Corey Crittenden v. County of Los Angeles

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedAugust 8, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-02852
StatusUnknown

This text of Corey Crittenden v. County of Los Angeles (Corey Crittenden v. County of Los Angeles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Corey Crittenden v. County of Los Angeles, (C.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP TONY M. SAIN, SB# 251626 2 E-Mail: Tony.Sain@lewisbrisbois.com TORI L. N. BAKKEN, SB# 329069 3 E-Mail: Tori.Bakken@lewisbrisbois.com ABIGAIL J. R. McLAUGHLIN, SB# 313208 4 E-Mail: Abigail.McLaughlin@lewisbrisbois.com 633 West 5th Street, Suite 4000 5 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: 213.250.1800 6 Facsimile: 213.250.7900 7 Attorneys for Defendants, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 8 MICHAEL ALBUREZ, BRANDON VANARSDALE, and TERRIE COATS 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION 12 13 COREY CRITTENDEN, Case No. 2:25-CV-02852-MWC (MAAx) 14 Plaintiff, [Hon. Michelle Williams Court, Dist. Judge; Hon. Maria A. Audero, M. 15 vs. Judge] 16 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a public entity; MICHAEL ALBUREZ, [DISCOVERY MATTER] 17 an individual; BRANDON VANARSDALE, an individual; 18 TERRIE COATS, an individual; and STIPULATED PROTECTIVE DOES 1 through 20, individuals, ORDER 19 inclusive, 20 Defendants. [Proposed Order filed concurrently herewith] 21 22 Complaint Filed: 04/02/2025 Trial: 07/20/2026 23 24 1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 25 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 26 proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure 27 and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. 1 following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Stipulated 2 Protective Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses 3 to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends 4 only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment 5 under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in 6 Section 13.3 below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to 7 confidential information under seal; Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that 8 must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission 9 from the Court to file material under seal. 10 11 2. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 12 2.1. Contentions re Harm from Disclosure of Confidential Materials. 13 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 14 protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace officer 15 personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for the 16 following reasons. 17 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy 18 in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is 19 underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure 20 of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 21 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12- 22 13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based 23 discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is 24 consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] 25 privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 26 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights 27 [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code 1 uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of 2 non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 3 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies 4 have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information 5 privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege 6 (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel files of their peace 7 officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain 8 critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or 9 communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – 10 potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal 11 Affairs type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records 12 or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of 13 obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa 14 Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 15 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 16 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); 17 Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. 18 v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants 19 further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the 20 public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that 21 uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; 22 impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements 23 and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of 24 open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged 25 misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement 26 any remedial measures that may be required. 27 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same rights 1 fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ 2 compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 822, 3 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 4 Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing 5 such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially 6 impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, 7 frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving 8 the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’ 9 families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, and 10 preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by 11 publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can and often does 12 result in litigation. 13 2.2. Plaintiff does not agree with and does not stipulate to Defendants’ 14 contentions herein above, and nothing in this Stipulation or its associated Order shall 15 resolve the parties’ disagreement, or bind them, concerning the legal statements and 16 claimed privileges set forth above. 17 However, plaintiff agrees that there is Good Cause for a Protective Order so as 18 to preserve the respective interests of the parties without the need to further burden 19 the Court with such issues. Specifically, the parties jointly contend that, absent this 20 Stipulation and its associated Protective Order, the parties' respective privilege 21 interests may be impaired or harmed, and that this Stipulation and its associated 22 Protective Order may avoid such harm by permitting the parties to facilitate discovery 23 with reduced risk that privileged and/or sensitive/confidential information will 24 become matters of public record. 25 2.3. The parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized need 26 for protection as to any medical or psychotherapeutic records and autopsy 27 photographs, because of the privacy interests at stake therein. Because of these 1 agreement between the parties. 2 2.4.

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Related

Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)

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Bluebook (online)
Corey Crittenden v. County of Los Angeles, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/corey-crittenden-v-county-of-los-angeles-cacd-2025.