Corey Terrell Maywather v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 22, 2025
• Docket: 01-23-00614-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued May 22, 2025.

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00614-CR ——————————— COREY TERRELL MAYWEATHER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 178th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case 1711363

OPINION

A jury found the appellant guilty of promotion of prostitution. The trial court

assessed punishment at six years’ confinement. In two points of error, the appellant

claims the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction and the trial

court erred by allowing him to exercise his right to self-representation. We affirm.

Background

An anonymous tipster told Houston police a woman was recruiting juveniles

for a prostitution ring. The tipster gave police information about the woman and

images of prostitution advertisements the woman had supposedly placed. An

undercover detective texted the phone number on the advertisements and set up a

meeting. At the meeting, the woman, A.H., agreed to an act of prostitution.1 Police

arrested her and seized her phone.

Police got a search warrant for the phone. Rather than finding evidence of

A.H. running a juvenile prostitution ring, they found evidence A.H. was being

pimped out by the appellant. The State admitted hundreds of pages of text messages

from the phone. The messages showed that A.H. reported her prostitution

activities—including how much she earned—to the appellant, the appellant gave

A.H. quotas for how much money she needed to earn from prostitution, and the

appellant would arrange meetings for A.H. and on at least some occasions give her

1 The indictment uses the complainant’s initials. We will also use the complainant’s initials, as nothing would be gained by using her full name in this opinion. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (“A crime victim has the … right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process.”) Although there is nothing in the record requesting the use of a pseudonym, the fact that the Legislature allows victims to use pseudonyms in such cases shows that the use of a victim’s real name is not always essential. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 58.103 (allowing use of pseudonyms to maintain confidentiality of files and records of victims of sexual assault).

2 rides to prostitution activities. In the text messages, the appellant told A.H. he was

not her boyfriend, rather they had a “p and ho” relationship. A member of the

Houston Police Department’s vice squad testified that was slang for a pimp and

prostitute relationship.

Sufficiency of Evidence

In his first point of error, the appellant claims the evidence is legally

insufficient to support his conviction. The appellant does not specify which element

the evidence failed to prove or how the evidence failed to prove it. Instead, his point

consists of stating the standard of review, describing the evidence—most of which

points toward his guilt—then concluding that “[t]here was legally insufficient

evidence that [the appellant] committed the offense of promotion of prostitution

because the evidence failed to establish that ‘while acting other than as a prostitute

receiving compensation for personally rendering prostitution services, he knowingly

… solicit[ed] [A.H.] to engage in sexual conduct with another person for

compensation.’” That’s every element of the charged offense.

We find this point was inadequately briefed. An appellant’s brief “must

contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate

citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). “Rule [of Appellate

Procedure] 38.1 allows an appellant to present whatever issues for review he or she

desires, with very few limitations.” Garrett v. State, 220 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex.

3 Crim. App. 2007). But if an appellant does not present an argument, “an appellate

court has no ‘obligation to construct and compose [an] appellant’s issues, facts, and

arguments with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.’” Wolfe v.

State, 509 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Busby v. State, 253

S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (alterations in original)).

By claiming the evidence is insufficient without explaining how, the appellant

is inviting us to make arguments for him. Doing so would require abandoning our

role as impartial arbiter, so we decline the invitation. See Heiselbetz v. State, 906

S.W.2d 500, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“From appellant’s brief, we cannot

discern his specific arguments, and we will not brief appellant’s case for him.”);

Gibson v. State, No. 06-24-00007-CR, 2024 WL 4585607, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana Oct. 28, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(rejecting, as inadequately briefed, sufficiency claim that was general assertion State

failed to meet burden of proof); see also English v. State, No. 01-20-00139-CR, 2021

WL 4202159, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 16, 2021, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (where defendant argued evidence was

insufficient regarding one element, declining to address sufficiency regarding

elements for which defendant presented no argument); Quintana v. State, No.

01-23-00815-CR, 2024 WL 5049020, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec.

10, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

4 In its brief, the State notes the vagueness of the appellant’s point but responds

by arguing the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the elements of the offense. In

his reply brief, the appellant presents a short argument critiquing the State for not

using its brief to argue the evidence was sufficient to identify him as the sender of

the text messages. The appellant’s reply brief relies on a case from 1979 and a case

from 1981 to claim that phone records connecting a defendant to a particular phone

number are not enough to prove the defendant used the phone on a particular

occasion.

We need not address this argument because it was raised for the first time in

a reply brief. Barrios v. State, 27 S.W.3d 313, 322 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2000, pet. ref’d); see Chambers v. State, 580 S.W.3d 149, 161 (Tex. Crim. App.

2019) (holding intermediate court should have addressed argument raised in reply

brief that was “related” to argument in original brief, but contrasting that to situation

where “the defendant raises a completely different sufficiency challenge for the first

time in a reply brief”).

This case illustrates the wisdom of this rule. Raising a vague complaint in an

opening brief forces the appellee to guess at an appellant’s argument. Were we to let

an appellant—who carries the burden of proof and persuasion on appeal—see the

appellee’s argument before making his own, it would force the appellee to either let

the appellant’s real argument go unaddressed, or open up a round of sur-reply briefs

5 that is not contemplated by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Restricting an

appellant’s reply brief to “addressing any matter in the appellee’s brief,” TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.3, promotes the orderly processing of appeals.

In the interest of justice, we will note that the appellant’s argument fails. The

cases relied on by the appellant, Steinhauser v. State, 577 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Crim.

App. [Panel Op.] 1979), and Wolfe v. State, 620 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1981), were telephone harassment cases. As one would expect from their

vintage, in those cases the phone records showed the harassing calls came from

phone numbers associated with the defendants’ homes, but did not show who made

the phone calls.2 In contrast, the phone records here regarded a cell phone, which is

more directly connected to an individual than is a landline. The State’s evidence

2 Steinhauser and Wolfe are dated not just by the technology involved but by the law they used. Both held the evidence was legally insufficient because it did not exclude “every other reasonable hypothesis” except the defendant’s guilt. See Wolfe v. State, 620 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Steinhauser v. State, 577 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). The Court of Criminal Appeals disavowed the “outstanding reasonable hypothesis” analytical construct in 1991. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 159–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 520–21, 522–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (reiterating rejection of outstanding reasonable hypothesis analytical construct). Texas courts now look at whether the evidence proved the charged offense, not whether it disproved alternative theories. See Melgar v. State, 593 S.W.3d 913, 922 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020) (“We cannot indulge [alternative hypotheses] because they all lead to inferences that were rejected by the jury, and under our standard of review, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s decision.”), pet. dism’d, No. PD-0243-20, 2022 WL 2240263 (Tex. Crim. App. June 22, 2022).

6 showed the cellular account for the phone was in the appellant’s name, the appellant

listed the phone number as his on a pawn receipt contemporaneous with the pimping

text messages and on his bail bond after his arrest, A.H. had pictures of the appellant

in her phone, and A.H. used the appellant’s name at least once in the text messages.

The appellant’s reply brief does not address this evidence or explain how it is

insufficient. See Diamond v. State, 496 S.W.3d 124, 134 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence that text messages came from phone

registered to defendant and defendant listed phone number on paperwork when

arrested by police was sufficient to let jury infer defendant sent and received text

messages on phone).

We overrule the appellant’s first point.

Waiver of Right to Counsel

In his second issue, the appellant argues the trial court erred by allowing him

to waive his right to counsel and exercise his right to self-representation.

“The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court may dispense

with counsel and make his own defense.” Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 396 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1999). For such a decision to be constitutionally effective, it must be

made 1) competently, 2) knowingly and intelligently, and 3) voluntarily. Id.

7 The appellant’s challenges go to his competence, and whether he made the

decision “knowingly and intelligently.” The decision to represent oneself is made

“knowingly and intelligently” if is made with a full understanding of the right to

counsel that is being abandoned as well as the danger and disadvantages of

self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834–36 (1975).

The appellant claims he was not made aware of the dangers and disadvantages

of self-representation. As the State correctly notes, the record belies this claim.

There’s a volume of the reporter’s record titled “Faretta Hearing” where the trial

court gave the appellant what are commonly called “Faretta warnings” and the

appellant acknowledged them. The trial court advised the appellant he would be held

to the same standard of conduct as a lawyer during trial, that he would have to

“comply with the same technical rules of evidence and appellate procedure” as a

lawyer, that his lack of formal legal training could lead him to waive claims by

failing to make proper objections and offers, and that he would be unable to raise an

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on his own performance. The

appellant’s brief does not address these warnings, but they are facially sufficient. See

Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (holding pro se

defendant was properly advised of dangers and disadvantages of self-representation

where trial court “explained to him that there were technical rules of evidence and

procedure that applied at trial, that he would not be granted any special consideration

8 with respect to those rules, and that as a result he might be disadvantaged both at

trial and in any appeal that might follow”).

The appellant’s brief seems to argue the Faretta hearing doesn’t count

because it was conducted months before trial by a judge who did not preside at trial.

The appellant cites no authority suggesting each judge to preside in a case must

provide Faretta warnings and inquire into a pro se defendant’s competence. The

warnings ensure the defendant is aware of his rights and of the dangers of

self-representation. Changing judges on a case should not alter the defendant’s

awareness of these things.

The appellant also claims he was not competent to assert his right to

self-representation. The appellant points to his “admission to being autistic and

presenting as being paranoid” as evidence of incompetence. At the Faretta hearing

the appellant told the trial court he was home-schooled because he was autistic. The

trial court noted it did not appear the appellant had “any problems communicating.”

The appellant said he was “able to perform out of it” “because of [his] mother’s good

skills.”

The level of competence required to exercise the right of self-representation

is the same as that required to stand trial. Osorio-Lopez v. State, 663 S.W.3d 750,

757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). A defendant is competent to stand trial if he has

“‘1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of

9 rational understanding’” and “‘2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the

proceedings against him.’” Id. (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396

(1993)). The appellant cites no authority suggesting that autistic individuals are

categorically incompetent to stand trial or represent themselves. Cf. United States v.

Roof, 10 F.4th 314, 336–37, 363 (4th Cir. 2021) (rejecting claim that defendant with

significant evidence of autism was incompetent to represent himself in death-penalty

case).

The federal constitution allows states to deny the right of self-representation

if a defendant is competent to stand trial but has a “severe mental illness” that

interferes with his ability to conduct a trial. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164,

178 (2008). That said, the federal constitution does not require states to do so.

Fletcher v. State, 474 S.W.3d 389, 400–01 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015,

pet. ref’d) (so holding and collecting federal cases so holding). Nothing in the record

suggests the appellant’s level of autism interfered with his ability to represent

himself.

The appellant’s claim that he “present[ed] as paranoid” seems to be a

reference to a statement by the trial court at the beginning of the Faretta hearing.

The trial court said that two days before the Faretta hearing the appellant came to

court with his attorneys and dismissed them because “they had made threats against

10 his life and had discussed [a] potential defense of entrapment.” The record contains

no more information about this claim.

This statement by the trial court does not bring the appellant’s competency to

stand trial into question. See Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 395–96 (holding defendant’s

“outbursts” during trial, defendant’s prior hospitalization for depression, and

testimony defendant had “symptoms of schizo-affective disorder” did not bring

competency to stand trial into question). Upon inquiry, the appellant told the trial

court he had never been found incompetent, he had graduated high school, and he

was very near completing a college degree. The trial record shows he presented

on-point argument, questioned witnesses on topical matters, and raised objections.

See Fletcher, 474 S.W.3d at 401 (using defendant’s on-point performance at trial to

support implied finding that defendant was competent to represent himself).

The record supports the trial court’s finding that the appellant’s decision to

exercise his right of self-representation was made competently, knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. The trial court did not err by allowing the appellant to

waive his right to counsel and exercise his right to self-representation.

11 Conclusion

We affirm the trial court court’s judgment.

Clint Morgan Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Morgan.

Publish.