Corey M. Jeter v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
• Decided: June 14, 2018
• Docket: 2017-SC-0232
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JUNE 14, 2018 O BE PUBUSHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2017-SC-000232-DG

COREN M. JETER APPELLANT

ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS V. CASE NO. 2017-CA-000223-MR JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 16-CR-003332

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM

AFFIRMING

On September 21, 2016, Appellant, Corey M. Jeter, was arraigned by the

Jefferson District Court on a charge of one count of second-degree burglary.

The court set Jeter’s bond at $10,000 full cash and granted him $100 a day

bail credit pursuant to KRS 431.066(5)(a). On December 20, 2016, the

Jefferson County grand jury returned an indictment charging Jeter with

second-degree burglary and theft by unlawful taking of property valued over

$500 but less than $10,000.

Following his indictment, on December 28, 2016, Jeter appeared for his

initial hearing before the Jefferson Circuit Court, which “fixed” a bond “in the

interim” at $10,000. Formal arraignment and pre-trial conference were

scheduled for February 8, 2017. On January 13, 2017, Jeter filed a RCr 4.40(1) motion for bond

reduction, for release on bail credit for his jail time pursuant to KRS

431.066(5)(a), and, in the alternative, to release him to the Home Incarceration

Program. Jeter argued that he had spent 99 days in custody accruing bail

credit prior to arraignment in the Jefferson Circuit Court and was entitled to

release on bail credit after 100 days pursuant to the district court’s order.

On January 17, the circuit court held a hearing to consider Jeter’s

motion. After consideration of the record, the circuit court denied Jeter’s

request to decrease his bond, and instead increased it from $10,000 to $20,000

full cash. Furthermore, the circuit court found that Jeter was ineligible for bail

credit under KRS 431.066(5)(a) because: (1) Jeter was a flight risk due to his

history of not appearing in court and (2) he was a persistent felony offender

(“PFO”). See KRS 431.066(5) (b). The circuit court referred to these oral

findings in its order denying Jeter’s motion. They were not reduced to writing.

Jeter appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals pursuant to RCr

4.43(1). A divided Court of Appeals upheld the trial court. In so holding, the

Court of Appeals stated that the circuit court had properly increased Jeter’s

bond at the January 17 hearing. Citing Sydnor v. Commonwealth, 617 S.W.2d

58, 59 (Ky. App. 1981), the Court of Appeals stated that the December 20

indictment was a change in Jeter’s status “sufficient to authorize the circuit

court ... to summarily exercise a new discretion as to the amount of bail.” Jeter appealed for discretionary review pursuant to RCr 4.43(l)(h), which this

Court granted J

Analysis

We review a circuit court’s decision whether to modify a bail bond for an

abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Peacock, 701 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Ky.

1985); Long v. Hamilton, 467 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Ky. 1971) (“Appellate courts will

not attempt to substitute their judgment for that of the trial court and will not

interfere in the fixing of bail unless the trial court has clearly abused its

discretionary power.”) (internal citations omitted). That is, we must analyze

“whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or

unsupported by sound legal principles.” Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 423

S.W.3d 152, 156 (Ky. 2014) (internal citations omitted).

Upon indictment, jurisdiction over Jeter’s bail passed from the district to

the circuit court. RCr 4.54(1). Additionally, upon indictment and the issuance

of a bench warrant, the circuit judge shall fix bail. RCr 6.54(1). Therefore, at

the December 28 appearance, it was solely up to the circuit judge to set a new

bond on the charges returned in Jeter’s indictment. Here, even though the

circuit judge used the peculiar term “interim bond,” he fixed a new bond at

$10,000. Although this circuit court bond had the same monetary value as the

1 On October 25, 2017, Jeter plead guilty to both charges in exchange for the Commonwealth dropping a first-degree persistent felony offender charge in a separate case. Two days later, the Jefferson Circuit Court sentenced him to a concurrent five- year sentence. However, although this case is arguably moot, this Court may exercise its jurisdiction as this is a situation “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Lexington Herald-Leader Co., Inc. u. Meigs, 660 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Ky. 1983) (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n u. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976)). bond set by the district court, it was not the same bond. Furthermore, with

the expiration of the district court’s bond, the district court’s bail credit order

became moot. Because the district court bond was moot, all requirements

which attended it were moot and unenforceable. Nevertheless, the circuit court

considered the issue anew pursuant to Jeter’s motion, but found that Jeter

was not entitled to bail credit under KRS 431.066(5)(a).

After the circuit court set Jeter’s circuit court bond on December 28,

2016, the issue as to whether the grand jury’s indictment was a “material

change in circumstances” sufficient under Sydnoror RCr 4.42 was moot.

Sydnor and RCr 4.42 only apply when a defendant has been released on bail.

They embody a historic concept of fairness meant to protect an individual’s

liberty interest from arbitrary bond revocation and reimprisonment. As

opposed to the defendant in Sydnor, Jeter was never released on bail.

Therefore, the “material change in circumstances” test for bail modification

never came into play. Bolton v. Irvin, 373 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. 2012) (“The

rule [RCr 4.42] provides additional protections for the liberty interests of a

defendant who has already been granted pretrial release. It is therefore

inapplicable to a defendant like [Jeter] who remained incarcerated pending

trial.”). The circuit judge used the indictment as a justifiable reason for

modifying the bond under RCr 6.54(1). Thus, Sydnor and RCr 4.42—the

primaiy focus of both parties’ arguments—are not operative in this case.

Bond modification is brought before a trial court through statutory and

rule-based authorities. Some grant a trial court power to modify a bond sua sponte, such as RCr 3.14(1), which permits a district court to modify an initial

bail amount after a finding of probable cause. Others empower the court to

consider modifying bond upon either party’s motion. See, e.g., Bolton v. Irvin,

373 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. 2012) (citing RCr 4.40(1)).

Bolton illustrates that Kentucky’s statutes and criminal rules provide the

minimal due process requirements for bail modification. Id. at 435-36. Bolton

stands for the maxim that judges may only modify bail as authorized by statute

or procedural rule. Thus, we will assess an alleged abuse of discretion in bail

modification for a trial court’s deviation from those authorities.

Here, Jeter filed a motion titled “DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO REDUCE

HIS BOND” pursuant to RCr 4.40(1), which also contained motions: for bail

credit under KRS 431.066(5)(a); for release on his own recognizance; for release

to maintain employment while awaiting trial; and, alternatively, for HIP release.

In response, the Commonwealth argued that the bond should remain

unchanged, and that bail credit should not be granted to Jeter because of his

prior felony record and risk of flight. The circuit judge appropriately granted

Jeter’s request for an adversarial hearing on the motion to modify bond under

RCr 4.40(1). Also, even though the bail credit issue was rendered moot by the

circuit court’s initial bond, the court and attorneys proceeded as if it was still a

viable concern.

In so doing, the circuit court considered Jeter’s prior record on his bond

reduction request under RCr 4.40 as well as his request for bail credit release

under KRS 431.066(5). This included his history of prior failures to make appearances and whether he posed a danger to the community. KRS

431.525(1) (requisite criteria for trial courts to consider in setting bail); RCr

4.40 (defendant is entitled to a hearing the first time he moves for review of

conditions of release); RCr 4.16(1) (when determining bail, the trial court shall

consider “the defendant's past criminal acts, if any, [and] the defendant's

reasonably anticipated conduct if released . . . .”); KRS 431.066(2) (the court

shall consider whether the defendant constitutes a flight risk, is unlikely to

appear, or poses a danger to the public if released prior to trial).

After considering Jeter’s motion and reviewing the arguments of the

parties, the circuit judge decided to increase Jeter’s bond. The circuit judge

also denied bail credit because he found Jeter to be a flight risk and a danger

to others. See KRS 431.066(5)(b). In its January 20 order, the court noted

that, “for the reasons stated on the record [at the January 17 hearing] and

incorporated herein by reference, the Defendant’s bond is fixed at $20,000 full

cash. The Defendant’s motion for bail credit is respectfully DENIED.”

During the January 17 hearing, the circuit judge stated that he was

familiar with Jeter’s criminal history and his history of not showing up for

court. Specifically, the circuit judge said:

I’ve gotta make sure you’re gonna come back to court, and your history says that you might or you might not. I’ve gotta make sure you’re gonna not get into any more trouble, and your history says that you will get into more trouble because you have been in trouble for so long for so many things . . .I’m going to set the bond at $20,000 full cash and deny bail credit, because you are a flight risk and because you are a danger to the community.

Bond Modification Hr’g 8:47:09 - 8:47:48, Jan. 17, 2017. Applying the abuse of discretion test, we conclude that the trial judge did

not abuse his discretion in modifying Jeter’s bond to $20,000 full cash and

denying him bail credit. The court’s order was based upon the evidence of

Jeter’s PFO status, history of non-appearance, and the danger he posed to

others if released. Such a finding was not arbitrary; the court came to its

decision after a full and fair hearing with all parties present, represented by

counsel, and given the opportunity to present evidence.

Additionally, RCr 4.40(2) requires that, whenever a trial court denies a

defendant’s motion for bond modification or other change of conditions of

release, “the judge shall record in writing the reasons for so doing.” RCr

4.40(2). Here, the circuit judge made oral findings of record on January 17

that Jeter was a flight risk and a danger to others in the community. Bond

Modification Hr’g 8:47:39 - 8:47:48, Jan. 17, 2017. However, in the judge’s

written order of January 20, he “incorporated [t]herein by reference” his oral

findings from the January 17 hearing. Therefore, we find that the circuit court

substantially complied with RCr 4.40(2).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, we hereby affirm the decision of the Court

of Appeals.

All sitting. All concur. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT;

Cicely Jaracz Lambert Chief Appellate Defender

Adam Braunbeck Louisville Metro Public Defender

Daniel T. Goyette Louisville Metro Public Defender

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE;

Andy Be shear Attorney General of Kentucky

Dorislee J. Gilbert Special Assistant Attorney General