Copco Steel & Engineering Co. v. the Prins Willem Van Oranje

159 F. Supp. 79
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedOctober 14, 1957
DocketCiv. 9628
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 159 F. Supp. 79 (Copco Steel & Engineering Co. v. the Prins Willem Van Oranje) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Copco Steel & Engineering Co. v. the Prins Willem Van Oranje, 159 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. Mich. 1957).

Opinion

*81 KOSCINSKI, District Judge.

This is an action in Admiralty for rust damage to steel shipped from Antwerp, Belguim, on August 16, 1949, on board the S. S. Prins Willem Van Oranje for delivery to libelant at Detroit, Michigan, where it was outturned on September 11, 1949.

Suit was filed on July 31, 1950. The libel and complaint alleges that 158 lifts (290 tons) of structural steel shapes were delivered to respondents in good order and condition for transportation and delivery in like condition, under the terms of the bill of lading, but were delivered seriously damaged by rust, to libelant’s damage of $5,000, as nearly as the damage could then be estimated. At the pretrial hearing libelant particularized its damage as the cost of pickling 261 tons (143 lifts) of the steel at $17 a ton, or $4,437. At that time libelant also charged improper stowage, directly above the steel, of many crates of tulip bulbs which it claims are productive of moisture.

The answer denies liability and alleges as defenses an exemption from liability for rust damage in the bill of lading, a statutory exemption from liability for damage arising from an inherent vice of the goods and from insufficiency of packing, failure to give notice of claim as required by law, absence of exceptions on the tally sheets upon discharge of the cargo, lack of knowledge by respondents as to the actual condition of the inside bars of steel in each bundle which were not visible at the time of loading, and delivery of the steel in a condition not substantially different from its condition upon loading. All of these defenses were raised at the trial.

Libelant, a manufacturer of steel window frames, began importing steel late in 1948 when shipments arrived on three vessels, including the S.S. Alwaki. This shipment was next and was followed by another on the S.S. Prins Frederik Hendrik which arrived about two weeks later. All steel shipments to that date resulted in rust damage claims and led to some litigation. See Copco Steel and Engineering Co. v. The Prins Frederik Hendrik, D.C., 129 F.Supp. 469, and Copco Steel & Engineering Co. v. S/S Alwaki, D.C., 131 F.Supp. 332. As to the rust damage these cases are identical on facts except that the tulip bulb and steel cargo combination was not involved in the Alwaki case and in the Hendrik case the crates of tulip bulbs and the steel in one of the holds were found to be dripping of moisture while in this case both the bulbs and the steel were dry upon unloading.

When this ease was at issue proctors requested that the court await the disposition of the above cases, which would determine some of the issues present here before scheduling a pretrial. The case was pretried in May and tried in August, 1956, some six years after filing of suit and almost seven years after discharge of the cargo.

The hot-rolled steel shapes in this case, which were approximately 20 feet long, were nested in tiers and several nested tiers were tightly banded with metal straps to form a compact bundle or lift, but they were not otherwise protected or wrapped. They were stowed at the bottom of the deck in three lower holds located in both the forward and after parts of the ship, directly beneath general cargo consisting of several hundred crates of tulip bulbs, tires, and other goods. A bill of lading was issued stating that the steel was shipped in apparent good order and condition and no exceptions were noted thereon.

This case, as were the two earlier cases, is an action on a contract for carriage of goods by sea to a port of the United States in foreign trade and is therefore controlled by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1207, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1300 et seq. (Sec. 1312). The defenses of statutory exemption from liability for damage from inherent vice and from insufficiency of packing are common to all three suits. The effect of the exemption from rust damage in the bill of lading was also determined in the Hendrik case and the issue as to proof of the condition of the inside bars of steel in each bundle, upon loading, was introduced and deter *82 mined in the Alwaki case. The remaining defenses are peculiar to this case only.

In both of the earlier cases the courts enunciated the established rule that to establish a prima facie case the shipper must prove that the goods were delivered in good condition and outturned damaged and that it thereupon becomes the duty of the carrier to assume the burden of proving that the damage was produced by a cause from which the carrier is exempted by law or that damage from a non-exempt cause resulted without the fault or neglect of the carrier.

In the Hendrik case [129 F.Supp. 470], the court considered the issue whether all “rust damage” is included within the meaning of “damage arising from inherent defect, quality, or vice of the goods” as an exemption to the carrier’s liability under See. 1304(2) (m, n) of the Act, and found that surface rust is generally encountered on steel shapes shipped in like manner which may be removed by an incidental brushing operation, but it distinguished this type of rust from the deep rusting which occurred in some of the bundles, and a similar finding as to the prevalence of light atmospheric rust in transatlantic shipments of this kind was made in the other case. The court determined that since such excessive rusting was not within the statutory exemption, such non-statutory exemption from liability for rust damage in the bill of lading did not relieve the carrier from the burden of proving want of fault or neglect under Section 1304(2) (q) of the Act. In both cases it was held that the customary method of packing such steel shipments was employed. The issue relating to the condition of the inner bars of steel upon loading is reserved for later discussion.

After disposition of the two earlier cases proctors for the libelant and respondents stipulated at the pretrial hearing that no recovery can be had for ordinary accummulation of atmospheric rust on the steel and that a factual issue for the trial will be whether ordinary or excessive rusting occurred. This stipulation is incorporated in the court’s pretrial order on file in this case.

During the trial the evidence. elicited the information that libelant was fully compensated for its claimed damage by the insurer of the cargo and that the action is being prosecuted on behalf of the insurer, whereupon proctor for respondents moved to dismiss this action on the ground that libelant is not the real party in interest. The trial proceeded without arguments on the motion which were to be presented in post-trial briefs. In their brief respondents state that they now withdraw this motion.

Respondents introduced at the trial the testimony by deposition of Capt. Visser, who was the chief officer in charge of the cargo on the vessel and who boarded the ship at Rotterdam, as to care of the cargo; it also introduced evidence to show that the whereabouts of the master, who was present at both the loading and unloading of the cargo, were unknown; no other testimony to show care of the cargo on the leg of the voyage from Antwerp to Rotterdam was introduced and respondents in their brief admit that they did not assume the burden of proof imposed upon them and consequently admit liability for any excessive rust damage. It is therefore unnecessary for the court to appraise the testimony of Capt.

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Bluebook (online)
159 F. Supp. 79, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/copco-steel-engineering-co-v-the-prins-willem-van-oranje-mied-1957.