Coregis Insurance v. Baratta & Fenerty, Ltd.

187 F.R.D. 528, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10817, 1999 WL 498560
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 22, 1999
DocketNo. Civ.A. 99-573
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 187 F.R.D. 528 (Coregis Insurance v. Baratta & Fenerty, Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coregis Insurance v. Baratta & Fenerty, Ltd., 187 F.R.D. 528, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10817, 1999 WL 498560 (E.D. Pa. 1999).

Opinion

[529]*529 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOYNER, District Judge.

This Memorandum and Order address the defendants’ Baratta & Fenerty, LTD. and Anthony Baratta, Esquire’s (collectively Ba-ratta & Fenerty) Motion to Compel Full and Complete Answers to Interrogatories and Responses to Request for Production of Documents and for Sanctions and Coregis Insurance Company’s (Coregis) opposition thereto. For the reasons that follow, Baratta & Fen-erty’s motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Coregis is seeking a declaratory judgment against Baratta & Fenerty concerning its obligation to defend and/ or indemnify Ba-ratta & Fenerty in connection with a legal malpractice claim pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, Lee v. Baratta & Fenerty, Ltd., et al. On February 25, 1999, Baratta & Fenerty served its First Set of Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents upon Coregis. Coregis’ responses were due on or before March 30, 1999.

Baratta & Fenerty advised Coregis by letter dated March 31, 1999 that Coregis’ replies to discovery were past due. To avoid filing a motion to compel, Baratta & Fenerty requested Coregis to contact Baratta & Fen-erty’s counsel by April 2, 1999. Contact among the parties did not occur until April 7, 1999. During that conversation, counsel for Coregis agreed to serve responses to the outstanding discovery requests within ten days. Accordingly, counsel for Baratta & Fenerty agreed to defer filing the motion to compel pending the receipt of Coregis’ responses.

On April 14, 1999, Coregis served its responses by fax. The responses contained more objections than answers and upon receiving it, Baratta & Fenerty sent counsel for Coregis a letter dated April 20, 1999 to resolve Baratta & Fenerty’s discovery concerns. In a response letter dated April 23, 1999, Coregis maintained its objections as appropriate and made in good faith. Consequently, Baratta & Fenerty filed the motion to compel contending Coregis’ responses are insufficient and untimely.1

II. DISCUSSION

This dispute over discovery centers on whether the agreed upon ten-day delay to respond to Baratta & Fenerty’s discovery requests is an extension of time to object to the requests made by Baratta & Fenerty. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,2 as well as ease law, have established that when a party fails to serve objections to interrogatories and/or document requests within the time required, in absence of good cause or of an extension of time to do so, they have generally waived the right to raise objections later. Puricelli v. Borough of Morrisville, 136 F.R.D. 393, 396 (E.D.Pa.1991); Shenker v. Sportelli, 83 F.R.D. 365, 366 (E.D.Pa. 1979); Davis v. Romney, 53 F.R.D. 247, 248 (E.D.Pa.1971). Even an objection that information sought is privileged is waived if not timely stated and it is within the court’s discretion to determine whether the privilege has been properly invoked. Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir.1981).

Before a court may compel discovery, it is advisable that it examines the dis[530]*530covery sought and the objections made in opposition to it. See Shenker v. Sportelli 83 F.R.D. 365, 367 (E.D.Pa.1979). Objections should be plain and specific enough so that the court can understand in what way the interrogatories are alleged to be objectionable. Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir.1981). The party asserting the objections must show specifically how each interrogatory is privileged or vague or overly broad. Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296 (E.D.Pa.1980).

Coregis asserts that it filed a motion for summary judgment simultaneously with its opposition to Baratta & Fenerty’s motion to compel because it believes that this case involves only matters of law and not fact. This Court is of the opinion that the motion is not relevant to the present discovery dispute. The facts clearly show that Coregis failed to object within the 30-day period provided by the Rules. Only after negotiating a 10-day delay with counsel for Baratta & Fenerty did Coregis serve responses to Baratta & Fenerty’s nine interrogatories and asserted sixteen general objections and five specific objections that included blanket statements such as: “documents can be found in the underwriting file; used to harass or impose an undue burden or expense; overly broad, vague, unduly burdensome and oppressive; not relevant or reasonably calculated to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Coregis’ response to Baratta & Fenerty’s document requests were just as elusive or left blank. After being advised, by letter and several phone calls, of Baratta & Fenerty counsel’s concerns to the objections and items left blank, Coregis amended its response to the discovery requests maintaining that the information sought is privileged, without providing reasons for its determination.

Technically, Coregis waived its right to object to Baratta & Fenerty’s discovery requests. Although, both Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 and 34 permit the court to allow a longer period to respond to a discovery request, Coregis made no request to this Court for an extension of time to respond, resulting in a failure to comply with the letter and spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Shenker v. Sportelli 83 F.R.D. 365, 366 n. 1 (E.D.Pa.1979). For this Court to consider otherwise, Coregis bears the onus in clarification as to whether the delay in answering the discovery requests included objections as well as answers. Coregis has not provided any information that would allow this Court to believe that Baratta & Fenerty’s counsel agreed to wait for Coregis’ objections. Additionally, an agreement among the parties to wait for responses beyond the 30-day period is not considered a stay or an extension of time for filing objections. See Davis v. Romney, 53 F.R.D. 247, 248 (E.D.Pa.1971). Furthermore, Coregis’ responses consisted solely of boilerplate language and never identified its objections with any specificity.

To resolve this matter, we are guided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) which provides: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of the other party....

Applying the Rule to the present matter, this Court concludes that Baratta & Fenerty’s interrogatory numbers 1 and 3 and its request for documents in numbers 5, 8, 11, 14, and 15 seem meritorious because the items request information concerning the policy in this case and are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant information.

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Bluebook (online)
187 F.R.D. 528, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10817, 1999 WL 498560, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coregis-insurance-v-baratta-fenerty-ltd-paed-1999.