Cordarian Henderson v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedApril 16, 2009
Docket06-08-00128-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Cordarian Henderson v. State (Cordarian Henderson v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Cordarian Henderson v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion



In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana



______________________________


No. 06-08-00128-CR
______________________________


CORDARIAN HENDERSON, Appellant


V.


THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee





On Appeal from the 124th Judicial District Court
Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 35417-B





Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss


MEMORANDUM OPINION


Charged with two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, Cordarian Henderson's defensive theory was that his eight-year-old victim had made up these allegations of sexual abuse as a result of having a fanciful imagination--an imagination that was the unfortunate product of being physically abused by his mother and of having what seemed to be unfettered access to pornographic videos. But for the pornography and being abused by his mother, the victim would never have "made up" these claims against Henderson--or so went Henderson's theory of the case.

Henderson's jury disagreed with this defensive theory and found Henderson guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual assault. The jury assessed his punishment at ten years' imprisonment on each count. Henderson now appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his ten-year sentences are disproportionate to his crimes. We overrule both issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.

(1) The Evidence Is Legally and Factually Sufficient To Support the Jury's Verdict

Henderson contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish that he committed either of the two counts of aggravated sexual assault for which the jury found him guilty. A legal sufficiency review requires an appellate court to ask "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This standard mandates that the reviewing court accord deference to the fact-finder's duty to resolve conflicts in testimony and other evidence. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This review standard requires an examination of all the evidence, both that which was properly admitted and that which was improperly admitted, to determine whether the cumulative force of all the evidence (direct, circumstantial, or both) supports the verdict when such evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to that verdict. Id.; see also Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). During this review process, the court measures the evidence against the elements of the offense as defined in a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge "sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Id.

A factual sufficiency review has subtle differences. "Evidence may be factually insufficient if: '1) it is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or 2) the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the available evidence.'" Berry v. State, 233 S.W.3d 847, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). "Such a factual sufficiency review requires the reviewing court to consider all of the evidence." Id. (citing Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). "A clearly wrong and unjust verdict occurs where the jury's finding is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly demonstrates bias." Id. (citing Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). As in a legal sufficiency review, the hypothetically correct jury charge construct is employed in assessing the factual sufficiency of the evidence. Vega v. State, 267 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

One way in which the crime of aggravated sexual assault can be committed is if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means and the victim is younger than fourteen years of age. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Another way the crime of aggravated sexual assault can be committed is if the actor intentionally or knowingly "causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor" and the victim is younger than fourteen years of age. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B). These two methods of committing aggravated sexual assault were alleged as alternative paragraphs in Count I of the grand jury's indictment, the count alleging that offenses occurred April 1, 2006. The named victim for both alternative paragraphs was the same: John Doe 08201999. (1)

Count II of the grand jury's indictment also contained two alternative allegations. These alternative allegations mirrored the allegations contained in Count I of the indictment, except that these offenses were alleged to have occurred April 15, 2006. The named victim for both paragraphs of Count II was the same as Count I: John Doe 08201999.

With respect to the first paragraph of either count of the indictment, the applicable hypothetically correct jury charge would require the State to bring forth proof of the following elements: that Henderson (1) intentionally or knowingly, (2) caused the penetration of the victim's anus, (3) by any means, and (4) the victim was younger than fourteen years of age. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B).

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