Coppage v. City of Raleigh

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. North Carolina
DecidedOctober 8, 2020
Docket5:20-cv-00135
StatusUnknown

This text of Coppage v. City of Raleigh (Coppage v. City of Raleigh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coppage v. City of Raleigh, (E.D.N.C. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WESTERN DIVISION CASE NO. 5:20-CV-00135-M KEVIN COPPAGE, ) Plaintiff, ) V. ORDER CITY OF RALEIGH, Defendant. _)

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Kevin Coppage’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [DE-20] and Defendant City of Raleigh’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss [DE-11]. I. Factual & Procedural Background On March 30, 2020, Plaintiff, a long-time member of the City of Raleigh Fire Department, filed a complaint alleging that he has been repeatedly overlooked for advancement and subjected to a hostile work environment because of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [DE-1]. On June 18, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [DE-11]; on July 30, 2020, Plaintiff responded in opposition [DE-18]; and on August 13, 2020, Defendant filed a reply [DE-19]. On August 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to amend his complaint [DE-20]. On September 3, 2020, Defendant responded in opposition, arguing that the motion should be denied on futility grounds [DE-22]. Plaintiff did not file a reply. The proposed amended complaint [DE-20-1] primarily adds factual detail relating to Plaintiff's claims.

Il. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [DE-20] Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs amendments to pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. This rule allows amendment once as a matter of course within twenty-one days after serving the pleading, or “if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or . . . motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A)-{B). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15(a)(2) provides that leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Jd; see also Scott vy. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 112 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting the Fourth Circuit’s “policy to liberally allow amendment in keeping with the spirit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)”) (citation omitted). A district court has “broad discretion concerning motions to amend pleadings.” Booth v. Maryland, 337 F. App’x 301, 312 (4th Cir. 2009). Absent a showing of undue delay, bad faith, futility, or prejudice to the opposing party, a court should grant leave to amend. See id.; see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Equal Rights Center v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010); Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426-27 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Matemu v. Brienzi, No. 5:19-CV-00380-M, 2020 WL 5414563, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 9, 2020). Here, Defendant opposes Plaintiff's motion by arguing the proposed amended complaint fails to cure the deficiencies in Plaintiff's original complaint and is therefore futile. DE-22 at 4. “A proposed amendment is futile when it is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face” or “if the claim it presents would not survive a motion to dismiss.” Save Our Sound OBX, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't. of Transp., 914 F.3d 213, 228 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's additional factual allegations “do not cure the defects of Plaintiff's claims previously outlined by the City.” DE-22 at 2 & n.2 (incorporating by reference Defendant’s pending motion to dismiss [DE-11] and associated memorandum [DE-12] and reply [DE-19] in support). However, Plaintiff's proposed amendment complaint addresses many of the factual deficiencies Defendant identified in its motion to dismiss. Compare DE-12 at 17 (“Plaintiff pleads no facts indicating who made the promotional decision and whether the person or persons involved had previously promoted Plaintiff.”) with DE-20-1 {75-76 (“Defendant’s decision to hire Mr. Wilson to fill the role of Division Chief of Service was made by Interim Chief Brad Harvey... □ Mr. Wilson did not seek the position . . . but rather was recruited by Interim Chief Brad Harvey to prevent Plaintiff from securing the role.”’); compare DE-12 at 19 (“The complaint offers no factual content about the required qualifications for either position, whether Plaintiff met qualifications, or the qualifications of the person selected.”) with DE-20-1 4 71-72 (listing “required qualifications to serve as Division Chief” and noting that “Plaintiff met or exceeded all of the required qualifications”); compare DE-12 at 19 (“In addition, Plaintiff alleges only that he was charged with a DWI” whereas “[t]he cited policy provision applies to an employee who is charged and convicted with an impaired driving offense.” (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original)) with DE-20-1 § 55 (“Plaintiff was initially convicted of the charged on or about July 10, 2019.” (emphasis added)). Defendant argues that, even with the proposed changes, Plaintiff's amended complaint still falls short. Although the court expresses no opinion on the ultimate merits of any renewed motion to dismiss, see Orr v. U.S. EPA, No. 1:19 CV 226, 2020 WL 223920, at *2 (WD.N.C. Jan. 14, 2020), “Plaintiff's proposed amended allegations . . . are not clearly insufficient or frivolous on [their] face, nor is it facially obvious that the proposed [ ] amended complaint could not survive a

. motion to dismiss,” Al] Seasons Restoration, Inc. v. Forde, No. 7:19-CV-00247-BR, 2020 WL 2115437, at *2 (E.D.N.C. May 4, 2020) (internal quotations and citations omitted), and amendment should be permitted. Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot use a motion to amend to circumvent a motion to dismiss, but the cases Defendant cites involve multiple amendments, delay, and prejudice to the defendants. DE-22 at 10; Googerdy v. N.C. Agric. & Tech. State Univ., 386 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (“Plaintiff's motion to amend is the second of its kind brought while a motion to dismiss was pending,” noting “delay,” and noting “prejudice[]” to “newly-named defendants”). Here, to the contrary, this is Plaintiff's first attempt to amend his complaint, and the court sees no delay or prejudice to Defendant by granting Plaintiff's motion.

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Related

Equal Rights Center v. NILES BOLTON ASSOCIATES
602 F.3d 597 (Fourth Circuit, 2010)
Foman v. Davis
371 U.S. 178 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Booth v. State of Maryland
337 F. App'x 301 (Fourth Circuit, 2009)
Luanna Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.
733 F.3d 105 (Fourth Circuit, 2013)
Googerdy v. North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University
386 F. Supp. 2d 618 (M.D. North Carolina, 2005)
Young v. City of Mount Ranier
238 F.3d 567 (Fourth Circuit, 2001)

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Bluebook (online)
Coppage v. City of Raleigh, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coppage-v-city-of-raleigh-nced-2020.