Corey Lee Walton v. State of Alabama (Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court: CC-22-30)

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama
• Decided: August 23, 2024
• Docket: CR-2022-1342
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: August 23, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 _________________________

CR-2022-1342 _________________________

Corey Lee Walton

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court (CC-22-30)

McCOOL, Judge.

AFFIRMED BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum and Minor, JJ., concur. Cole, J., dissents,

with opinion. CR-2022-1342

COLE, Judge, dissenting.

Because I believe that the trial court erred by admitting Walton's

youthful-offender adjudications into evidence, I respectfully dissent.

Before Walton's trial began, he filed a motion in limine requesting

that the prosecution be prohibited from offering any character evidence

pursuant to Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid. In particular, he asserted that the

trial court should "preclude any mention or evidence of [Walton's] prior

conviction under youthful offender." (R. 195.) Immediately before jury

selection, this motion was argued by counsel, and the prosecution agreed

that youthful-offender convictions are generally not admissible but

acknowledged that the "door can be opened" for their admissibility. (R.

33.) During voir dire of the prospective jurors, Walton stated that "[t]his

is a stand your ground state, meaning you don't even have to run, you

can stand your ground; okay? Anybody got a problem with that?

Anybody got a problem with the right to defend yourself, to defend

yourself with a gun?" (R. 151.) Neither the "stand your ground" law nor

the duty to retreat was ever mentioned again to the jury by defense

counsel. During the trial, the State asserted that Walton had opened the

door to the introduction of Walton's youthful-offender adjudication by

2 CR-2022-1342

raising a "stand your ground" defense. Walton argued that he had not

raised the issue of when an individual had the right to stand his or her

ground, but he agreed that the trial court could "make it known to the

jury that [Walton] was not supposed to carry a gun pursuant to a court

order, that [the court] could do it without putting in these charges of

attempted murder, discharging a gun into an occupied building,

distribution, robbery without putting this to the jury." (R. 435.) He

argued that "its probative value is not outweighed by prejudicial effects"

and that it would improperly "taint[] the jury against him." (R. 435.) The

trial court admitted State's Exhibit 29 over Walton's objection, but

Walton asked if "the Court's ruling would be the same on State's Exhibit

29 if we would agree with the Court that he had a duty to retreat and not

go the stand your ground route but self-defense route?" (R. 426, 435.)

The trial court said it would "consider that." (R. 437.)

The trial court later noted that Walton had filed a pretrial motion

alleging that he was entitled to immunity based upon Alabama's "stand

your ground" law, that Walton had raised the "stand your ground" issue

during voir dire of the jury and during his opening statement, and that

"for four or five years … this has been a self-defense stand your ground

3 CR-2022-1342

case." (R. 528.) Walton seemed to concede that he had mentioned "stand

your ground" during voir dire, but he correctly argued that otherwise

"[t]here was no point in opening arguments or in the course of this trial

we've talked about stand your ground." (R. 523.) The trial court agreed

with the State's argument that Walton's youthful-offender adjudication,

which precluded Walton from possessing a firearm, was relevant to the

issue whether Walton had a duty to retreat from a confrontation or

whether he was permitted to stand his ground without retreating. The

trial court also agreed that Walton had raised the defense that he could

stand his ground; therefore, he had opened the door to the admission of

the youthful-offender convictions. Walton acknowledged that he was

arguing that he acted in self-defense and "plan[ned] on going down the

road on self-defense," but that they were not arguing "stand your

ground." (R. 523-24.) He reiterated that there was "no need for [the

youthful-offender adjudication] to come in, especially with we're not even

going down the realm of stand your ground. We're only going down the

realm of self-defense. And his duty to retreat, that's -- we have no

problem with that." (R. 524.) The trial court essentially held that Walton

could not change his strategy at that point, that the youthful-offender

4 CR-2022-1342

adjudication would be admitted into evidence, and that the jury would be

"charged on the duty to retreat." (R. 525, 527, 529.)

The adjudications were admitted into evidence, and the trial court

gave the jury a "limiting instruction" that the adjudications were not to

be considered as "character evidence" or used to infer that Walton was

guilty in this case, that they could be considered only as they "relate[] to

[Walton's] possession of a firearm. That’s it. Whether he rightfully had

a firearm." (R. 563-64.) The youthful-offender adjudications notified the

jury that Walton had been ordered not to possess a firearm, but it also

notified the jury that, less than two months before the incident in

question occurred, he had been adjudicated guilty of two counts of

attempted murder, one count of first-degree robbery, one count of

shooting into an occupied vehicle, one count of distribution of a controlled

substance, and that two unknown charges had been dismissed pursuant

to a plea agreement with the State. (C. 310-14.)

I agree with the unpublished memorandum that Walton's youthful-

offender adjudications were relevant to the issue whether Walton had the

duty to retreat during the shooting in this case, but his possession of a

firearm did not preclude him from asserting that his actions were in self-

5 CR-2022-1342

defense. The memorandum correctly cites the applicable law, including

the general principle that, "[i]f the defendant's commission of another

crime or misdeed is an element of guilt, or tends to prove his guilt

otherwise than by showing bad character, then proof of such other act is

admissible." Horton v. State, 217 So. 3d 27, 47 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016).

"However, the fact that evidence of a prior bad act may fit into one of the[] exceptions [outlined in Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid.,] will not alone justify its admission. Judicial inquiry does not end with a determination that the evidence of another crime is relevant and probative of a necessary element of the charged offense. It does not suffice simply to see if the evidence is capable of being fitted within an exception to the rule. Rather, a balancing test must be applied. The evidence of another similar crime must not only be relevant, it must also be reasonably necessary to the government's case, and it must be plain, clear, and conclusive, before its probative value will be held to outweigh its potential prejudicial effects."

Floyd v. State, 289 So. 3d 337, 398 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (emphasis

added; internal quotations and citations omitted).

First, I question whether Walton's comment during voir dire opened

the door for the trial court to consider whether his youthful-offender

adjudications were admissible. Walton did not tell the potential jurors

that he did or did not have a right to stand his ground during the incident

in question. He merely told the jury panel that Alabama has a "stand

your ground" law and asked the potential jurors if they believed a person

6 CR-2022-1342

should have the right to defend themselves with a gun. Although, under

the appropriate circumstances, a party can open the door to the

admission of evidence during voir dire of potential jurors, I question

whether Walton's limited question opened to door to this issue. The trial

court had conditionally granted Walton's motion in limine regarding his

youthful-offender adjudications; therefore, the evidence of his prior

offenses would not have been admitted for the jury's consideration if the

trial court did not believe that the defense had sufficiently raised this

issue by his comment during voir dire.

Even if Walton did open the door and made his youthful-offender

adjudications relevant, admission of the adjudications was not necessary

to the State's case, and they were unduly and unfairly prejudicial to

Walton. Neither this Court in its memorandum nor the State asserts

that Walton's youthful-offender adjudications were admissible for any of

the reasons specifically outlined in Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid. The sole

reason proffered for their admissibility was to establish that Walton had

a duty to retreat if he could do so safely. "[T]his Court recognizes the

distinction between the right to self-defense under § 13A-3-23(a)[, Ala.

Code 1975,] and the separate right to stand one's ground under § 13A-3-

7 CR-2022-1342

23(b)[, Ala. Code 1975,] " Diggs v. State, 203 So. 3d 120, 123 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2015), and Walton attempted to make this distinction to the trial

court when he argued that his youthful-offender adjudications were

inadmissible. Walton agreed that he would not argue that he had the

right to stand his ground, that the trial court could instruct the jury that

he had a duty to retreat, and that the trial court could instruct that jury

that Walton did not have the right to stand his ground because he had

been ordered not to possess a firearm. Walton merely wanted the details

of the offenses underlying the youthful-offender adjudications to be

withheld from the jury. Clearly, the trial court would have instructed the

jury, as was frequently done before the law on self-defense was amended

to include the no-duty-to-retreat language, that Walton "is not justified

in using deadly physical force upon another person if it reasonably

appears or he knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force

with complete safety." § 13A-3-23(b), Ala. Code 1975. As Walton

suggested, the trial court also could have notified the jury, without

divulging details of the underlying allegations, that, "if the defendant

claiming self-defense was, at the time of the shooting, a convicted felon

in possession of a firearm [or, in this case, that a court had ordered that

8 CR-2022-1342

he not possess a firearm], he has a duty to retreat because he is engaged

in 'unlawful activity' and is not 'free from fault.' " Wallace v. State, 216

So. 3d 464, 468 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). In fact, the trial court did instruct

the jury that Walton was required to retreat, if he could do so safely,

without mentioning Walton's youthful-offender adjudications. The trial

court instructed the jury as follows:

"A defendant is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person and a defendant cannot prevail on the issue of self-defense if he reasonably -- if it reasonably appears or the defendant knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating."

(R. 953.) The trial court also reiterated to the jury during the final

instructions that Walton's youthful-offender adjudications could be

considered only "as to the legality of possessing a firearm," but it did not

explain why it mattered that Walton did not legally possess the firearm,

nor did the court explain to the jury that the adjudications were in any

way related to the issue of an individual's duty to retreat. (R. 953-54.)

Because there was no argument that the previous offenses were relevant

for one of the reasons outlined in Rule 404(b), and the trial court

instructed the jury that Walton could not prevail on a self-defense claim

if he could safely retreat from the situation, the nature of the allegations

9 CR-2022-1342

underlying the youthful-offender adjudication was irrelevant and

unnecessary to the State's case. Evidence of prior bad acts is not

admissible unless the evidence is "reasonably necessary to the state's

case," Horton, 217 So. 3d 46; therefore, this evidence was not admissible.

In addition to the State needing to establish that the prior-act

evidence was "necessary," the State also needed to show that its probative

value outweighed the prejudicial effect of the evidence. The exclusionary

rule outlined in Rule 404(a)

"is simply an application of the character rule which forbids the State to prove the accused's bad character by particular deeds. The basis for the rule lies in the belief that the prejudicial effect of prior crimes will far outweigh any probative value that might be gained from them. Most agree that such evidence or prior crimes has an almost irreversible impact upon the minds of jurors."

Bailey v. State, 75 So. 3d 171, 184 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (internal quotes

and citations omitted). The memorandum correctly notes that the trial

court gave a curative instruction in an effort to limit the prejudice

suffered by Walton, but the State clearly did not heed the trial court's

instruction when it gave its closing argument.

The State repeatedly reminded the jury about the nature of

Walton's prior offenses and how he had "looked at this judge in the eye,

10 CR-2022-1342

and he promised" not to have a firearm. (R. 933.) Moreover, the

prosecutor never discussed the significance of the prior adjudications and

how they related to the issue of the lack of a duty to retreat. This is

understandable because the defense did not argue that he had the right

to stand his ground. Rather, Walton argued only that he acted in self-

defense, and this argument was not altered by the fact that he could not

legally possess a firearm. The evidence of Walton's prior violent acts,

which were similar to the offense charged in this case, had an

"irreversible impact" on the jury and should not have been admitted into

evidence. This adverse impact is particularly likely because even the

State's evidence supported Walton's common-law claim of self-defense.

The State's witnesses testified that Walton was essentially forced to leave

by a large group, that he was "encircled" and "essentially trapped" at the

bottom of a hill, that the group was "trying to hurt [Walton and Chuco],"

that Chuco "fainted," and that Walton was tackled and "[t]hat's when the

gunshot went off." Even the investigator testified that the gun was fired

"close to the ground." Thus, an overwhelming amount of evidence was

presented, by the State no less, that supported Walton's argument that

11 CR-2022-1342

he acted in self-defense. This evidence was likely overcome by the details

of Walton's youthful-offender adjudications.

Finally, I disagree with the assertion in the memorandum that "at

the time the [youthful-offender] adjudications were admitted, it appeared

that whether Walton was entitled to stand your ground or had a duty to

retreat was going to be a factual issue for the jury to resolve." As

previously noted, Walton had never asserted to the jury that he had the

right to stand his ground; he informed the trial court that he would not

argue that he had the right to stand his ground; and he agreed that the

trial court could instruct the jury that he did not have the right to stand

his ground. This issue was resolved before the exhibit that contained

Walton's youthful-offender adjudications was submitted to the jury.

Because evidence of Walton's youthful-offender adjudications was

both unnecessary for the State to prove its case and was unduly

prejudicial, I would reverse Walton's conviction for attempted murder

and remand this matter to circuit court for a new trial.