Corbett v. Winston Elkhorn Coal Co.

296 F. 577, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 3369
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMarch 14, 1924
DocketNo. 3886
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 296 F. 577 (Corbett v. Winston Elkhorn Coal Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Corbett v. Winston Elkhorn Coal Co., 296 F. 577, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 3369 (6th Cir. 1924).

Opinion

DONAHUE, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). [1-4] It is claimed upon the part of the coal company that the contract of November 28, 1919, was not a contract for the sale and purchase of coal, but merely a sales agency contract. The first paragraph of this contract read as follows:

“E. J. Corbett, Detroit, Mich., agrees to buy from the Winston Elkhorn Coal Company, of Kegina, Ky., and Winston Elkhorn Coal Company agrees to sell to E. J. Corbett the output of Kewanee and Winright mines.”

Courts do not make contracts for parties, and it is a rule of construction that, where the language used in a contract is plain and unequivocal, it must be given its plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, unless it further appears that words or phrases therein have acquired a trade or technical meaning. It is also a rule of construction that ‘contracts must be construed in accordance with the meaning and intention of the parties, in so far as that intention can be ascertained from the language of the whole contract, the situation of the parties at the time the contract was written, the purposes and subject-matter of tbe contract, and the mutual construction by the parties themselves of the terms and conditions therein written. Parol evidence may not be received to vary the terms of a written agreement, but only for the purpose of aiding a court in construing the language used in accordance with the understanding of the parties at the time the contract was written, but where, under the state of the proof, the language is not subject to such construction, a court of equity will reform the contract to conform to the real intent, agreement, and understanding of the parties.

[580]*580After this contract was executed, the coal company, with the knowledge of Corbett, and without objection on his part, referred to him in a number of' letters as its selling agent, and Corbett, in many letters that he wrote to the coal company and to others interested in the purchase of coal, referred to himself as the selling agent of the Winston Elkhom Coal Company. Eor these reasons, we are inclined to think that both parties understood and intended thát this was a sales agency contract, and not an absolute contract of purchase and sale; but, in view of the conclusion this court has reached, we do not consider this question of vital importance in the determination of the issues in this case. Accepting the theory of the coal company that this was merely a sales agency contract, nevertheless, under its terms and provisions, it was required to ship upon the orders secured by its agent, Corbett, the entire output of these two mines, and Corbett was required to pay therefor the market price, or best price available, less 10 per cent, commission.

It is also claimed by the coal company that Corbett was to pay to it the market price, or the best price available, on the day of shipment, and not on the day the orders were received. The language of this provision of the contract as to price is not more definite, certain, and unambiguous than the first paragraph, which provides that “Corbett agrees to buy, and the coal company agrees to sell to Corbett,” the entire output of these two mines, and therefore is equally subject to construction or reformation by a court of equity, in accordance with the mutual intention and understanding of the parties at the time the contract was written.

A contract requiring a selling agent to pay the market price on day of shipment would be practically impossible of performance by the agent on a rising market, and especially so if the principal is permitted to delay shipment through necessity or whim until the market price on day of shipment is largely in excess of the price at which the agent had sold the coal. On the other hand, in case of a falling market, such a provision would be wholly inconsistent with the further provision in this contract that the principal is to receive the whole of the selling price, less 10 per cent, commission; that is to say, if coal were sold to-day for $3, and at date of shipment the market price were but $2, the principal under one provision of this contract would be entitled to all the money received by the agent, less 10 per cent., and under the other provision to but $2, less 10 per cent, although the agent, received $3 for his principal’s coal. It must be remembered that this contract was to continue for practically five years, and it necessarily must have been within the contemplation of the parties that in that length of time there would be both a rising and falling market. Nor is it conceivable that a selling agent would he sent out by his principal to sell coal at the market price, or best price obtainable, upon day of shipment. If the agent were able to find any customers willing to buy upon these conditions, such ■ customers would certainly demand, not only a further agreement as to prompt delivery, but also a definite date when such delivery would be made, and there is nothing in this contract that would authorize the agent to bind his undisclosed [581]*581principal to a definite date of delivery. In fact, the obligation to make any shipments at all is subject to strikes, accidents, wrecks, or car supply, or other occurrences beyond control of either party.

That the coal company did not so understand this contract at .the time it was written, or even as late as the 24th of March, iii the subsequent year, is evidenced by its second telegram of that date, in which is stated, “We have no orders from you or your customers accepted by us.” There was nothing except the price named in such orders that called for acceptance on the part of the coal company. It was not its business to whom the coal was sold, or where shipments were to he made. The only thing that could possibly have justified it in jhe rejection of orders would be that the selling price, if any was named therein, was not the market price, or the best available price. If no selling price was named in the orders, then the coal company would be required to fill the same, and depend upon the contract for the determination of the selling price for which its agent must account. To the same effect is the last paragraph of its letter of March 27th (Defendant’s Exhibit No. 22), in which it demanded that Corbett should forward all orders directly to it for the April shipments, and that these orders—

“must siiow the price of coal f. o. b. mine. * 9 * These orders must be for the best available price in the market, and on receipt of them we will determine whether these orders are for such prices. * * *

If the coal company then understood that it was to receive the market price, or best price available, on date of shipment, or that Corbett, as its agent, was to sell the coal to his customers at the market price, or best available price, on day of shipment, then it would have been wholly impossible for Corbett to show in his orders the price at which such coal had been sold. The market price on day of shipment could not, at the time the orders were taken, be definitely determined.

That it was the understanding of- both parties to this contract that the coal company was to receive the price for which Corbett sold the coal on the day the order was given, less 10 per cent, commission, no more and no less, regardless of a rising or falling market, is further evidenced by the fact that after this contract was written, and during federal control, shipments were made upon orders taken by Corbeft under the July contract, which contains substantially the same provision as to price.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hotchner v. Neon Products, Inc.
163 F.2d 672 (Sixth Circuit, 1947)
Thompson v. Baltimore & OR Co.
59 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Missouri, 1945)
University City, Mo. v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
114 F.2d 288 (Eighth Circuit, 1940)
Griffin Mfg. Co. v. Boom Boiler & Welding Co.
90 F.2d 209 (Sixth Circuit, 1937)
Peoples Sav. Bank v. American Surety Co.
15 F. Supp. 911 (W.D. Michigan, 1936)
Columbia Gas Const. Co. v. Holbrook
81 F.2d 417 (Sixth Circuit, 1936)
O'CONNOR v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co.
63 F.2d 523 (Eighth Circuit, 1933)
Larsen v. Buys
292 P. 239 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1930)
Owensboro Ditcher & Grader Co. v. Markham
32 F.2d 564 (Sixth Circuit, 1929)
Pearce v. Union Nat. Bank
33 F.2d 997 (N.D. Ohio, 1929)
Canadian Nat. Ry. Co. v. George M. Jones Co.
27 F.2d 240 (Sixth Circuit, 1928)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
296 F. 577, 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 3369, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/corbett-v-winston-elkhorn-coal-co-ca6-1924.