317 Ga. 676 FINAL COPY
S23A0846. COOPER v. THE STATE.
MCMILLIAN, Justice.
In September 2021, a jury found Kiresa Cooper guilty of malice
murder, feticide, and other related crimes in connection with the
shooting death of Auriel Briana Callaway, who was pregnant at the
time she died.1 On appeal, Cooper asserts: (1) that the evidence was
1 Callaway and her unborn child were killed on July 22, 2019, and on
October 22, 2019, an Athens-Clarke County grand jury indicted Cooper for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 2), three counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Counts 3, 5, and 6), feticide (Count 4), and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Counts 7-10). Following a trial from September 13 through 17, 2021, a jury found Cooper guilty of malice murder, felony murder, one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, feticide, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; the jury found her not guilty of the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Cooper to two consecutive sentences of life in prison for malice murder and feticide, plus two consecutive sentences of five years in prison for her possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime convictions; the felony murder count was vacated by operation of law and the aggravated assault count for which Cooper was found guilty was merged for sentencing purposes. Cooper timely filed a motion for new trial on September 30, 2021, which was amended by new counsel on July 29 and again on October 3, 2022. Following a hearing on November 2, 2022, the trial court denied Cooper’s insufficient to support her malice murder conviction; and (2) that
her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object
to 20 portions of the lead detective’s testimony on various grounds,
such as inadmissible hearsay, confrontation violations, improper
opinion and speculation, and failure to properly authenticate
evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the
evidence at trial showed that on the afternoon of July 22, 2019, a
group of teenage girls were fighting at the apartment complex where
Callaway lived. Police arrived and broke up the fight, but after the
police left, people exited their apartments, forming a crowd that
spread out around the apartment complex. At least two distinct
groups of people formed; one of which included Cooper and some of
her family members, and the other which included Callaway and
members of another family named Calhoun. Certain people within
each group, including Cooper but not including Callaway, began
motion for new trial on March 1, 2023. Cooper filed a timely notice of appeal on March 23, 2023, and the case was docketed to the August 2023 term and thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 yelling and threatening each other. Finally, gunfire rang out, and
as people scattered, Callaway was struck once in the torso by a 9mm
bullet, causing her death and that of her unborn child.
Multiple eyewitnesses who were among the people at the
apartment complex on the night of the shooting testified at trial.
Felicia Calhoun testified that she arrived at the apartment complex
after the initial fighting but before the shooting because she received
a call informing her that one of her daughters was involved in the
fight. As Calhoun stood outside with her daughters and others,
including Callaway, a group of people came from one of the
apartment buildings “yelling and cussing.” That group included
Cooper, who shouted “I’ll shoot all of y’all,” “I will kill all you
b***hes,” and “I’ll shoot everybody,” as she walked toward them.
Calhoun testified that she then saw Cooper begin shooting and that
Cooper was “aiming at us.”
According to Brittny Mason, she came to the apartment
complex to visit her cousin that day, and when she arrived, the police
were still there and “[e]verybody was rowdy,” but the police left a
3 short time after she arrived. After the police left, “everybody went
outside,” including Cooper, who was holding a handgun and saying
she “didn’t come to fight,” she “came to shoot.” Mason and others
told Cooper to put the gun away, but, according to Mason, “[s]he told
us that she grown, don’t tell her what to f**king do.” Cooper also
said, “Y’all got guns, then we got guns, too.” Mason testified that
she made a phone call, and while she was on the phone, she heard
gunshots and then, again, saw Cooper holding the gun, though she
did not see her shooting. Mason also acknowledged at trial,
however, that she previously told investigators that she saw Cooper
fire her gun, though she did not see where Cooper was aiming.
According to Mason’s trial testimony, she heard multiple shots but
did not see who fired first or where the shots came from.
Ivy Dunn, who resided at the apartment complex, testified that
on the day of the shooting, she witnessed some earlier fights between
“the Cooper girls and some more people.” After the fights, Dunn saw
Cooper and members of her family come back outside, and Cooper
told the other crowd of people who were also gathered outside,
4 “When I shoot, I’m going to aim. Ain’t nobody fixing to f**k with my
family members,” before she “stood in the middle of the road and she
started shooting . . . towards up the crowd – where the other crowd
was.” Dunn testified that she “seen it plain as day” and that “the
first shot came from Ms. Cooper.” Dunn did not witness anyone
threaten Cooper before she began shooting.
Another witness, Jocelyn Wheeler, who was visiting Callaway,
was with Callaway when she was shot. Wheeler testified that once
the shooting began, “[i]t just went haywire,” and they began to flee
but Callaway fell, and “I felt like they was trying to kill all of us that
was over there,” so Wheeler pulled out her own gun and “fired back
at where I seen sparks was coming from,” where she saw a girl with
“red hair, red braids or something.”2 According to Wheeler, other
people started firing as well, and she believed that as many as 100
shots were fired.
Another resident, Shandra Goolsby, testified that before the
2 Photographs extracted from Cooper’s phone that were admitted into evidence showed Cooper with red-colored braids days before the shooting. 5 shooting, she saw Cooper standing outside with members of her
family, yelling and holding a gun. Goolsby heard gunfire which she
believed was pointed into the air to clear the crowd of people who
were gathering outside, and she then heard another person,
Jasmine Taylor, whom Goolsby did not believe was holding any gun,
shout, “Y’all b***hes shooting in the air. We’re aiming.” Goolsby
was not sure what, if anything, Cooper may have yelled. At that
point, gunfire began erupting. Although Goolsby saw Cooper
“walking back and forth with her gun,” she did not see Cooper
aiming the gun. Seconds after the shooting, however, Goolsby saw
Cooper coming around the side of Goolsby’s building, holding her
gun, and Cooper appeared to have “a smirk on her face.” Goolsby
came outside as the police were there collecting evidence, and when
she returned to her apartment, Cooper was there and told her that
she fired her gun between two buildings. Approximately 30 minutes
later, Callaway’s sister arrived at Goolsby’s apartment, at which
time, Cooper claimed that she did not fire her gun, despite being
challenged with her earlier statement that she had, but Cooper kept
6 saying, “I didn’t kill your sister. I didn’t kill your sister.”
Callaway was transported to the hospital, where she and her
unborn child were pronounced dead. Callaway’s autopsy showed
that her cause of death was a single gunshot through the chest. The
9mm bullet that killed her was retrieved from her body.
Based on multiple witness statements during law
enforcement’s investigation of the shooting, police obtained and
executed a search warrant for Cooper’s apartment, where they
recovered a KelTec gun box with documents bearing Cooper’s name
and the serial number of a KelTec 9mm handgun. Cooper’s mother,
Barbara Patman, also consented to a search of her vehicle, which
Cooper also used and where police recovered a backpack containing
ammunition of various different calibers, including 9mm, and a
magazine, though no evidence was introduced at trial tying any of
these items specifically to Cooper’s gun or to the bullet that killed
Callaway. Investigators also recovered over 80 spent shell casings
from the scene, including 9mm casings. Based on the information
they had gathered, investigators obtained an arrest warrant for
7 Cooper, and she was arrested two days later in Smyrna and
transported to the Athens-Clarke County Jail. After Cooper’s
arrest, Patman came to the jail with Cooper’s loaded 9mm KelTec
gun “to get her name cleared.”3 According to Patman, Cooper told
her that on the day of the shooting, she came out to protect her
cousins who were involved in the initial fighting, and Cooper
admitted to her that she fired shots but denied shooting Callaway.
A forensic firearms examiner testified that he performed
analysis on Cooper’s gun and the bullet recovered from Callaway’s
body, as well as some of the shell casings recovered from the crime
scene, and that it was his expert opinion that the bullet and some of
the shell casings were fired from Cooper’s gun. Another law
enforcement officer testified that she was able to extract information
from Cooper’s cell phone, which was given to the lead investigator,
Athens-Clarke County Police Detective Scott Black.
3 It was stipulated at trial that Cooper owned the 9mm KelTec handgun.
No evidence was introduced at trial tying the ammunition that was in the gun when it was turned over by Patman to the bullet recovered from Callaway’s body. 8 Detective Black testified as one of the State’s final witnesses
before it rested. Detective Black explained, as part of his initial
summary of the investigation, that after police had conducted
several interviews, “[t]he name Kiresa Cooper kept being brought
up more and more,” and “[s]everal witnesses actually identified Ms.
Cooper out of a lineup as seeing her. Several witnesses stated that
they saw her with a gun,” and “[t]here were witnesses who stated
that they saw her shoot the gun in the direction of [Callaway].”
Detective Black explained that some of these witnesses had already
testified at trial and that “there was just a plethora of evidence that
just kind of kept pointing [to] Kiresa Cooper which gave us probable
cause to believe that she was in fact the person responsible for this.”
Describing the findings of the investigation in more detail,
Detective Black recounted that the events had started with the
earlier fighting between groups of girls at the apartment complex,
whom he referred to as the “Calhoun group,” who had gathered in
the parking area toward “the top of the complex” near building 160,
and “the Cooper group.” Detective Black explained that based on
9 law enforcement’s investigation, the initial shot came from the area
where the Calhoun group was gathered and was a shot in the air,
“likely a crowd-clearing shot or a warning shot,” but that it
prompted Cooper to start yelling, “So you b***hes got guns. We got
guns, too. When I shoot, I aim.” A “short volley of fire” then rang
out, and it was during that volley of shots that Callaway was struck
and killed. Detective Black further explained that based on the shell
casings recovered from the scene, it appeared that multiple shots
were fired from the area where the Calhoun group was gathered but
that the lack of property damage to any building, window, or vehicle,
made it appear that those shots had been fired in the air. Detective
Black also noted that there were not any witnesses who said that
someone was shooting at Cooper or that Callaway ever possessed a
gun.
A portion of the initial fighting was recorded by Mason and
provided to law enforcement. That recording was played for the jury
during Detective Black’s direct examination. According to Detective
Black, the video showed Cooper with “very long kind of reddish or
10 burgundy braids that kind of made her a little easier to find in the
crowd,” and she appeared to be “apparently fine with the fight . . .
allow[ing the girls] to fight and . . . trying to just make sure no one
else jumped in.” Detective Black also testified about photographs
extracted from Cooper’s phone, showing that she had long, red-
colored braids in the days before the shooting; these photographs
were also shown to the jury. By the time Cooper was arrested two
days after the shooting, she had altered her appearance and no
longer had long red braids. Detective Black also testified regarding
text messages that were recovered from Cooper’s phone.
Screenshots of the text messages were introduced into evidence.
Detective Black noted that those messages indicated that Cooper
was afraid of being arrested after the shooting and that she denied
being the one who shot Callaway, but when asked, Detective Black
testified that he saw nothing in any of her texts after the shooting
“expressing any kind of sadness” about it.
Cooper called two witnesses in her defense, Cassandra Smith
and Saquia Davenport, and Cooper testified in her own defense.
11 Smith testified that she was at the apartment complex on the night
of the shooting and standing near Callaway with the group of people
that was gathered near building 160. Smith recalled that she first
heard two shots come from the area near building 160, followed by
“a shot or two [ ] from the other direction,” which was the time when
Callaway was shot, “and then a couple of seconds later, a lot of shots
came . . . [from] all directions.” Davenport, who is Cooper’s cousin,
testified that her daughters were also involved in the earlier fighting
and that she and Cooper went to break up the fight. When police
also arrived to break up the fight, Cooper asked them to stay because
there were “a lot of people at the top [of the hill near building 160]
yelling down at us,” but the police left. According to Davenport, after
the police left, the first shots came from the top of the hill near
building 160, and she then saw Cooper firing.
Cooper testified that after learning of the initial fighting, she
arrived to separate Davenport’s children from the “Calhoun kids.”
Cooper said that after police arrived and broke up the fight, she “was
begging them to stay in the neighborhood because I knew if they
12 leave, it was going to get worser [sic],” but the police left anyway.
After the police left, the Calhoun sisters came back out holding bats
and yelling at Davenport’s daughter, saying “Y’all b***hes need to
come on. We’ll show y’all how to fight,” and Davenport’s daughters
yelled back, “Oh, y’all b***hes got guns. We got guns, too, and if
y’all aim, we know how to aim, too.” Cooper admitted that she had
her gun but denied yelling at anyone. Cooper testified that the
initial two shots came from near building 160, but she could not tell
what direction they were going, and that several shots then started
“going off at the same time.” Cooper said she was scared of being
shot, and she admitted firing her gun two or three times, but said
that she fired toward the river and never aimed at anyone. She
testified that she knew she did not kill anyone due to the direction
in which she fired her gun. She maintained that she was trying to
protect herself and her family.
1. Cooper contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support her malice murder conviction. We disagree.
When this Court evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence, “the
13 relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781,
61 LE2d 560) (1979) (emphasis omitted). In this case, multiple
eyewitnesses testified that Cooper brandished her gun while yelling
belligerent threats toward the group of people where Callaway was
located. Both Calhoun and Dunn testified that they observed
Cooper aiming toward that group as she shot. Dunn further testified
that Cooper fired the first shots. Moreover, Goolsby testified that
immediately after the shooting, she saw Cooper holding her gun and
smirking. And this was all in addition to Cooper’s own admission
that she fired her gun during the incident and the ballistics evidence
confirming that the bullet that killed Callaway, as well as shell
casings recovered from the crime scene, were fired from Cooper’s
This evidence was more than constitutionally sufficient for a
rational jury to find Cooper guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
14 malice murder. And this remains true despite Cooper’s arguments
that the evidence of who fired first and who said what was
inconsistent; that she only fired out of fear and not toward any
people; and that the firearm examiner testified that he was not
permitted to use the terminology “reasonable scientific certainty,” in
opining that the shell casings and fatal bullet were fired from
Cooper’s gun, because it is well established that it is for the jury who
heard that evidence to determine the credibility of the witnesses and
to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, as well as
whether to accept or reject a defendant’s version of events. See
Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 147, 151 (1) (886 SE2d 818) (2023); see
also McIntyre v. State, 312 Ga. 531, 531 (1) (863 SE2d 166) (2021)
(“This Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in
testimony; instead, evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to
the verdict, with deference to the jury’s assessment of the weight
and credibility of the evidence.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails.
2. Cooper also contends that her trial counsel rendered
15 ineffective assistance by failing to object to multiple portions of
Detective Black’s testimony. We are not persuaded.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Cooper must show both that her counsel’s performance was deficient
and that such deficiency prejudiced her defense. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)
(1984). To satisfy the deficiency prong, Cooper must demonstrate
that her counsel “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable
way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing
professional norms.” Bacon v. State, 316 Ga. 234, 239 (3) (887 SE2d
263) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). In doing so, Cooper
must overcome “[a] strong presumption . . . that trial counsel’s
performance was reasonable and that counsel’s decisions and
choices at trial fell within the broad range of professional conduct as
assessed from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial and under
the specific circumstances of the case.” Id. (citation and punctuation
omitted). To establish prejudice, Cooper “must prove that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for [her] trial counsel’s deficiency,
16 the result of the trial would have been different.” Bates v. State, 313
Ga. 57, 62 (2) (867 SE2d 140) (2022). And if Cooper fails to make a
sufficient showing on either the deficiency or the prejudice prong,
we need not address the other prong. See Washington v. State, 313
Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022).
In all, Cooper lists the following 20 portions of Detective
Black’s testimony, which she asserts—without further argument or
citation to any case law—were objectionable because they
constituted inadmissible hearsay that served to bolster his
investigation and that violated her confrontation rights;4 because
they constituted improper speculation or opinion, including opinion
on the ultimate legal issue in the case; or because they were not
based on Detective Black’s personal knowledge:
1) Detective Black’s preface of his description of the police
investigation that “[a] lot of times it’s not uncommon for folks
involved in situations like this to not want to be involved or
4 Cooper does not indicate in her brief whether she is referring to her
right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, the comparable right under the Georgia Constitution, or both. 17 want to be witnesses or go to court. In certain areas of the
county that is kind of even more difficult.”
2) Detective Black’s response in the negative when asked by the
prosecutor if it was “surprising” to him that some witnesses did
not want to be involved and that so many shell casings were
discovered.
3) Detective Black’s testimony that during witness interviews,
Cooper’s name came up “more and more”; that “[s]everal
witnesses stated that they saw [Cooper] with a gun”; that
witnesses “stated that they saw her shoot the gun in the
direction of [Callaway]”; and that “[t]here was just a plethora
of evidence . . . pointing [to Cooper].”
4) Detective Black’s testimony that Cooper was “in the wind . . . .
She seemed to have kind of disappeared or fled the area most
likely.”
5) Detective Black’s description, in response to a question from
the prosecutor about evidence that was “significant,” of the gun
box and backpack with ammunition that were found during the
18 searches for which he was not present.
6) Detective Black’s testimony that unnamed witnesses had said
they saw Cooper in possession of a gun “while shooting.”
7) Detective Black’s response, when asked by the prosecutor, that
he had taken the legal defenses of justification and self-defense
into consideration during the investigation.
8) Detective Black’s description of the groups involved as the
“Calhoun group” and the “Cooper group.”
9) Detective Black’s testimony that he did not think Callaway was
a part of either group.
10) Detective Black repeating Goolsby’s testimony that the initial
gunfire sounded like a warning shot, which was not
uncommon.
11) Detective Black’s testimony that none of the investigation
indicated that anybody was firing at Cooper or that Callaway
ever possessed a gun.
12) Detective Black’s testimony about the alleged “crowd-clearing
shot” that “most people were describing as likely that they just
19 know it’s in the air, and it’s kind of trying to get rid of the
crowd.”
13) Detective Black’s testimony that “witnesses and the general
investigation shows [Cooper] then starts yelling . . . ‘you
b***hes got guns. We got guns, too . . . When I shoot, I aim,’
which seems to be a reference to ‘Well, I’m not shooting
warning shots.’”
14) Detective Black being used by the State to lay the foundation
to introduce into evidence the video of the fighting, taken and
provided by Mason, that supposedly sparked the ensuing
events, despite his lack of personal knowledge to authenticate
that evidence.
15) Detective Black’s testimony while discussing the video and
selected screenshots for the jury that they depicted Cooper,
whom he could identify based on her hair color and witnesses’
description of the shooter as having red braids.
16) Detective Black’s testimony that nowhere in Cooper’s text
messages did she express any sadness for Callaway.
20 17) Detective Black’s testimony on cross-examination that the
video appeared to show Cooper encouraging the other girls to
fight.
18) Detective Black being used by the State to lay the foundation
to introduce into evidence the magazine and ammunition taken
from Cooper’s gun, despite his lack of personal knowledge to
authenticate that evidence.
19) Detective Black’s testimony that shooting into a crowd that
included children was neither reasonable nor justified.
20) Detective Black’s testimony that Callaway was “completely
innocent [and] one of the few true victims” he had encountered
in his career and that “[y]ou can’t just shoot into a crowd . . .
and expect to be able to do that with impunity.”
As an initial matter, many of these portions of Detective
Black’s testimony simply did not violate Georgia’s rules of evidence.
As for alleged deficiency numbers 1 and 16 (failure to object to
testimony that some people were resistant to talking to police about
crimes they had witnessed and that none of Cooper’s texts expressed
21 sadness for Callaway), this was not impermissible opinion
testimony, as Cooper argues, but rather, was no more than
straightforward factual testimony regarding matters within
Detective Black’s personal knowledge, which is admissible. See
OCGA § 24-6-602; see also Draughn v. State, 311 Ga. 378, 385 (4)
(858 SE2d 8) (2021).
As for alleged deficiency numbers 2, 5, and 17 (failure to object
to Detective Black’s responses that it did not surprise him that so
many shell casings were recovered or that some people were
resistant to talking to the police; his responses concerning what
evidence he found significant; and the cross-examination exchange
in which he testified that the fight video appeared to show Cooper
encouraging the girls to fight), Detective Black’s testimony was
permissible as non-expert opinion testimony that was “[r]ationally
based on the perception of the witness” and “[n]ot based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Code
Section 24-7-702 [expert testimony and qualifications].” OCGA § 24-
7-701 (a) (1), (3); see also Harris v. State, 309 Ga. 599, 604-05 (2) (a)
22 (847 SE2d 563) (2020).
And as for alleged deficiency number 14 (failure to object to
Detective Black’s authentication of the fight video recorded by
Mason), the rules of evidence do not provide that a video recording
can be authenticated solely by the person who recorded it or who
was an eyewitness to the events depicted therein. It appears that
Detective Black properly authenticated the video by testifying that
he responded to the apartment complex as part of his investigation,
where he personally observed the location and spoke with multiple
eyewitnesses of the day’s events; that he recognized the video as the
recording supplied by Mason—who was also available and testified
at trial—during his investigation; that he had personally reviewed
the video; that it showed part of the fighting that occurred at the
apartment complex, as he recognized some of the persons depicted
in the video, including Cooper, as well as the location it depicted;
and that he had not altered the video.5 See OCGA § 24-9-901 (a)-(b)
5 In addition, because Mason was available to authenticate the video, it
was a reasonable strategy to refrain from objecting on grounds that could have
23 (1), (4) (“The requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility shall be satisfied by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims[, which includes, for example,] [t]estimony of a
witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be; [or]
[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with
circumstances”); see also United States v. Broomfield, 591 F. App’x
847, 851-52 (III) (A) (11th Cir. 2014) (video recording that
government did not make of defendant in possession of firearm was
amply authenticated where government’s evidence “identified the
individual in the video as [defendant], established where and
approximately when the video was recorded, and then identified the
specific rifle and ammunition depicted in the video”). Objections to
been easily cured. See Washington, 313 Ga. at 774 (3) (b) (holding that defendant failed to show that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to video recording on the ground that it was not properly authenticated by lead detective and district attorney investigator because “refraining from objecting to foundational matters that can be readily cured,” including by another witness who is able to do so, “is not an unreasonable strategy”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 24 these portions of Detective Black’s testimony (numbers 1, 2, 5, 14,
16, and 17), therefore, would have been meritless, and “the failure
to make a meritless objection is not deficient performance.” Smith
v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 367 (5) (b) (882 SE2d 289) (2022).
As to several of Cooper’s other claims of ineffectiveness for
failure to object, even if those objections would not have been
meritless, Cooper has not shown that counsel’s failures to object to
those portions were objectively unreasonable. These include
counsel’s failure to object to Detective Black’s testimony concerning
alleged deficiency numbers 3, 6, 8, 10-13, and 15 (referring to other
witnesses’ statements about the shooting) because that testimony
was cumulative of other properly admitted trial court testimony and
evidence. Cooper has not offered any evidence to overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the broad
range of professional conduct and therefore has not carried her
burden of showing that counsel’s failure to object to that cumulative
evidence was objectively unreasonable, especially since such
objections may draw more attention to inculpatory testimony. See
25 Sawyer v. State, 308 Ga. 375, 384 (2) (b) (839 SE2d 582) (2020) (trial
counsel not deficient in failing to object to cumulative testimony);
Koonce v. State, 305 Ga. 671, 676 (2) (d) (827 SE2d 633) (2019) (“Trial
counsel was not deficient in failing to object to the cumulative
testimony of [the lead detective] on these matters [regarding the
results of her investigation].”); see also Snipes v. State, 309 Ga. 785,
794 (3) (b) (iv) (848 SE2d 417) (2020) (allegedly objectionable
testimony was “largely cumulative of other admissible testimony
. . . and therefore [defendant] has failed to show that trial counsel
was deficient in failing to object to this testimony or that a
reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would
have been different if the objection had been made”).
As for alleged deficiency numbers 9 and 20 (failure to object to
Detective Black’s testimony that Callaway was an innocent
bystander who was not a part of either group), trial counsel testified
at the motion-for-new-trial hearing, “I don’t think that is something
that would have been looked favorably upon by the jury if I had
objected to the victim being characterized as innocent.” This
26 rationale was not objectively unreasonable, and “trial counsel’s
strategic or tactical decisions,” including whether to object to
testimony, “generally will not form the basis of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim unless they are so patently unreasonable
that no competent attorney would have made [them] under the
circumstances at the time.” Davis v. State, 311 Ga. 225, 231 (3) (857
SE2d 207) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accordingly,
Cooper has not carried her burden of demonstrating that her trial
counsel acted deficiently in not objecting to Detective Black’s
testimony as to numbers 1-3, 5, 6, 8-17, or 20.
That leaves Cooper’s claims that her trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to Detective Black’s
testimony that Cooper identifies in numbers 4 (that Cooper had
probably fled); 7 (that he had considered justification defenses); 18
(authentication of a magazine and ammunition that came from
Cooper’s gun); and 19 (that shooting into a crowd with children was
not reasonable or justified). Pretermitting whether this testimony
was objectionable and whether any failure to object to this testimony
27 was deficient, Cooper has not established that she was prejudiced by
those deficiencies—even considering their cumulative effect, see
Ingram v. State, 316 Ga. 196, 208 (2) (887 SE2d 269) (2023). The
jury was well aware that Detective Black was not an eyewitness to
the crimes upon which he was commenting, such that Cooper’s
remaining claims of ineffectiveness for failing to object to these
portions of his testimony go to more tangential issues versus the
substantial evidence of her guilt that the jury had already heard.
That evidence included multiple eyewitnesses to the crimes who
testified to Cooper’s belligerence and intentionality in firing into the
crowd of people, as well as the ballistics evidence that tied Cooper’s
gun directly to the bullet that killed Callaway and to shell casings
recovered from the crime scene, unlike the ammunition
authenticated by Detective Black, which was not directly linked to
the shooting. We cannot say Cooper has carried her burden of
establishing a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s failure to
object to the remaining portions of Detective Black’s testimony, the
result of her trial would have been different. See id. (cumulative
28 effect of multiple assumed deficiencies on the part of trial counsel
did not actually prejudice defendant where there was substantial
evidence of his guilt and he failed to show that absent counsel’s
alleged deficiencies, there was a reasonable probability of a different
outcome); Bates, 313 Ga. at 68-69 (2) (d) (assuming without deciding
that counsel was deficient in failing to object to a witness’s testimony
on the ultimate issue of the case, defendant failed to carry his
burden to show prejudice given the overwhelming evidence of his
guilt). Accordingly, this enumeration of error also fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided November 7, 2023.
Murder. Clarke Superior Court. Before Judge Haggard.
John W. Donnelly, for appellant.
Deborah Gonzalez, District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr,
Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula
K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric C. Peters,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.