Cornel Marton, Individually and on Behalf of Minor Child, Z.M. v. Stephen Dubner
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Opinion
NUMBER 13-22-00155-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CORNEL MARTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD, Z.M., Appellant,
v.
STEPHEN DUBNER, Appellee.
On appeal from the 414th District Court of McLennan County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Longoria, Hinojosa, and Silva Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva
This cause is before the Court on its own motion. 1 On March 25, 2022, appellant
1 This case is before the Court on transfer from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco pursuant to a
docket equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001. By separate memorandum opinion issued on this same date, we denied alternative relief sought by appellant in this cause. See In re Marton, No. 13-22-00235-CV, 2022 WL _____, at *__ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg May 26, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Cornel Marton, individually and on behalf of minor child, Z.M., filed a pro se notice of
appeal regarding an order dismissing appellant’s claims against Stephen Dubner. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. On May 10, 2022, this Court notified appellant that it appeared that
there was no final, appealable judgment, directed appellant to correct this defect, if
possible, and advised appellant that the appeal would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction
if the defect was not corrected. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3. Appellant filed a letter response
asserting, inter alia, that “the judge never gave [him] a fair opportunity to have [his] case
tried before the court as English is not [his] native language” and that “[t]o dismiss [his]
appeal at this point and to require [him] to wait until all of [his] case is final is very inefficient
and harms [his] ultimate case against . . . Dubner.”
In the instant case, appellant filed suit against Dubner and Axtell Independent
School District, J.R. Proctor, Steve January, Lacy Hollingsworth, Karen Brannen, Penny
Kocian, Brandon Dietrich, Paul Briggs, Emmy Briggs, and Sunny Beseda. Dubner filed
an “Original Answer, Special Exceptions, and Motion to Dismiss Baseless Causes of
Action.” On March 2, 2022, the trial court granted Dubner’s motion to dismiss appellant’s
claims against him. The record before the Court fails to contain an order of severance,
any orders resolving appellant’s claims against the remaining defendants, or a final
judgment.
“Usually, only final judgments are subject to appeal.” Alexander Dubose Jefferson
& Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 540 S.W.3d 577, 581 (Tex. 2018) (per
curiam). Absent a timely filed notice of appeal from a final judgment or appealable
interlocutory order, we do not have jurisdiction over an appeal. See Lehmann v. Har-Con
2 Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it
disposes of all parties and claims in the record. See id. at 195; see also Sherer v. Sherer,
393 S.W.3d 480, 486 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (stating that a judgment
“cannot be final as to some issues but not other issues”). “Because the law does not
require that a final judgment be in any particular form, whether a judicial decree is a final
judgment must be determined from its language and the record in the case.” Lehmann,
39 S.W.3d at 195; see also Jack M. Sanders Family Ltd. P’ship v. Roger T. Fridholm
Revocable, Living Tr., 434 S.W.3d 236, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no
pet.) (stating that the question of whether appellate jurisdiction exists cannot be waived
or settled by agreement of parties). If the record before the Court does not affirmatively
demonstrate our jurisdiction, we have no option but to dismiss the appeal. See IFS Sec.
Grp., Inc. v. Am. Equity Ins., 175 S.W.3d 560, 562 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.);
Parks v. DeWitt Cnty. Elec. Coop., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 157, 160 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg 2003, no pet.); see Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 199–200.
In this case, the trial court’s March 2, 2022 order of dismissal was not a final
judgment because it disposed of appellant’s claims against Dubner, but not appellant’s
claims against Axtell Independent School District, J.R. Proctor, Steve January, Lacy
Hollingsworth, Karen Brannen, Penny Kocian, Brandon Dietrich, Paul Briggs, Emmy
Briggs, or Sunny Beseda. We conclude that the record does not contain a judgment that
is final for purposes of appeal, and there is no statute providing for consideration of this
interlocutory order. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. Because the record does not
affirmatively demonstrate our jurisdiction, we have no option but to dismiss the appeal.
3 See id. at 199–200; IFS Sec. Grp., Inc., 175 S.W.3d at 562; Parks, 112 S.W.3d at 160.
The Court, having considered the record, the applicable law, and appellant’s failure
to correct the defect in this matter, is of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c). Accordingly, we dismiss the
appeal for want of jurisdiction. See id.
CLARISSA SILVA Justice
Delivered and filed on the 26th day of May, 2022.
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