Corey Morrell v. Burton Baker, Individually and in His Professional Capacity, Lummus, Hallman, Pritchard & Baker, P.C., and Mercer Transportation Co., Inc.

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: 02-25-00642-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00642-CV ___________________________

COREY MORRELL, Appellant

V.

BURTON BAKER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY, LUMMUS, HALLMAN, PRITCHARD & BAKER, P.C., AND MERCER TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., Appellees

On Appeal from the 236th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 236-363739-25

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Before us is a motion to dismiss and a supplement to the motion to dismiss

filed by Appellees—Burton Baker, Individually and in his Professional Capacity;

Lummus, Hallman, Pritchard & Baker, P.C.; and Mercer Transportation Co., Inc.—

asking that we dismiss this appeal filed by Appellant Corey Morrell because it is not

from a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order. We agree with Appellees

that Morrell’s appeal is from neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory

order. We will thus dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

II. BACKGROUND

In April 2025, Morrell filed a lawsuit against Appellees in the trial court.

Morrell later filed a first amended petition and a second amended petition. In his

second amended petition—his live pleading1—Morrell brought fourteen claims

against Appellees: (1) fraudulent lien filing, (2) slander of title, (3) abuse of process,

1 The parties dispute which document is Morrell’s live pleading. Appellees claim that Morrell filed a third amended petition—what they say is the live pleading— pointing to a document titled “Plaintiff’s Third Amended Petition” that was attached as an exhibit to a motion filed by Appellees in the trial court. Morrell argues that his second amended petition is “[t]he live pleading in the clerk’s record.” He explains that while he initially transmitted a third amended petition to the trial court, the “envelope [for that filing] was later cancelled in the e-filing system and never resulted in a separate docket entry or index line for a Third Amended Petition.” After receiving Morrell’s notice of appeal and Appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal, we checked with the trial court clerk regarding whether Morrell had filed a third amended petition. We were informed by the clerk that Morrell had not filed a third amended petition.

2 (4) constructive fraud and misrepresentation, (5) civil conspiracy, (6) negligence,

(7) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (8) declaratory judgment, (9) collateral

challenge to domesticated judgment, (10) declaratory relief regarding venue clause,

(11) violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, (12) filing a fraudulent court

record / constructive fraud through judicial misrepresentation, (13) gross negligence,

and (14) unjust enrichment.

Appellees filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss and a Texas Citizens Participation

Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss (collectively, the Motions). See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1;

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.003. The trial court later signed an order

granting the Motions (the Order on the Motions). In the Order on the Motions, the

trial court said that the Motions were granted and that “the following causes of action

asserted by [Morrell] in this lawsuit are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE:

(1) fraudulent lien; (2) slander of title; (3) abuse of process; (4) civil conspiracy;

(5) negligence; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) Deceptive Trade

Practices Act violation; (8) gross negligence; and (9) unjust enrichment.” The trial

court also stated that “[Morrell’s] only remaining claims in this lawsuit are Counts 1, 3,

and 5 in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Petition.” The trial court further said that

Appellees were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under Rule 91a.7 and

Section 27.009(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. R. Civ.

P. 91a.7; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.009(a)(1).

3 Morrell later filed a motion to correct or clarify the Order on the Motions. In

his motion to correct or clarify, Morrell pointed out that “[t]here is no Third

Amended Petition on file” and that his “live pleading is the Second Amended

Petition.” Morrell argued that the Order on the Motions “create[d] an internal

inconsistency” because it “dismisse[d] certain causes of action by title and . . . state[d]

that numerically corresponding counts remain.” Morrell requested that the trial court

correct the Order on the Motions to account for the alleged internal inconsistency or,

alternatively, to clarify what claims survived against Appellees. The trial court later

signed an order denying Morrell’s motion to correct or clarify.

After the trial court signed the Order on the Motions, Appellees filed an

application for their attorney’s fees. The trial court later signed an order granting

Appellees’ application for attorney’s fees (the Fee Order). In the Fee Order, the trial

court awarded Appellees certain attorney’s fees from Morrell. The Fee Order

contemplated that claims against Mercer Transportation were still pending, as the Fee

Order stated that Morrell was restrained from serving any written discovery or

deposition notices on Mercer Transportation until Morrell had complied with the

order. The Fee Order also contained a Mother Hubbard Clause—a statement that

“[a]ll other relief not expressly granted herein is denied”—and a provision saying that

“[a]ll writs and process for enforcement of this order may issue as necessary.”

4 Morrell later filed a notice of appeal from the Fee Order and the Order on the

Motions.2 Appellees moved to dismiss Morrell’s appeal, arguing that it was not from

a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order. Morrell responded, claiming

that the trial court had rendered a final judgment. After making that response,

Morrell filed his appellate brief, in which he changed his position regarding finality.

In his appellate brief, Morrell argued that “[t]he [t]rial [c]ourt’s refusal to correct or

clarify an obviously confusing order leaves the case without a clear final judgment.”

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Law Regarding Finality

Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or interlocutory

orders authorized by statute. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 200 (Tex.

2001). Absent a conventional trial on the merits, a judgment is final if it either

(1) states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all

parties or (2) actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court,

regardless of its language. Id. at 192–93. In determining whether an order is a final

judgment, we should first examine the language of the order itself. In re Elizondo,

544 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at

195, 205–06); In re M & O Homebuilders, Inc., 516 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. App.—

2 Morrell had previously filed a separate notice of appeal pertaining to the Order on the Motions. After we questioned our jurisdiction over that appeal, Morrell filed a notice of withdrawal of that appeal, which we granted. See Morrell v. Baker, No. 02-25- 00439-CV, 2025 WL 2679336, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 18, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).

5 Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding). If the order does not clearly and

unequivocally indicate finality, we then look at the record to determine finality.

Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 827–28; M & O Homebuilders, Inc., 516 S.W.3d at 106.

Although no “magic language” renders a judgment final, “a trial court may

express its intent to render a final judgment by describing its action as (1) final, (2) a

disposition of all claims and parties, and (3) appealable.” Bella Palma, LLC v. Young,

601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020). Examples of clear and unequivocal finality language

include: “This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is

appealable,” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206, and “This judgment is final, disposes of all

claims and all parties, and is appealable,” Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 825.

B. Neither The Order on the Motions Nor the Fee Order Contains Clear and Unequivocal Finality Language

We begin by determining whether either the Order on the Motions or the Fee

Order states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all

parties. See Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 827–28; M & O Homebuilders, Inc., 516 S.W.3d

at 106.

After examining the Order on the Motions and the Fee Order, we find no

language in them indicating that the trial court rendered a final and appealable

disposition of all claims and parties. See Bella Palma, LLC, 601 S.W.3d at 801. Indeed,

nothing in the Order on the Motions or the Fee Order comes close to the examples

offered in Elizondo and Lehmann to indicate finality. See Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 825

6 (“This judgment is final, disposes of all claims and all parties, and is appealable.”);

Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206 (“This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims

and is appealable.”). To the contrary, both of the orders signal that pending claims

remain. The Order on the Motions explicitly references what the trial court sees as

pending claims—“Plaintiff’s only remaining claims in this lawsuit are Counts 1, 3, and

5 in Plaintiff’s Third Amended Petition.” The Fee Order similarly suggests that

claims remain, as it states that Morrell is restrained from serving any written discovery

or deposition notices on Mercer Transportation until Morrell has complied with the

order.

In his response to Appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal, Morrell offers

several arguments in support of finality. He points to language in the Fee Order

stating that “[a]ll writs and process for enforcement of this order may issue as

necessary.” According to Morrell, execution is a remedy only available with final

judgments, and thus, the execution language is indicative of finality. However,

language permitting execution does not unequivocally express finality in the absence

of a judgment that actually disposes of all parties and all claims. In re Burlington Coat

Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding);

see Meadors v. Makowski, 658 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2022, pet. denied) (rejecting argument that trial court’s judgment was a final judgment

merely because it contained language permitting execution to issue).

7 Morrell also argues that the Fee Order’s Mother Hubbard clause is a clear sign

of finality. But courts have repeatedly held that a Mother Hubbard clause is not a

conclusive sign of finality. See, e.g., In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Tex. 2019);

Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206–07; see also Meadors, 658 SW.3d at 425 (rejecting argument

that Mother Hubbard clause contained in judgment indicated finality when said

judgment contained no language expressing finality as to all claims and parties). And

while Morrell initially argued that the trial court had rendered a final judgment, in his

more-recently filed appellate brief, Morrell argues that the case does not contain a

“clear final judgment.”

Based on our review of the face of the Order on the Motions and the face of

the Fee Order, we hold that neither the Order on the Motions nor the Fee Order

states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final and appealable order as to all claims

and all parties. See Bella Palma, LLC, 601 S.W.3d at 801; Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192–

93.

C. The Record Does Not Demonstrate That Either the Order on the Motions or the Fee Order is Final

Because the Order on the Motions and the Fee Order do not contain

unambiguous language of finality, we next examine the record to determine whether

every pending claim and party was disposed of when the Order on the Motions and

the Fee Order were signed. See Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 827–28; M & O Homebuilders,

Inc., 516 S.W.3d at 106.

8 Our examination of the record reveals that Morrell’s live pleading was his

second amended petition. In that petition, Morrell brought fourteen claims against

Appellees. In the Order on the Motions, the trial court expressly stated that nine

claims were dismissed with prejudice. The Order said nothing with respect to the

dismissal of the five other claims contained in Morrell’s second amended petition—

(1) constructive fraud and misrepresentation, (2) declaratory judgment, (3) collateral

challenge to domesticated judgment, (4) declaratory relief regarding venue clause, and

(5) filing a fraudulent court record / constructive fraud through judicial

misrepresentation. The Fee Order similarly said nothing with respect to the dismissal

of those five claims.

Based on our review of the record, we hold that neither the Order on the

Motions nor the Fee Order actually disposed of all claims and parties then before the

trial court.3 See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192–93. And neither the Order on the

Motions nor the Fee Order are appealable interlocutory orders. See Harrell v. Evans,

No. 01-21-00666-CV, 2023 WL 3634318, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

May 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that order granting Rule 91a motion to

dismiss was not an appealable interlocutory order); Cent. States Water Res., Inc. v. Undine

Dev., LLC, No. 02-22-00134-CV, 2022 WL 2526944, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

July 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (collecting cases for the proposition that an order

In his appellate brief, Morrell states that the trial court’s orders “cannot satisfy 3

Lehmann’s requirement of a clear, final judgment disposing of all claims and parties or unmistakably stating that it does.” We agree.

9 granting a TCPA motion to dismiss is not an appealable interlocutory order); Eureka

Holdings Acquisitions, L.P. v. Marshall Apartments, LLC, 597 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2020, pet. denied) (holding that no statutory basis existed for

interlocutory appeal of trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees stemming from

partial grant of TCPA motion to dismiss).

IV. CONCLUSION

Because neither the Order on the Motions nor the Fee Order is a final

judgment or an appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss Morrell’s appeal for want

of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack Justice

Delivered: March 26, 2026