1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Lynnsey Coppinger, No. CV-25-00100-PHX-DWL
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Don Sanderson Ford Incorporated, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to seal the complaint. 16 (Doc. 16.) For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied. 17 BACKGROUND 18 On January 13, 2025, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, initiated this action by filing 19 the complaint. (Doc. 1.) The complaint includes extremely detailed allegations suggesting 20 that Plaintiff was sexually assaulted by her then-boss during a work trip and then resigned 21 shortly afterward. (Id. ¶¶ 11-66.) Based on those allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims of 22 assault and battery against her former boss and her former employer and a claim of sex 23 discrimination based on constructive discharge against her former employer. (Id. ¶¶ 75- 24 100). 25 On February 5, 2025 and February 28, 2025, the parties stipulated to extensions of 26 the deadline for Defendants to respond to the complaint (Docs. 10, 14), the second of which 27 was “to allow the parties to engage in an early mediation, which is presently scheduled for 28 March 20, 2025.” (Doc. 14.) The current response deadline is today, April 3, 2025. (Doc. 1 15.) 2 On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to seal the complaint. (Doc. 3 16.) The motion simply asserts that the complaint “contains allegations of a sensitive 4 nature over matters with which Plaintiff cannot fully or clearly recall” and that the 5 “sensitive nature of the allegations supports the sealing of her complaint.” (Id.) Plaintiff 6 further indicates that she intends to file a notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice 7 “[p]ending a ruling” on her motion to seal. (Id.) 8 On April 2, 2025, defense counsel contacted the undersigned judge’s chambers to 9 indicate that defense counsel wanted to make sure the motion to seal was granted before 10 the case was dismissed. 11 DISCUSSION 12 The public has a general right to inspect judicial records and documents, such that 13 a party seeking to seal a judicial record must overcome “a strong presumption in favor of 14 access.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). To 15 do so, the party must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings 16 that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring 17 disclosure . . . .” Id. at 1178-79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court 18 must then “conscientiously balance the competing interests of the public and the party who 19 seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Id. at 1179 (internal quotation marks 20 omitted). “After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial 21 records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis for 22 its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. (internal quotation marks 23 omitted). “The party seeking to seal any part of a judicial record bears the heavy burden 24 of showing that the material is the kind of information that courts will protect and that 25 disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure,” 26 Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014), at which point that injury is 27 weighed against the public’s interest in disclosure. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79. “The 28 mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, 1 incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to 2 seal its records.” Id. 3 The “stringent” compelling reasons standard applies to all filed motions and their 4 attachments where the motion is “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” 5 Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). 6 The “compelling reasons” standard also applies to pleadings, particularly to the complaint 7 and its amendments, as the operative complaint is the crux of any civil action. See, e.g., In 8 re Google Location Hist. Litig., 514 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“[T]his 9 Court and many others have held that the compelling reasons standard applies to 10 the sealing of a complaint precisely because the complaint forms the foundation of the 11 lawsuit.”); Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 565 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that 12 the “compelling reasons” standard applies to most judicial records). 13 The fact that a sealing request is stipulated or unopposed does not weigh in favor of 14 sealing. See generally Lipocine Inc. v. Clarus Therapeutics, Inc., 2020 WL 4569473, *7 15 (D. Del. 2020) (“The problem for judges is that [sealing] requests are seldom opposed— 16 the would-be opposing party has access to the materials and doesn’t particularly care 17 whether the public has access as well. . . . That leaves the judge in the position of having 18 to decide a sometimes complex issue of sealing or redaction with no adversarial briefing 19 and often, as in this case, with only a perfunctory submission from the party seeking 20 relief.”); Senderra Rx Partners LLC v. Express Scripts Incorporated, 2:19-mc-00016- 21 DWL, Doc. 5 (“Petitioner has filed a petition in federal district court, and this Court does 22 not automatically seal documents—let alone entire cases—based on agreements between 23 the parties.”); TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. v. Avago Techs. Ltd., 2010 WL 2474387, *1 24 (D. Ariz. 2010) (“TriQuint’s sole basis advanced for sealing the motion to amend in this 25 case is this side agreement. Similarly, Avago’s sole basis for seeking to seal its response 26 is the side agreement. The Court again does not find this side agreement to show a 27 compelling reason to seal the complaint in this case.”). 28 Where a party puts certain information at issue, that party’s ability to claim a privacy 1 interest in that information is weakened. See, e.g., Longoria v. Kodiak Concepts LLC, 2020 2 WL 4501456, *1 (D. Ariz. 2020) (“Plaintiffs cannot reasonably bring this action and then 3 expect confidentiality . . . .”); Shapiro v. Hasbro Inc., 2016 WL 9137526, *3 (C.D. Cal. 4 2016) (“Hasbro put these documents at issue in the litigation and thus fails to . . . make a 5 particularized showing of compelling reason[s] to file these exhibits under seal.”); B.F. v. 6 Amazon.com, Inc., 2019 WL 4597492, *2 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (“By bringing this lawsuit 7 against Defendants, [Plaintiffs] have put [the information sought to be sealed] directly at 8 issue, and cannot reasonably expect filings in this case not to include details about [that 9 information].”). 10 Moreover, once information is public, it is no longer confidential—a belated 11 decision that publishing information on the public docket was unwise “does not provide 12 good cause, let alone a compelling reason, to retroactively seal documents that have long 13 been part of the public record.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Noland, 2022 WL 939926, *6 (D. 14 Ariz. 2022). See also Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 n.11 (2d Cir. 15 2004) (“[W]hen information that is supposed to be confidential . . . is publicly disclosed 16 . . . it necessarily remains public . . . . ‘Once the cat is out of the bag, the ball game is 17 over.’”) (citation omitted); In re Application to Unseal 98 Cr. 1101(ILG), 891 F. Supp. 2d 18 296, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Any balancing of the interests . . .
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Lynnsey Coppinger, No. CV-25-00100-PHX-DWL
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Don Sanderson Ford Incorporated, et al.,
13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to seal the complaint. 16 (Doc. 16.) For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied. 17 BACKGROUND 18 On January 13, 2025, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, initiated this action by filing 19 the complaint. (Doc. 1.) The complaint includes extremely detailed allegations suggesting 20 that Plaintiff was sexually assaulted by her then-boss during a work trip and then resigned 21 shortly afterward. (Id. ¶¶ 11-66.) Based on those allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims of 22 assault and battery against her former boss and her former employer and a claim of sex 23 discrimination based on constructive discharge against her former employer. (Id. ¶¶ 75- 24 100). 25 On February 5, 2025 and February 28, 2025, the parties stipulated to extensions of 26 the deadline for Defendants to respond to the complaint (Docs. 10, 14), the second of which 27 was “to allow the parties to engage in an early mediation, which is presently scheduled for 28 March 20, 2025.” (Doc. 14.) The current response deadline is today, April 3, 2025. (Doc. 1 15.) 2 On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to seal the complaint. (Doc. 3 16.) The motion simply asserts that the complaint “contains allegations of a sensitive 4 nature over matters with which Plaintiff cannot fully or clearly recall” and that the 5 “sensitive nature of the allegations supports the sealing of her complaint.” (Id.) Plaintiff 6 further indicates that she intends to file a notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice 7 “[p]ending a ruling” on her motion to seal. (Id.) 8 On April 2, 2025, defense counsel contacted the undersigned judge’s chambers to 9 indicate that defense counsel wanted to make sure the motion to seal was granted before 10 the case was dismissed. 11 DISCUSSION 12 The public has a general right to inspect judicial records and documents, such that 13 a party seeking to seal a judicial record must overcome “a strong presumption in favor of 14 access.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). To 15 do so, the party must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings 16 that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring 17 disclosure . . . .” Id. at 1178-79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court 18 must then “conscientiously balance the competing interests of the public and the party who 19 seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” Id. at 1179 (internal quotation marks 20 omitted). “After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial 21 records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis for 22 its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. (internal quotation marks 23 omitted). “The party seeking to seal any part of a judicial record bears the heavy burden 24 of showing that the material is the kind of information that courts will protect and that 25 disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure,” 26 Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014), at which point that injury is 27 weighed against the public’s interest in disclosure. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79. “The 28 mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, 1 incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to 2 seal its records.” Id. 3 The “stringent” compelling reasons standard applies to all filed motions and their 4 attachments where the motion is “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” 5 Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). 6 The “compelling reasons” standard also applies to pleadings, particularly to the complaint 7 and its amendments, as the operative complaint is the crux of any civil action. See, e.g., In 8 re Google Location Hist. Litig., 514 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“[T]his 9 Court and many others have held that the compelling reasons standard applies to 10 the sealing of a complaint precisely because the complaint forms the foundation of the 11 lawsuit.”); Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 565 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that 12 the “compelling reasons” standard applies to most judicial records). 13 The fact that a sealing request is stipulated or unopposed does not weigh in favor of 14 sealing. See generally Lipocine Inc. v. Clarus Therapeutics, Inc., 2020 WL 4569473, *7 15 (D. Del. 2020) (“The problem for judges is that [sealing] requests are seldom opposed— 16 the would-be opposing party has access to the materials and doesn’t particularly care 17 whether the public has access as well. . . . That leaves the judge in the position of having 18 to decide a sometimes complex issue of sealing or redaction with no adversarial briefing 19 and often, as in this case, with only a perfunctory submission from the party seeking 20 relief.”); Senderra Rx Partners LLC v. Express Scripts Incorporated, 2:19-mc-00016- 21 DWL, Doc. 5 (“Petitioner has filed a petition in federal district court, and this Court does 22 not automatically seal documents—let alone entire cases—based on agreements between 23 the parties.”); TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. v. Avago Techs. Ltd., 2010 WL 2474387, *1 24 (D. Ariz. 2010) (“TriQuint’s sole basis advanced for sealing the motion to amend in this 25 case is this side agreement. Similarly, Avago’s sole basis for seeking to seal its response 26 is the side agreement. The Court again does not find this side agreement to show a 27 compelling reason to seal the complaint in this case.”). 28 Where a party puts certain information at issue, that party’s ability to claim a privacy 1 interest in that information is weakened. See, e.g., Longoria v. Kodiak Concepts LLC, 2020 2 WL 4501456, *1 (D. Ariz. 2020) (“Plaintiffs cannot reasonably bring this action and then 3 expect confidentiality . . . .”); Shapiro v. Hasbro Inc., 2016 WL 9137526, *3 (C.D. Cal. 4 2016) (“Hasbro put these documents at issue in the litigation and thus fails to . . . make a 5 particularized showing of compelling reason[s] to file these exhibits under seal.”); B.F. v. 6 Amazon.com, Inc., 2019 WL 4597492, *2 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (“By bringing this lawsuit 7 against Defendants, [Plaintiffs] have put [the information sought to be sealed] directly at 8 issue, and cannot reasonably expect filings in this case not to include details about [that 9 information].”). 10 Moreover, once information is public, it is no longer confidential—a belated 11 decision that publishing information on the public docket was unwise “does not provide 12 good cause, let alone a compelling reason, to retroactively seal documents that have long 13 been part of the public record.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Noland, 2022 WL 939926, *6 (D. 14 Ariz. 2022). See also Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 n.11 (2d Cir. 15 2004) (“[W]hen information that is supposed to be confidential . . . is publicly disclosed 16 . . . it necessarily remains public . . . . ‘Once the cat is out of the bag, the ball game is 17 over.’”) (citation omitted); In re Application to Unseal 98 Cr. 1101(ILG), 891 F. Supp. 2d 18 296, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Any balancing of the interests . . . would be academic as the 19 information the Government and Doe seek to maintain sealed has already been publicly 20 revealed; the cat is out of the bag, the genie is out of the bottle.”). 21 Here, the allegations in the complaint may be “sensitive,” but they are no more 22 sensitive than the allegations in many other cases involving allegations of sexual assault. 23 In such cases, plaintiffs sometimes seek (before disclosure on the docket) to have their 24 names redacted, which is far less of an impingement of the public’s right of access than 25 sealing the complaint in its entirety—and yet even just the redaction of the plaintiffs’ names 26 has a high bar and calls for a careful analysis. See, e.g., Doe v. Ayers, 789 F.3d 944, 945 27 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the petitioner “met the high bar for proceeding under a 28 pseudonym” but also affirming the denial of the petitioner’s “request to seal much of the 1 || critical information in our proposed opinion, including all its references to his sexual and 2 || emotional abuse, which formed the evidentiary basis for the claim”). 3 Plaintiff put the circumstances of her alleged sexual assault at issue by filing the complaint, so she cannot now claim a privacy interest in those details—and moreover, the || complaint has been public for months, so there is nothing in it that could be deemed 6|| confidential. Finally, to the extent Defendants may wish to keep the allegations in this action a secret—which is not clear from the motion, given that it was only filed by 8 || Plaintiff—a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79. 10 Accordingly, 11 IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff's motion to seal. (Doc. 16.) 12 Dated this 3rd day of April, 2025. 13 14 Lam a’ 15 f t _ oc Dominic W. Lanza 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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