Copeland & Thompson, Inc. v. United States

12 Cust. Ct. 85, 1944 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 10
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedMarch 1, 1944
DocketC. D. 833
StatusPublished
Cited by44 cases

This text of 12 Cust. Ct. 85 (Copeland & Thompson, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Copeland & Thompson, Inc. v. United States, 12 Cust. Ct. 85, 1944 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 10 (cusc 1944).

Opinion

Keefe, Judge:

The merchandise at issue in this case consists of earthen tableware assessed for duty at 50 per centum ad valorem and 10 cents per dozen pieces under paragraph 211 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The plaintiff claims that the articles are properly dutiable at 30 per centum ad valorem and 10 cents per dozen pieces under paragraph 211 as amended by the trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, T. D. 49753. At the trial counsel for the plaintiff limited the claim to “the items described on the invoice as oatmeals or oatmeal saucers wherever those items or that description occurs.” (Record page 2)

Paragraph 211 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides in part as follows:

Par. 211. Earthenware and crockeiw ware composed of a nonvitrified absorbent body, including white granite and semiporcelain earthenware, and cream-colored ware, terra cotta, and stoneware, including clock cases with or without movements, pill tiles, plaques, ornaments, charms, vases, statues, statuettes, mugs, cups, steins, lamps, and all other articles composed wholly or in chief value of such ware; * * * * painted, colored, tinted, stained, enameled, gilded, printed, ornamented, or decorated in any manner, and manufactures in chief value of such ware, not specially provided for, 10 cents per dozen pieces and 50 per centum ad valorem.

[86]*86Paragraph 211 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the trade agreement, T. D. 49753, provides in part as follows:

At the’ trial three witnesses testified for the plaintiff, to wit, L. O Lankas, salesman and assistant to the president of the importing firm, having 36 years’ experience in buying and selling earthenware in 40 of the 48 states of the Union; Justin Tharaud, head of Justin Tharaud, Inc., who has been in the earthenware business for about 40 years representing foreign manufacturers and had also represented American manufacturers from 1934 to 1940; and Donald M. Miller, of Maddock & Miller, importers of chinaware and earthenware and dealers in domestic hotel ware, who has been connected with the earthenwa.re business for 28 years, and whose firm sells a full lino of earthen dinnerware throughout the United States.

The Government also produced three witnesses, to wit, Fornaud De-Maison, assistant to sales manager of Edwin M. Knowles China Co., manufacturers of earthenware, including-dinnerware, who had been in the china business since 1905, dealing with the same sort of dishes as dinnerware of earthenware, and during the last 6 years selling earthenware throughout the country; Charles L. Sebring, sales manager of Edwin M. Knowles China Co. for about 2 years; and Michael George, salesman for the Sebring Pottery Co. for 28 years, selling all kinds of dinnerware from Washington, D. C., to New York City.

At the commencement of the trial, counsel for the plaintiff stated for the record that ho had advised counsel for the Government that he did not intend to prove commercial designation. Continuing he stated that he considered that the-court was entitled to the aid of such qualified witnesses as he would produce to determine the ordinary trade meaning of the terms, and asserted that “common, ordinary, everyday trade meaning will govern in this case, * * ,* ” (Record, page 20). . Government counsel, on the other hand, asserted that the question for the court to determine is whether these are dishes or saucers, within the meaning of paragraph 211, as amended.

We are of the opinion that the testimony of the witnesses heretofore named is of little assistance to us in determining the common, ordinary meaning of the term “saucer,” as the witnesses for both plaintiff and [87]*87the Government testified concerning the trade meaning of the term. However, the plaintiff produced a preponderance of evidence establishing that the trade meaning of the term is not at variance with the common meaning thereof appearing in the various dictionaries. In their understanding, we might say, their technical understanding, the plaintiff’s witnesses apply the term “saucers”'to the terms “oatmeal” and “fruit” in buying and selling such articles, and that ofttimes the term “saucers” is understood in the trade and not mentioned, the articles being merely called “oatmeals” and “fruits.” The Government witnesses testified that in the trade and commerce of the United States with which they were familiar the term “saucers” is never used, except as referring to a stand for a cup or other article. However, one of Government’s witnesses admitted that “some people” use the term “saucers” when referring to fruit dishes, but not in connection with “oatmeals.”

The witnesses testified that the difference between the fruit and the oatmeal dishes is in the size or diameter of the dish and the depth, the fruit dishes being 4, 4}{, or 5 inches in diameter and about 1 % inches deep, while the oatmeal dish is 6 inches in diameter and about 1}{ inches deep; that the main difference is the depth, as some so-called 5-inch fruit dishes are actually 6 inches in diameter but the depth is only l)i inches, whereas an “oatmeal” would be V/% inches deep although having the same diameter.

On behalf of the plaintiff there were admitted in evidence exhibits 1 to 5, inclusive, representing the merchandise in question, which we find to consist of decorated earthenware dishes 6}i to 6% inches in diameter and from 1% to 1K inches deep, outside dimensions, and also 8 illustrative exhibits, which we find from the description of the witnesses and an inspection of the samples to be as follows: Illustrative exhibits A, after dinner saucer, 4% inches in diameter and % inch deep; B, tea saucer, 5% inches in diameter and 1%¡ inches deep; C, tea saucer, 6 inches in diameter and l}i inches deep; D, Irish tea saucer, 6% inches in diameter and 7/& inch deep; F, fruit saucer, 5% inches in diameter and % inch deep; G, oatmeal saucer, 6% inches in diameter and 1% inches deep; and H, an oatmeal bowl, 6% inches in diameter and 2}í inches deep. Exhibits A to G, inclusive, are all of the general shape of a saucer designed to hold a cup, except that the depth thereof varies, the oatmeal saucer being -the deepest. Exhibit H has straight sides rather than the flaring sides of saucers.

Seven illustrative exhibits were also admitted in evidence on behalf of the Government. We find from the description of witnesses and an inspection of the samples that these exhibits consist of the plain white earthenware articles following: Illustrative exhibits I, dinner coffee saucer, 4% inches in diameter and % inch deep; collective J, standard teacup saucers, 5% inches in diameter and 1 inch deep, [88]*886 inches in diameter and % inch deep; K, regular coffee saucer, 6% inches in diameter and % inch deep; collective L, cream soup saucers, 6% inches in diameter and % inch deep, and 6% inches in diameter and '% inch deep; collective M, 5 fruit dishes, measuring 5 inches to 5%6 inches in diameter and 1% to lKr, inches deep; collective N, 4 oatmeal dishes 5% to 6}{ inches in diameter and 1% to 1% inches'deep; and illustrative exhibit O, consisting of a catalog of Edwin M. Knowles China Co. of East Liverpool, Ohio, showing the offerings of “fruits” .and “oatmeals.”

The invoice herein discloses 6 items of the merchandise under consideration are described as follows: 100 oatmeals 6"

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Bluebook (online)
12 Cust. Ct. 85, 1944 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 10, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/copeland-thompson-inc-v-united-states-cusc-1944.