[Cite as Copas v. Luikart, 2025-Ohio-1694.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
FAYETTE COUNTY
HALEY COPAS, : CASE NO. CA2024-08-020 Appellee, : O P I N I O N AND : JUDGMENT ENTRY - vs - 5/12/2025 :
AARON LUIKART, :
Appellant. :
CIVIL APPEAL FROM FAYETTE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CVH 2024 0038
Haley Copas, pro se.
The Law Office of Eric J. Allen, Ltd., and Eric J. Allen, for appellant.
____________ OPINION
SIEBERT, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Aaron Luikart, appeals the decision of the Fayette County Court
of Common Pleas denying his motion for relief from a judgment granting a civil stalking
protection order ("CSPO") against him. Appellee, Haley Copas, presented competent, Fayette CA2024-08-020
credible evidence of Luikart's threatening "pattern of conduct" supporting the CSPO. The
menacing by stalking statute does not require evidence of immediate and present danger
at a full CSPO hearing. Luikart failed to establish the trial court abused its discretion by
denying Luikart relief from the judgment. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial
court.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Petition for CSPO
{¶ 2} On February 6, 2024, Copas filed a petition for a CSPO against Luikart. To
support her petition, Copas alleged that Luikart had been stalking her. That same day,
the magistrate held an ex parte hearing, which Copas attended along with a victim's
advocate. As part of her testimony, Copas described several encounters with Luikart over
a two-year period that she found concerning.
{¶ 3} First, approximately two years before Copas testified, unbeknownst to
Copas, Luikart had followed her and a friend to Kentucky and engaged in a physical
altercation with Copas' friend. After the incident, Copas discovered Luikart had attached
a tracking device underneath her vehicle without her knowledge. The device was
subsequently removed by law enforcement.
{¶ 4} Second, sometime between 2022 and 2023, Luikart threatened Copas and
her family, stating that if Copas obtained a restraining order against him, Luikart, his
brother, and his father would make her life a "living hell." Luikart further threatened to
"come after" Copas' younger brother, stating he knew her brother's routine, and that it
"would be a shame if something happened to him."
{¶ 5} Third, in May 2023, Luikart created an Instagram profile which contained
nude photographs of Copas. After Copas blocked all contact from Luikart, he shared the
Instagram profile with the public.
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{¶ 6} Fourth, one month before the ex parte hearing, Luikart went to the local
hospital where Copas worked, when she was not present, and left "things" on her desk
without her permission. Luikart returned to Copas' work the following day and waited for
her in the parking lot. Copas stated Luikart did not approach her that day because hospital
security escorted her to her vehicle.
{¶ 7} Fifth, Copas testified there had been several instances when she was
working with some of her patients at a local gym, and Luikart approached her, cornered
her in the hallways, or blocked access to her vehicle. Although Luikart was formerly a
member of the gym, the gym's owner reprimanded Luikart for his behavior toward Copas,
"kicked [him] out" of the gym by the time of the ex parte hearing, and no longer permitted
him to be on the premises. Despite this, Copas encountered Luikart in a parking lot near
the gym one week prior to the hearing. At that time, Luikart was rummaging through his
trunk, allegedly searching for a knife, and yelling at Copas.
{¶ 8} Finally, the night before the hearing, Copas and a friend were dining at a
local restaurant when Luikart arrived. According to Copas, Luikart walked in and out of
the restaurant twice before sitting by himself at the bar and staring at her. Eventually,
Luikart engaged in a conversation with Copas before leaving. When Copas left the
restaurant, she discovered her vehicle was covered in calamine lotion. The restaurant did
not have security cameras in its parking lot, so Copas acknowledged she could not
conclusively prove it was Luikart who put the lotion on her vehicle.
{¶ 9} Based upon the evidence Copas presented at the ex parte hearing, the
magistrate issued a temporary ex parte CSPO and scheduled a full evidentiary hearing
on the matter on February 14, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. ("CSPO hearing"). On February 8, 2024,
a sheriff personally served Luikart notice of the ex parte CSPO the magistrate had granted
and the related CSPO hearing, including its date, time, and location.
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{¶ 10} The trial court held the CSPO hearing according to the scheduled date and
time. The trial court noted on the record that although service to Luikart had been
perfected on February 8th, he was not there. Copas appeared and confirmed her
testimony from the ex parte hearing. Copas also brought police reports and informed the
court that Luikart had been "arrested" with a "pending case against him of menacing by
stalking" in which Copas was the alleged victim.
{¶ 11} Based upon Copas' testimony, the trial court granted the CSPO for a period
of five years.
Motion to Reopen
{¶ 12} On February 22, 2024, Luikart moved the trial court to reopen the case and
set a new hearing date. Luikart argued the trial court should reopen the case because
"counsel was with Mr. Luikart in [municipal court] and did not catch the hearing that
occurred the same day in the [trial court]." Shortly thereafter, Luikart retained new counsel
to represent him in the case.
{¶ 13} On July 1, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Luikart's motion to reopen,
which it construed as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). Luikart
and his former attorney, Peter Scranton, testified at the hearing. Their testimony revealed
that Luikart had separate legal cases pending before different courts on February 14,
2024, and he was scheduled to appear in both. The CSPO hearing occurred at the trial
court at 9:00 a.m. The second hearing occurred in the local municipal court at 11:00 a.m.
and concerned a pending criminal case against Luikart ("Municipal Court hearing").
Copas attended both the CSPO and Municipal Court hearings. Luikart failed to appear at
the CSPO hearing but did appear at the Municipal Court hearing.
{¶ 14} Luikart and his former counsel acknowledged that Luikart was served with
the ex parte CSPO, which contained the date, time, and location for the CSPO hearing,
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and that Luikart had retained Scranton to "handle" the matter prior to the date for the
CSPO hearing. Luikart attributed his failure to appear at the CSPO hearing to his
confusion regarding the separate cases, as well as a trip to the hospital that morning for
low blood sugar. Luikart provided documentation regarding his hospital trip, but it did not
indicate what time he was at the hospital on the day of the CSPO hearing.
{¶ 15} After considering the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court
denied Luikart's 60(B) motion. The court found that Luikart was served with notice of the
CSPO hearing and his explanation for missing it was inconsistent and unsupported by
detailed documentation. Therefore, the court held Luikart had failed to establish he was
entitled to relief from judgment.
The Appeal
{¶ 16} Luikart now appeals, raising two assignments of error for this court's review.
{¶ 17} Assignment of Error No. 1:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED THE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER FOR THE PETITIONER.
{¶ 18} Luikart argues the trial court's decision granting Copas a CSPO is against
the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. Copas presented competent, credible
evidence that Luikart engaged in the type of "pattern of conduct" required to support the
CSPO. Luikart's argument that Copas was required to show a "danger of immediate
harm" is misplaced in his appeal of the trial court's issuance of the CSPO because that
statutory requirement only applies to ex parte CSPO orders.
{¶ 19} We begin our analysis of Luikart's assignment of error by establishing the
applicable CSPO law and our standard of review.
Applicable CSPO Law and Standard of Review
{¶ 20} Pursuant to R.C. 2903.214(C)(1), the issuance of a civil stalking protection
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order "requires the petitioner to establish," by a preponderance of the evidence, "that the
respondent engaged in conduct constituting menacing by stalking." Harnar v. Becker,
2021-Ohio-784, ¶ 6, 10 (12th Dist.). "Menacing by stalking" means engaging in a "pattern
of conduct" that "knowingly" causes "another person to believe that the offender will cause
physical harm to the other person" or "mental distress to the other person or a family or
household member of the other person." R.C. 2903.211(A)(1). As relevant here, "pattern
of conduct" means "two or more actions or incidents closely related in time." R.C.
2903.211(D)(1).
{¶ 21} "Preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight of the evidence,
or evidence that leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of the contested fact is
more probable than its nonexistence. Cutler v. Reed, 2016-Ohio-1151, ¶ 28 (12th Dist.).
Therefore, "[w]hen assessing whether a civil stalking protection order should have been
issued, the reviewing court must determine whether there was sufficient credible evidence
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner was entitled to relief."
Fouch v. Pennington, 2012-Ohio-3536, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.). This standard is, in essence, a
review as to whether the issuance of the civil stalking protection order was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Kronk v. Getts, 2024-Ohio-1516, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.), citing
McBride v. McBride, 2012-Ohio-2146, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 22} A challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence requires this court to
examine whether there exists a greater amount of credible evidence to support one side
of the issue rather than the other. Martinez v. Martinez, 2023-Ohio-4783, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.).
Therefore, when considering a manifest weight challenge, this court (1) reviews the entire
record, (2) weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, (3) considers the credibility
of the witnesses, and (4) determines whether the trier of fact "in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice." Id. at ¶ 16. If
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the appellate court finds the trial court lost its way and created an injustice, it must reverse
the trial court's decision. Id. But this appellate review is conducted according to well
established legal principles.
{¶ 23} A core principle within our justice system is that the trier of fact primarily
determines witness credibility. Konk at ¶ 10, citing State v. Lewis, 2020-Ohio-3762, ¶ 19
(12th Dist.). This norm means that within an appellate court's "manifest weight" review, if
the judgment is "supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all essential
elements of the case," this court will not reverse it. Id. Accordingly, reversing a judgment
on manifest weight grounds is the rare exception, rather than the rule. See id.
{¶ 24} Luikart contends it is against the manifest weight of the evidence that he
engaged in the statutorily required pattern of conduct and that Copas was in danger of
immediate harm.
Luikart's Actions Constitute a Pattern of Conduct
{¶ 25} Luikart asserts that Copas' testimony did not establish that he engaged in a
pattern of conduct as defined by R.C. 2903.211 because the events Copas described
were not closely related in time. In support, Luikart argues that some of Luikart's conduct
occurred two years prior to Copas' CSPO petition, and that Copas did not "attempt to
provide dates for the incidents."
{¶ 26} "To establish a pattern of conduct, there only needs to be two or more
actions closely related in time." Konk, 2024-Ohio-1516 at ¶ 13, citing R.C.
2903.211(D)(1). The trier of fact should resolve whether the incidents in question satisfy
this statutory requirement "considering the evidence in the context of all the
circumstances of the case." Middletown v. Jones, 2006-Ohio-3465, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). But
the "context" a court considers is not limited to the incidents which were "closely related
in time." See id. at ¶ 11. In Jones, this court considered reported and unreported
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threatening incidents spanning four years to provide "context" for two other incidents
occurring within the same month.1 Id. That is, the incidents spanning four years provided
the context for the two incidents within a month which were "closely related in time" and
therefore met the statutory threshold for a "pattern of conduct." Id. Jones shows it is
appropriate for a court to consider incidents that occurred more remotely in time to provide
context to the facts and circumstances of the case. But in order to justify a CSPO under
the plain language of the statute, the petitioner must still show two or more incidents
"closely related in time," even if more remote, contextual incidents are presented.
{¶ 27} First, we consider the "context" of incidents occurring over approximately
two years prior to Copas petitioning for a CSPO against Luikart.2 Luikart followed Copas
and a friend to Kentucky, had a physical altercation with her friend, and placed a tracking
device on Copas' car. Luikart threatened Copas and her family if she got a restraining
order. He posted nude photographs of her online. Luikart regularly approached Copas at
the gym where she saw patients, cornered her in the hallways, or blocked access to her
vehicle. Luikart's behavior toward Copas at this gym led the gym's owner to kick him out
and ban him from the premises.
{¶ 28} With that context of Luikart's behavior toward Copas in place, we next
consider whether other incidents Copas provided testimony about were related closely
enough in time to establish a "pattern of conduct." It might surprise no one reading this
opinion to find our answer is "yes, a pattern of conduct" followed the context established
by Luikart's prior actions.
1. "Explicit threats are not necessary to establish menacing by stalking under R.C. 2903.211." Bartells v. Bertel, 2018-Ohio-21, ¶ 56 (12th Dist.). Even if isolated incidents may not seem "particularly threatening," they must still be considered by the court. Jones at ¶ 11.
2. While Copas did not provide specific dates for these incidents, she did testify to the approximate timeline. -8- Fayette CA2024-08-020
{¶ 29} About a month before Copas petitioned for a CSPO, Luikart showed up at
the hospital where she worked and left items on her desk while she was not around. The
next day, Luikart was waiting for Copas in the hospital parking lot as she left work. Copas'
belief that Luikart's presence threatened her was supported by the fact a hospital security
guard accompanied Copas to the parking lot that day. One week prior to Copas' CSPO
petition, Luikart was in a parking lot near the gym, rummaging through his trunk for a knife
and yelling at Copas. The night before the ex parte CSPO hearing, Luikart showed up at
the restaurant where she and a friend were dining. He went in and out of the restaurant
several times during the course of their dinner. He stared at Copas, approached her, and
engaged in unwanted conversation with her.
{¶ 30} Luikart's behavior in the month prior to the ex parte CSPO hearing
establishes overwhelming evidence that his actions met the definition of a "pattern of
conduct." But his behavior in that month also shows an escalation in the frequency of
incidents: a month before—two days in a row, one week prior, the night before—several
times over the course of one dinner. Luikart's escalation led Copas to describe her
encounters with Luikart as "non-stop."
{¶ 31} We reviewed the entire record, weighed the evidence, and evaluated all
reasonable inferences from that evidence. Our review shows Copas provided competent,
credible evidence supporting her allegation that Luikart's actions constituted the essential
element of "pattern of conduct" within the menacing by stalking statute, and the trial court
found her evidence credible. The trial court did not "lose its way" nor did it create a
"miscarriage of justice" by granting the CSPO. As such, the manifest weight of the
evidence did not weigh heavily against the trial court's judgment that Luikart engaged in
a pattern of conduct pursuant to R.C. 2903.211(D)(1).
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Immediate Harm
{¶ 32} Luikart next argues that the evidence at the hearing did not show that Copas
was in immediate danger as required by R.C. 2903.214. In support, Luikart recites
language from R.C. 2903.214(D)(1), stating that "[i]mmediate and present danger to the
person to be protected by the protection order constitutes good cause . . . ." However, a
careful reading of R.C. 2903.214 reveals that subsection (D)(1) pertains to civil protection
orders issued ex parte, not civil protection orders issued after a full hearing.
{¶ 33} In order to award a CSPO after a full hearing, the trial court "must find that
the elements of R.C. 2903.214(C)(1) were proven by a preponderance of the evidence."
(Emphasis added.) Mather v. Hilfinger, 2021-Ohio-2812, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.). Pursuant to the
plain language of that subsection of the statute, a petitioner is not required to establish
"immediate and present danger" to be granted a CSPO. See R.C. 2903.214(C)(1).
Instead, "immediate and present danger" is only referenced in R.C. 2903.214(D)(1),
which specifies what may justify issuing a civil protection order ex parte. An ex parte order
requires petitioner to show "good cause" and specifies showing "immediate and present
danger" does constitute one way of showing "good cause." Id. The language requiring
"good cause," which may be established by showing "immediate and present danger"
does not extend to civil protection orders issued after a full hearing under R.C.
2903.214(C)(1). See T.O. v. T.G., 2024-Ohio-4510, ¶ 60 (2d Dist.) (noting limiting
requirement for "immediate and present danger" logical considering this burden at ex
parte proceedings helps protect rights of absent respondents, which is not concern at full
hearing when both parties have right to present evidence).
{¶ 34} Luikart ignores the plain language of R.C. 2903.214(C)(1) and focuses
solely on subsection (D)(1). We find the requirements of R.C. 2903.214(D)(1) inapplicable
to the instant appeal. Luikart fails to identify any reason why Copas was required to prove
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she was in fear of immediate and present danger before obtaining a CSPO against
Luikart, despite no statutory requirement to do so. As this court has stated, "[i]t is not . . .
our duty to create an argument where none is made." In re A.Z., 2011-Ohio-6739, ¶ 18
(12th Dist.).
{¶ 35} Luikart failed to show the trial court granted the CSPO against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Copas provided competent, credible evidence that Luikart
engaged in a pattern of conduct which satisfied R.C. 2903.211 and 2903.214, especially
after considering the context of Luikart's actions over the preceding two years. The plain
language of R.C. 2903.214(C)(1) contains no requirement to show "immediate and
present danger," so Luikart's argument fails on that as well.
{¶ 36} We overrule his first assignment of error.
{¶ 37} Assignment of Error No. 2:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S 60(B) MOTION.
{¶ 38} In his remaining assignment of error, Luikart argues the trial court abused
its discretion by denying his motion for relief from judgment. The trial court may relieve a
party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for several specific reasons, including,
as relevant to this appeal, "excusable neglect." Civ.R. 60(B)(1)-(5).
{¶ 39} To prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, the moving party must demonstrate
that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the
party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5);
and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time. Reynolds v. Turull, 2019-Ohio-2863,
¶ 9 (12th Dist.), citing GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146,
(1976), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 40} The trial court has discretion to grant or deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion and the
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court's decision will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. Purcell v. Schaefer,
2014-Ohio-4894, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.); Bowman v. Leisz, 2014-Ohio-4763, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.).
A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts with an unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable attitude. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶ 41} The trial court denied Luikart's motion because he failed to establish that he
was entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5). On
appeal, Luikart claims that he was entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) due to
"excusable neglect."
{¶ 42} "Inaction of a defendant is not 'excusable neglect' if it can be labeled as a
'complete disregard for the judicial system.'" Kay v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 1996-Ohio-430,
¶ 10, quoting GTE Automatic Electric, 47 Ohio St.2d at 153. This court has acknowledged
"unusual or special circumstances can justify neglect, [but] if a party could have controlled
or guarded against the happening or event he later seeks to excuse, the neglect is not
excusable." In re L.D.M., 2021-Ohio-1853, ¶ 41(12th Dist.).
{¶ 43} Luikart claims his failure to attend the full hearing on February 14, 2024,
constitutes excusable neglect because (1) neither Luikart nor his counsel attended the
hearing; (2) Luikart hired counsel for the hearing; and (3) his counsel testified he would
"not just not show up at hearings if he knew of their existence." We are not persuaded by
Luikart's arguments.
{¶ 44} At the hearing on Luikart's motion to reopen, Luikart provided several
reasons for missing the CSPO hearing. First, Luikart and his former counsel, Scranton,
claimed Luikart was confused regarding his ongoing cases and what his obligations were
in each case. Notwithstanding this confusion, both Luikart and Scranton acknowledged
that Luikart was properly served with notice of the CSPO hearing and had retained
counsel to assist in the matter prior to the hearing.
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{¶ 45} Luikart later claimed he missed the CSPO hearing because he was
admitted to the hospital that morning for low blood sugar. Luikart stated he was admitted
to the hospital for approximately two hours before attending his Municipal Court hearing.
Luikart submitted documentation from the hospital stating he received treatment on
February 14, 2024. However, that documentation did not provide the time he was treated.
{¶ 46} Our review of the record shows that Luikart had both knowledge and actual
notice of the CSPO hearing, rendering his failure to appear well within his control.
Although Luikart was treated at the hospital the day of the hearing, he failed to establish
the timing of that treatment. Luikart similarly failed to provide any reasoning for his failure
to timely inform the court of his expected absence. As such, when considering the record
properly before this court, we find Luikart failed to demonstrate any unique circumstances
sufficient to support a finding of excusable neglect. See J.C. v. A.M., 2024-Ohio-5664, ¶
23-25 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 47} Accordingly, we find the trial court did not exhibit an unreasonable, arbitrary,
or unconscionable attitude and did not abuse its discretion when it denied Luikart's Civ.R.
60(B) motion.
{¶ 48} Luikart's second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 49} Judgment affirmed.
PIPER , P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Presiding Judge
/s/ Mike Powell, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
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