Copeland v. Graybar Electric Company Inc
This text of Copeland v. Graybar Electric Company Inc (Copeland v. Graybar Electric Company Inc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 NO. 2:22-cv-280 RICO COPELAND, 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT 9 v. 10 GRAYBAR ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., Defendant 11 12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 This matter comes before the Court on the “Motion to Amend Complaint” filed by 14 Plaintiff Rico Copeland. The operative original Complaint includes race discrimination claims of 15 disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C § 2000e et seq. and 16 the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). Plaintiff requests leave to add to his 17 Complaint a claim for race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 18 As Defendant Graybar Electric Company, Inc. notes in its opposition, however, the 19 deadline for filing amended pleadings, set by the Court’s Order Setting Trial Dates and Related 20 Dates, was July 25, 2022. See Dkt. No. 18 (“Scheduling Order”). Thus, the Court construes 21 Plaintiff’s Motion as seeking: (1) leave to amend the Scheduling Order to extend that deadline; 22 and (2) leave to amend the complaint. See Aldan v. World Corp., 267 F.R.D. 346, 355 (D. N. Mar. 23 I.2010) (citing Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.1992)) 24 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND 25 2 no motion to modify the scheduling order is filed, the motion to amend the complaint is also 3 deemed to be a motion to amend the scheduling order.”). 4 Having reviewed the briefs in support of and opposition to this motion, the proposed 5 amended complaint, and the relevant caselaw, the Court finds and rules as follows. 6 II. BACKGROUND 7 Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 9, 2022. Plaintiff alleges that while at work at the 8 Renton, Washington facility of his former employer, Defendant Graybar Electric, he was 9 subjected to “menacing” and “aggressive” harassment by a fellow employee, Fred Christian. See 10 Compl., ¶¶ 10-17. The Complaint alleges several incidents involving Christian’s demeaning and 11 violent behavior towards Plaintiff, who is African American. The Complaint alleges that “other
12 people also complained about . . . racist comments that Christian made.” Id., ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges 13 that he reported the incidents to Defendant’s managers, but that Defendant failed to take 14 disciplinary action against Christian, and instead ultimately terminated Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims 15 that Christian’s “mistreatment of Copeland, which was permitted by and in some instances 16 conducted by Defendant, was based on Copeland’s race,” and that “Defendant’s disparate 17 treatment of Copeland . . . constitutes discrimination on the basis of race.” Id., ¶¶ 21, 23. 18 On June 16, 2022, the Court issued the Scheduling Order based upon the parties’ Joint 19 Status Report. The Court set July 25, 2022—a week later that the parties’ agreed proposed date— 20 as the deadline for seeking leave to amend the pleadings. That order also set a discovery cutoff of 21 February 8, 2023. Both dates have long past.
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24 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND
25 2 A. Standard for Amendment of Scheduling Order 3 The Court’s June 16, 2022 Scheduling Order explicitly states “[t]hese are firm dates that 4 can be changed only by order of the Court, not by agreement of counsel or the parties. The Court 5 will alter these dates only upon good cause shown.” Scheduling Order at 2. That admonishment 6 conforms to the standard set by Federal Rule 16(b)(4), which provides that a “schedule may be 7 modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Unlike the liberal standard under 8 Federal Rule 15 governing the amendment of a complaint, “which focuses on the bad faith of the 9 party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s 10 “good cause” standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” 11 Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. “The district court may modify the pretrial schedule if it cannot
12 reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension. . . . If that party was 13 not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. 14 B. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Good Cause Justifying Amendment of Scheduling Order 15 Plaintiff claims that the request to amend the Complaint to add a race discrimination claim 16 under Section 1981 is based on information obtained in an interview with another Graybar 17 employee, Erik Cota. According to Plaintiff, in that interview Cota reported that he overheard 18 Christian use an obscene and racist epithet in reference to Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims he obtained 19 this testimony on November 28, 2022, after receiving Cota’s contact information through 20 Defendant on September 30, 2022. Plaintiff claims that Cota’s testimony, “combined with 21 Plaintiff’s deposition testimony on November 9, 2022,” motivated him to seek leave to add the 22 Section 1981 claim. Pl.’s Mot. at 5. 23
25 2 leave to amend the Complaint, and thus has also failed to demonstrate good cause for an 3 extension of the Scheduling Order’s deadline to amend the pleadings. The Court could take issue 4 with Plaintiff’s suggestion1 that he could not have obtained Cota’s contact information and 5 testimony sooner than November 28, and certainly takes issue with the notion that he could not 6 have obtained his own testimony sooner than November 9. However, the real problem with 7 Plaintiff’s motion is that it does not explain in what way testimony obtained in Cota’s interview 8 or Plaintiff’s deposition justifies adding a Section 1981 claim after the amendment deadline, when 9 the Complaint already includes claims for disparate treatment, retaliation, and hostile work 10 environment based on race under Title VII and the WLAD. Indeed, the Complaint already 11 includes explicit claims of “discrimination on the basis of race,” and an allegation that
12 “mistreatment . . . was based on Copeland’s race.” Cota’s testimony might support these claims, 13 but there is simply no discernable reason Plaintiff could not have included a Section 1981 claim 14 in the original Complaint, or added the claim before the pleadings amendment deadline. 15 C. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint Is Untimely and Would Cause Prejudice
16 Because the Court concludes that good cause does not exist for extending the pleadings 17 amendment deadline, the question of whether amendment of the complaint should be allowed is 18 essentially moot. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (failure to demonstrate good cause to extend 19 deadline justifies denying motion to amend). The Court also concludes, however, that even setting 20
21 1 Plaintiff merely suggests, but does not explicitly claim, that he diligently attempted to obtain Cota’s contact information and testimony sooner but was unable to do so for reasons beyond his control. The Court is left to 22 surmise that the reason for Plaintiff’s failure to obtain the information before the amendment deadline was a lack of diligence, as the witness’s name and the value of his testimony was certainly known to Plaintiff at the time he filed 23 the Complaint. See Compl., ¶ 14 (referring to Erik Cota by name).
25 2 all depositions in this case have been taken and discovery has closed, would cause Defendant 3 undue prejudice. The request for leave to amend the complaint would also be denied based on 4 Plaintiff’s undue delay. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th 5 Cir.
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Copeland v. Graybar Electric Company Inc, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/copeland-v-graybar-electric-company-inc-wawd-2023.