Coppage v. Mellon Bank, N. A.

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Coppage v. Mellon Bank, N. A.

248 S.E.2d 330, 147 Ga. App. 233, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2632

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedSeptember 11, 1978

Docket55720

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 248 S.E.2d 330 (Coppage v. Mellon Bank, N. A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Coppage v. Mellon Bank, N. A., 248 S.E.2d 330, 147 Ga. App. 233, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2632 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978).

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Opinion

Banke, Judge.

The appellee brought this action pursuant to Code Ann. § 67-701 et seq. to obtain a writ of possession on a mobile home which the appellant had purchased on credit and in which the appellee alleged that it had a security interest. The appellee was awarded a writ of possession following a jury verdict in its favor, and the appellant appeals the denial of his motion for new trial. Held:

Code Ann. §§ 67-702, 67-703 (Ga. L. 1974, pp. 398, 399-400; 1975, pp. 1213, 1214) require that a petition for writ of possession be made under oath before the party authorized to issue the summons, i.e., "any judge of the superior court, or any justice of the peace, or any judge of any other court having jurisdiction over such proceedings, or any clerk of any such court within the county where the debtor may reside or where the secured property may be found.” Code Ann. § 67-702, supra. The oath in this case was made before a notary public. Therefore, under Jordan v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 141 Ga. App. 280 (233 SE2d 256) [234]*234(1977), the proceedings were void ab initio and the judgment in favor of the appellee is a mere nullity-

Submitted April 4, 1978 Decided September 11, 1978 Rehearing denied September 21, 1978 Elsie H. Griner, J. Laddie Boatright, for appellant. Memory & Thomas, Terry A. Dillard, for appellee.

2. In view of the ruling made in Division 1, the remaining enumerations of error need not be considered.

Judgment reversed.

Deen, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.

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Banke, Judge.

The appellee brought this action pursuant to Code Ann. § 67-701 et seq. to obtain a writ of possession on a mobile home which the appellant had purchased on credit and in which the appellee alleged that it had a security interest. The appellee was awarded a writ of possession following a jury verdict in its favor, and the appellant appeals the denial of his motion for new trial. Held:

Code Ann. §§ 67-702, 67-703 (Ga. L. 1974, pp. 398, 399-400; 1975, pp. 1213, 1214) require that a petition for writ of possession be made under oath before the party authorized to issue the summons, i.e., "any judge of the superior court, or any justice of the peace, or any judge of any other court having jurisdiction over such proceedings, or any clerk of any such court within the county where the debtor may reside or where the secured property may be found.” Code Ann. § 67-702, supra. The oath in this case was made before a notary public. Therefore, under Jordan v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 141 Ga. App. 280 (233 SE2d 256) [234]*234(1977), the proceedings were void ab initio and the judgment in favor of the appellee is a mere nullity-

Submitted April 4, 1978 Decided September 11, 1978 Rehearing denied September 21, 1978 Elsie H. Griner, J. Laddie Boatright, for appellant. Memory & Thomas, Terry A. Dillard, for appellee.

2. In view of the ruling made in Division 1, the remaining enumerations of error need not be considered.

Judgment reversed.

Deen, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.

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248 S.E.2d 330, 147 Ga. App. 233, 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2632, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coppage-v-mellon-bank-n-a-gactapp-1978.

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