Corcoran, J. v. Corcoran, L., Jr.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 28, 2023
• Docket: 319 MDA 2023
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A20033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

JANICE M. CORCORAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : LARRY D. CORCORAN, JR. : : Appellant : No. 319 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered February 15, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Civil Division at No(s): CV-2023-00059

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: NOVEMBER 28, 2023

Appellant, Larry D. Corcoran, Jr., appeals from the final order entered

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County granting the petition

for Protection from Abuse (“PFA”)1 filed by his wife, Janice M. Corcoran, who

is Appellee in the present appeal. We affirm.

The notes of testimony from the February 15, 2023, hearing on Ms.

Corcoran’s PFA petition establish that both parties were represented by

counsel. N.T. 2/15/23, at 2. At the outset of the hearing, counsel for

Appellant informed the trial court that “while [Appellant] denies the

allegations, he is open to having an order of protection issued against him,

providing he is allowed to remove all of his personal items from the home.”

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122. J-A20033-23

Id. Upon learning that the parties had not yet discussed, let alone agreed on,

the terms of a prospective PFA order, the trial court ordered a brief recess to

permit them to arrive at an agreement. Id.

When the hearing resumed, counsel for Appellant announced that

Appellant “agreed to everything” after receiving a full explanation of the terms

and conditions, and counsel for the petitioner, Janice Corcoran, likewise stated

that the parties “have an agreement.” N.T. at 3. Specifically, counsel for Ms.

Corcoran elaborated:

Counsel: The agreement is for a PFA for three years. [Appellant] will be evicted and excluded from the residence where my client currently is and had been [Appellant’s] residence up until the filing of the PFA.

[Appellant] will pay the home insurance and the property taxes. The home – they jointly own the home and [Ms. Corcoran] will pay all of the other household bills. [Appellant] will make sure they are all in [Ms. Corcoran’s] name and [Ms. Corcoran] agrees to list the home for sale after six months. . . . And [Appellant] will have a full day to retrieve his personal property from the house.

N.T. at 3-4. Counsel further clarified that the agreement called for Appellant’s

brother to retrieve, on a date agreed upon by the parties, Appellant’s clothing,

personal effects, tools, and anything that belongs to him. N.T. at 4.

The trial court then addressed each party in turn, confirming that each

understood and approved the described agreement, N.T. at 5-6. With that,

the trial court entered a three-year PFA order. N.T. at 6. On February 24,

2023, Appellant, acting pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 904(a).

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“Our standard of review for PFA orders is well settled. ‘In the context

of a PFA order, we review the trial court's legal conclusions for an error of law

or abuse of discretion.’” Boykai v. Young, 83 A.3d 1043, 1045 (Pa. Super.

2014) (quoting Stamus v. Dutcavich, 938 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa. Super.

2007)).

Appellant has filed a pro se brief raising twelve undeveloped, conclusory

issues contesting either the effective assistance of counsel or the validity of

the PFA order. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 1-12b. “When briefing the various

issues that have been preserved, it is an appellant's duty to present

arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must

support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and

with citations to legal authorities. ... [W]hen defects in a brief impede our

ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal

entirely or find certain issues to be waived.” See Commonwealth v. Hardy,

918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Herein, we conclude that Appellant’s briefing deficiencies hamper

meaningful review, and we deny relief on this basis. Nevertheless, even if we

were to reach the merits of Appellant’s truncated, fatally undeveloped issues

on appeal, we would discern no merit to any of them. It is well-settled that,

“[o]rdinarily, a party who consents to, or acquiesces in, a judgment or order

cannot appeal therefrom.” Brown v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Department of Health, 434 A.2d 1179, 1181 (Pa. 1981) (citing authority

holding that to obtain appellate relief from claimed error a party must first

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present it to the court whose determination is challenged on appeal); accord

Laird v. Clearfield & Mahoning Ry. Co., 916 A.2d 1091, 1097 (Pa. 2007).

The record before us demonstrates that Appellant freely consented in

open court to the agreement after having received the benefit of both

representation by counsel in the formation of the agreement and instruction

by the trial court that the agreement was contingent upon his approval, which

he was free to withhold. The substance of the agreement, moreover, was

uncomplicated and clearly articulated by respective counsel, such that there

simply exists no evidence that one or both parties misconstrued any aspect of

the agreement. For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant’s appeal

affords him no relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/28/2023

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