Cooperider v. OK Cafe & Catering, Inc.

2009 Ohio 6715
Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided December 21, 2009·No. 9-09-28·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

MARION COUNTY

TRACEY A. COOPERIDER, CASE NO. 9-09-28 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. OK CAFE & CATERING, INC. OPINION DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 08CV0862

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: December 21, 2009

APPEARANCES:

Scott E. Williams for Appellant Jeffrey J. Ratliff for Appellee

PRESTON, P.J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, OK Café & Catering, Inc. (hereinafter “OK Café), appeals the Marion County Court of Common Pleas’ judgment, which denied its motion to set aside the default judgment awarded to plaintiff-appellee, Tracey A. Cooperider (hereinafter “Cooperider”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} On October 14, 2008, Cooperider filed a complaint in the Marion County Common Pleas Court against OK Café alleging that he had suffered damages from a fall that had occurred on OK Café’s premises. The complaint and summons were delivered to OK Café via certified mail. An employee of OK Café signed the certified mail receipt; however, OK Café failed to file an answer, and on December 4, 2008, Cooperider filed a motion for default judgment on the issue of liability, which was granted on December 8, 2008. After receiving notice of the date of the damages hearing, on March 6, 2009, OK Café filed its motion to set aside the default judgment. Attached to its motion were affidavits from Karen Gillespie (hereinafter “Karen”), an owner of OK Café, and Ryan Gillespie (hereinafter “Ryan”), an employee and the daughter of OK Café’s owner, Karen. In her affidavit, Ryan acknowledged that the signature on the receipt was her signature. (Ryan Aff. ¶2). And while she stated that, per Karen’s instructions, it was her routine to place mail she received in Karen’s mailbox or in her office,

Ryan could not remember receiving this particular letter nor did she know why Karen never received the letter. (Id. at ¶¶2-3). In addition, Karen testified in her affidavit that the business had a procedure in place for mail received by an employee: the employee was to place the mail in Karen’s personal mailbox or on her desk in her office. (Karen Aff. ¶3). However, in this particular instance, Karen said that Ryan never told her about the certified letter, and she has no knowledge of what happened to the letter after Ryan signed for it. (Id. at ¶2, 4). Furthermore, Karen stated that the letter and its contents had still not been found, even though she conducted a search for it. (Id. at ¶4). She could only assume that it was accidentally thrown away or misfiled. (Id.).

{¶3} After a review of the evidence, on March 31, 2009, the trial court overruled OK Café’s motion to set aside the default judgment finding that OK Café had failed to demonstrate excusable neglect. The trial court specifically stated:

Upon consideration of all of the above, this Court finds the fact situation in this case to most closely track the fact situation of LaKing Trucking vs. Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. Neither the affidavit of Ryan Gillespie nor Karen Gillespie, explain precisely what happened to the summons documents after the documents were signed for by Ryan Gillespie. Ryan Gillespie does not state that she lost the documents. The best that can surmised, according to the affidavits, is that the certified mail letter and documents were accidentally thrown away or misfiled.

As the Plaintiff points out in his Memorandum Contra, there is no allegation that any employees of the Defendant failed to

follow the established procedure for handling certified mail letters.

After reviewing all the materials supplied by the Defendant in support of its Motion to Vacate, all the Court is left with is an unexplained disappearance of the summons after its receipt by the Defendant. As the Third District Court of Appeals has held that the unexplained disappearance of a summons after its receipt by the defendant cannot per se be held excusable neglect, the Court finds that the Defendant in this action has also failed to demonstrate excusable neglect.

(Mar. 31, 2009 JE at 4). Therefore, the trial court ordered that the case proceed to a damages hearing. OK Café was present and represented at the damages hearing held on June 29, 2009, after which time, on July 7, 2009, the trial court awarded Cooperider one hundred and thirty thousand dollars ($130,000) in damages.

{¶4} OK Café now appeals and raises one assignment of error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT/APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CIV.R. 60(B)(1)

FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE EXCUSABLE NEGLECT WHEN APPELLANT’S MOTION AND ACCOMPANYING AFFIDAVITS CLEARLY SHOWED THAT IT WAS ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE CIVIL RULE AND APPLICABLE CASE LAW. (Trial Court’s Ruling on Motion of Defendant to Set Aside Default Judgment, p. 4).

{¶5} In its assignment of error, OK Café argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion to set aside the default judgment entered in favor of Cooperider when there was evidence of excusable neglect pursuant to

Civ.R. 60(B)(1) as to why OK Café had failed to file an answer to the complaint. Cooperider responds by arguing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because OK Café had failed to prove that it was entitled to set aside the default judgment entered against it.

{¶6} The Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that “[a] motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that court’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” Griffey v. Rajan (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 514 N.E.2d 1122. An abuse of discretion constitutes more than an error of law or judgment and implies that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140. When applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, a reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Id.

{¶7} Civ. R. 60(B) specifically sets forth the grounds for relief from judgment and provides as follows:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4)

the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment

should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.

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Cooperider v. OK Cafe & Catering, Inc., 2009 Ohio 6715 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).

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