Coots v. Social Security Administration

Ninth Circuit

Coots v. Social Security Administration

123 F. App'x 279

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 31, 2005

DocketNo. 03-35496; D.C. No. CY-02-03031-DCA

StatusPublished

This text of 123 F. App'x 279 (Coots v. Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Coots v. Social Security Administration, 123 F. App'x 279 (9th Cir. 2005).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

***

We affirm the district court’s denial of Coots’s application for disability benefits.

There is substantial evidence¹ to support the Administrative Law Judge’s determination that Coots retained the residual functional capacity² to perform substantial gainful activity as a parking lot cashier and a surveillance systems monitor. Because there was substantial evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge’s determination that Coots could “make an adjustment to other work,”³ the Administrative Law Judge did not err in denying Coots disability benefits.

[281]*281The Administrative Law Judge also did not err in discounting Coots’s subjective testimony. Generally an administrative law judge is required to consider a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective symptoms.⁴ In the absence of affirmative malingering, the Administrative Law Judge must give “clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting the claimant’s testimony.⁵ He did, including several specific instances where Coots’ conduct supported an inference of malingering. There was substantial evidence for the ALJ’s conclusion.

The Administrative Law Judge gave “specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record”⁶ for rejecting Dr. Thomashefsky’s assessment. Nor does Dr. Haddad’s one-paragraph conelusory letter presented to the Appeals Council after the ALJ decision require a finding of disability. Dr. Had-dad’s letter provided no new clinical or diagnostic information and contradicted other medical records including his own assessments of Coots.

Finally, the Administrative Law Judge did not improperly ignore the physical capacity evaluation. He specifically rejected it because the physical capacity evaluators repeatedly asserted that the evaluation’s results were questionable.

AFFIRMED

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MEMORANDUM

***

We affirm the district court’s denial of Coots’s application for disability benefits.

There is substantial evidence¹ to support the Administrative Law Judge’s determination that Coots retained the residual functional capacity² to perform substantial gainful activity as a parking lot cashier and a surveillance systems monitor. Because there was substantial evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge’s determination that Coots could “make an adjustment to other work,”³ the Administrative Law Judge did not err in denying Coots disability benefits.

[281]*281The Administrative Law Judge also did not err in discounting Coots’s subjective testimony. Generally an administrative law judge is required to consider a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective symptoms.⁴ In the absence of affirmative malingering, the Administrative Law Judge must give “clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting the claimant’s testimony.⁵ He did, including several specific instances where Coots’ conduct supported an inference of malingering. There was substantial evidence for the ALJ’s conclusion.

The Administrative Law Judge gave “specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record”⁶ for rejecting Dr. Thomashefsky’s assessment. Nor does Dr. Haddad’s one-paragraph conelusory letter presented to the Appeals Council after the ALJ decision require a finding of disability. Dr. Had-dad’s letter provided no new clinical or diagnostic information and contradicted other medical records including his own assessments of Coots.

Finally, the Administrative Law Judge did not improperly ignore the physical capacity evaluation. He specifically rejected it because the physical capacity evaluators repeatedly asserted that the evaluation’s results were questionable.

AFFIRMED

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

123 F. App'x 279, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coots-v-social-security-administration-ca9-2005.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack