelve percent of the population of Tarrant County are members of the
black race. Thus, Appellant established that his jury panel contained a
smaller percentage of blacks than the general population of Tarrant
County. That, however, is not sufficient to establish purposeful
discrimination.19
During
voir dire, one of the veniremembers asked the prosecutor if burglary always
involved “the intent to do something else illegal while within the
habitation,” something “[b]esides burglary itself.” The prosecutor
said no. He continued explaining, “to commit the offense of burglary you have
to have the entry and it has to be either with intent upon entry or after
you’ve entered the intent to commit that other portion.” Appellant
objected to that explanation as being a misstatement of the law as the case had
been filed. The trial court overruled the objection.
Under
Texas Penal Code section 30.02(a), there are three different ways the crime of
burglary may be committed.20 Appellant’s
indictment, however, only charged him under section 30.02(a)(1),21 entering the habitation of Thayer without her effective
consent and “with the intent to commit sexual assault.” To violate
section 30.02(a)(1), a person must have the requisite intent at the time of
entry.22 Because Appellant was only charged
under 30.02(a)(1), the State had to prove that Appellant intended to commit
sexual assault at the time of entry rather than after he entered.
Therefore, the prosecutor’s explanation was misleading and was a misstatement
of the law as applied to Appellant’s case. Furthermore, the trial court erred
by overruling Appellant’s objection. The error, however, must be harmful
to be reversible.23
In
determining whether a prosecutor’s misstatement of the law during voir dire
was harmful, the court of criminal appeals has held that defense counsel’s
ability to voir dire the venirepersons and thereby correct the misstatement,24 the presence of a correct statement of the relevant law
in the court’s charge,25 and the fact that the
misstatement concern a nonissue at the trial26 are
factors that show the error is harmless. Because Appellant had the
opportunity to voir dire the venireperson after the prosecutor’s misstatement
and addressed the issue, the court’s charge provided a correct statement of
the law, and Appellant’s intent at the time of entry was not an issue in
trial, the error was not harmful and is not reversible.
Finally,
the trial court did not prohibit Appellant from asking the panel proper
questions. The trial court granted all of Appellant’s challenges for
cause. Thus, our review of the record reveals no reversible error occurred
pretrial.
B. Guilt-Innocence Phase
Viewed
in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence shows that on
September 5, 2001, Thayer was living in room 225 of the Intown Suites in North
Richland Hills, Tarrant County, Texas. Thayer, Pichler, and McClausky
testified that on that day a man meeting Appellant’s description forced his
way into Thayer’s room and attempted to sexually assault her. Thayer
testified that after forcing his way into her room the assailant threw her on
the bed and told her he wanted her pussy. He proceeded to pull down
Thayer’s pants and lick her genital area. After he then pulled down his
own pants exposing his genitals, he was interrupted by Pichler’s knock on the
door. The assailant then fled the room. Although some of the
witnesses had trouble identifying Appellant in court, the police officer Pichler
approached in the parking lot the day of the assault positively identified
Appellant at court as the man arrested that day, and each of the witnesses
identified Appellant at the scene. In addition, Appellant was arrested for
public intoxication, which corroborated Thayer’s testimony that the assailant
appeared to be drunk.
Thus,
under the proper standard of review, the evidence is legally and factually
sufficient to support the conviction for burglary of a habitation with intent to
commit sexual assault.27
Few
objections were made at trial, and most of the objections that were made were to
the form of the question asked by counsel or to the responsiveness of the answer
given by the witness. One of the objections made by the State, however, resulted
in the exclusion of certain DNA results found on the panties Thayer wore at the
time of the sexual assault, which Appellant had had analyzed. Appellant
attempted to introduce evidence that sperm cells were found on the panties as
well as both male and female skin cells because Appellant was excluded as a
contributor of both the sperm and skin cells. The State objected to the
introduction of the DNA analysis evidence as irrelevant,28
evidence of previous sexual conduct in a criminal case,29
and specific instances of conduct of a witness.30
The trial court sustained the State’s objection regarding the sperm cells and
admonished Appellant and the witness that he did not “want anything even said
about sperm,” but overruled the objection regarding the skin cells.
To
be admissible, sperm cell DNA evidence must be relevant.31
Thayer, however, did not testify that the assailant ejaculated during the sexual
assault. In fact Thayer testified that the assailant “was in the middle
of putting it in when Bryan knocked on the door,” and then he “got up,
pulled his pants up” and left. There is no other testimony that even
implies that the assailant ejaculated during the assault. Consequently,
there was no reason for the trial court to believe that any sperm found on the
panties could have belonged to the assailant. Furthermore, Thayer’s
previous sexual activity with other men was not a fact of consequence to the
determination of the action and thus evidence proving or disproving that fact
would not be relevant.32
Appellant
argued that the sperm cell evidence goes to the bias or the motive of the victim
in this case.33 He based his argument
primarily on the contention that the DNA evidence would have been admissible had
it established that the sperm was his. First, the evidence did not reveal any
hidden reason why Thayer would be biased against Appellant or have any motive to
falsely accuse him. She testified that she did not know him prior to the
incident. Secondly, the evidence is not admissible unless “its probative value
outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.”34
In this case, there was no reason to believe the sperm had come from the
assailant, but admitting the evidence would clearly impact Thayer’s privacy.
Therefore, the probative value of the evidence does not outweigh the danger of
unfair prejudice.
Consequently,
the trial court’s ruling on this objection as well as the rulings on the other
objections during trial did not constitute reversible error or an abuse of
discretion.
As
discussed above, the court’s charge on guilt-innocence properly defined the
law.35 At closing, the State objected to this
argument by Appellant’s counsel: “My question to you all is that will you
base a decision to deny [Appellant] his liberty—” The State objected to
arguing punishment during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, and the trial
court sustained the objection. Appellant’s counsel did not object to the
court’s ruling or state on the record what further argument, if any, he would
have made if the court had not sustained the State’s objection. Counsel simply
said he would rephrase his argument and stated, “They’re asking you to
say—to punish—to give a verdict that could potentially punish [Appellant] on
such unreliable evidence.”
Regardless
of whether the trial court committed error by sustaining the State’s
objection, no reversible error is committed where counsel fails to object or put
on the record what he would have argued if the court had not imposed the
limitation on his argument.36 Thus, in this
case, counsel did not perfect this point for appellate review.
Finally,
Appellant’s counsel at trial effectively cross-examined the State’s
witnesses and attempted to establish reasonable doubt regarding the identity of
the assailant. We find that counsel’s performance at guilt-innocence was
constitutionally sufficient.37
C. Punishment
At
punishment, the defense reurged its motion to quash the indictment because the
enhancement paragraph did not reference an offense that is punishable under
section 12.42 of the Texas Penal Code.38 The
trial court denied the motion, finding the offense alleged in the indictment to
be sexual assault under section 22.011,39 the
description that the sexual assault was “of a child” is surplusage, and that
it is adequate to notify the parties of the offense. As discussed above, the
trial court did not commit reversible error on this issue. The State presented
evidence of the prior conviction, and Appellant raised no objections to the
evidence. The trial court found the sexual offender notice to be true and
sentenced Appellant to mandatory life imprisonment in the Institutional Division
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice as required by section 12.42(c)(2)
of the Texas Penal Code.40 Our review of the
record reveals no reversible error from the punishment phase.
D. The Motion to Withdraw
Because
our independent review of the record reveals no reversible error, we agree with
counsel’s professional determination that an appeal of this case is
frivolous. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
IV.
Conclusion
Our
independent review of this record compels us to agree with counsel’s
determination that any appeal of this case would be frivolous. Therefore, we
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw on appeal and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
LEE
ANN DAUPHINOT
JUSTICE
PANEL
B: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and WALKER, JJ.
DO
NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED:
April 29, 2004
NOTES
1.
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).
3.
See Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no
pet.).
4.
See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
5.
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02 (Vernon 2003).
6.
See id. § 12.42(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
7.
See id. §§ 22.011, 22.021.
8.
Cole v. State, 611 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Hollins v.
State, 571 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
9.
See Santana v. State, 59 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
10.
See Tex. Const. art. V, § 12; Duron v. State,
956 S.W.2d 547, 550–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
11.
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Thompson
v. State, 691 S.W.2d 627, 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
12.
Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
13.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1716-17 (1986); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879).
14.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 86, 106 S. Ct. at 1717.
15.
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403–04, 65 S. Ct. 1276, 1279 (1945).
16.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 90, 106 S. Ct. at 1719.
17.
Akins, 325 U.S. at 403, 65 S. Ct. at 1279.
18.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S. Ct. at 1721.
19.
Akins, 325 U.S. at 403, 65 S. Ct. at 1279.
20.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a);
DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
21.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
30.02(a)(1).
22.
DeVaughn, 749 S.W.2d at 65.
23.
Tex. R. App. P. 44.2.
24.
Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
25.
Id.; Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 225 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993).
26.
Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
27.
See Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285–86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Clewis
v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
28.
See Tex. R. Evid. 403.
29.
See Tex. R. Evid. 412.
30.
See Tex. R. Evid. 608(b).
31.
See Tex. R. Evid. 402.
32.
See Tex. R. Evid. 401.
33.
See Tex. R. Evid. 412(b)(2)(C).
34.
Tex. R. Evid. 412(b)(3).
35.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.16
(Vernon 1981).
36.
See Ramirez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 636, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Dean
v. State, 481 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Price v. State,
870 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth), aff’d, 887 S.W.2d 949
(Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
37.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
38.
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42.
39.
See id. § 22.011.
40.
See id. § 12.42(c)(2).