Cooper v. Richardson

333 F. Supp. 249, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11006
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. West Virginia
DecidedOctober 30, 1971
DocketCiv. A. No. 1282
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 333 F. Supp. 249 (Cooper v. Richardson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cooper v. Richardson, 333 F. Supp. 249, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11006 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).

Opinion

CHRISTIE, District Judge:

This is an action under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. A decision by a hearing examiner on February 2, 1971, became the final decision of the Secretary when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on April 20, 1971. This final decision holds that plaintiff is not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance benefits iinder the provisions of the Act.1

Plaintiff meets the special insured status requirements of the Act through September 30, 1973, however, for favorable consideration to be given on this application which was filed March 11, 1970, he must establish that disability began prior to April 20, 1971, the date the Secretary’s decision became final. 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(b) and § 416 (i) (2) (G). The burden is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate with credible evidence that he was disabled within the meaning of the Act, though such proof need not be carried beyond a reasonable doubt. Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964).

The standard of judicial review in these actions is stated in Section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g), as follows:

“The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive * *

In short, the Courts are not to try the case de novo, and if the findings of the Secretary are supported by substantial [251]*251evidence, the Courts are bound to accept them. Hicks v. Gardner, 393 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1968); Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962). Nevertheless, this provision does not suggest a surrender of “traditional functions,” rather it requires a review of the record as a whole, not for the purpose of making an independent finding, but to determine whether or not the administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence and to see that the Administrative Agency does not act aribitrarily or capriciously in denying just claims or allowing unworthy ones. Thomas v. Celebrezze, supra; Underwood v. Ribicoff, supra; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1962). In determining the meaning of “substantial evidence,” the Courts have held it to be more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Thomas v. Celebrezze, supra. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and it must be based on the record as a whole. Celebrezze v. Bolas, 316 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1963). The Fourth Circuit has pointed out that if there is only a slight preponderance of the evidence on one side or the other, the Secretary’s findings must be affirmed. Underwood v. Ribicoff, supra. Therefore, the immediate task of this Court on this review is to determine whether the defendant’s denial of plaintiff’s claim is supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff was born on October 30,1932, and completed the seventh grade and a portion of the eighth grade in school. His work history indicates that he did some farming before entering the Army in August 1949. He served in the Army until May 13, 1952, after which he worked in the following areas of employment : Coal mining for a period of three months; running a machine for a glass company, decorating glasses; trained and worked in automobile body and repair work (painting and refinishing); worked in the housekeeping department of the Greenbrier Hotel; worked for vault companies and as a nightwatchman for a lumber company. He alleges that he became disabled in December 1969, due to a ruptured disc, hearing loss, diabetes and nervousness.

Following is a brief summary of pertinent medical evidence in the record:

Dr. George Henry Guy, general practitioner, Veterans Hospital, Berkley, West Virginia, submitted two reports for the Welfare Department. On September 19, 1969, he diagnosed:

“I Low back syndrome Sciatica
R/O herniated disc
II Hemorrhoids
III Old — healed duodenal ulcer”

Prognosis was “Guarded.” The doctor commented that plaintiff was “unable to do any type of work at present because any activity precipitates pain.” A radio-graphic report, dated 7-2-69, accompanying the above report, revealed:

“Lumbo-sacral spine, pelvis, and hip joints: Except for minimal degenerative osteoarthritic changes in the body of L-4, characterized by minute spurring of the anterior and lateral superior margins, the lumbar vertebral segments are normal in size, shape, and contour. The intervertebral spaces are normal. The lumbosacral angle is normal. There is no spondylolisthesis. The apophysial joints are normal. The articular facets between L-5 and S-l are asymmetrical. The right being in the saggital plane and the left being in the coronal plane. Both sacroiliac joints, the bony pelvis, and both hip joints are normal.”

The second report for the Welfare Department by Dr. Guy, dated 1-16-70, revealed essentially the same findings, and the doctor’s comment was that plaintiff was “unable to do any type of activity without pain.”

Plaintiff was hospitalized from December 30, 1968, to January’4, 1969, at the Greenbrier Valley Hospital. Dr. A. M. Benshoff, Jr., internist, after examination, submitted a final diagnosis of •

“1. Influenza with labyrinthitis and sinusitis, clearing, asymptomatic
[252]*2522. Chronic ruptured intervertebral disc syndrome, left lumbar, one year
3. Chronic anxiety state and psychoneurosis manifest by nervousness and insomnia.”

The doctor stated that “if this man’s symptoms should prevent him from doing his usual work then we would seriously consider a neurosurgical referral to a good orthopedic or neurosurgeon who can get consistently good results with disc surgery if not on the first try at least on the second try. There is no reason for a patient with sciatica like this to be permanently disabled from working. It can always be repaired surgically.” Dr. Benshoff continued: “We would like to note on this case summary that at the time we were telling this man about ruptured intervertebral discs, the Southern California and Ohio State Rose Bowl Game was on the air and the quarterback for Ohio had had a ruptured inter-vertebral disc operated and repaired a year prior to the game and he was really taking a great beating from Southern California players in spite of this previous back trouble. This is as it should be. There should be no disability once the ruptured disc is fixed. This patient knows this.”

On February 16 and 17, 1970, Dr. E. L. Crumpacker, internist, Greenbrier Clinic, White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, conducted diagnostic studies on plaintiff. X-ray studies of the lumbosacral spine revealed:

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Bluebook (online)
333 F. Supp. 249, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11006, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cooper-v-richardson-wvsd-1971.